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Full-Text Articles in Law
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …
Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …