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Full-Text Articles in Law

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …


Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …


Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee Feb 2015

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …


Foreword, Robert J. Rhee Oct 2013

Foreword, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

No abstract provided.


The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act: Time To End The Corporate Welfare, Robert J. Rhee Oct 2013

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act: Time To End The Corporate Welfare, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, inflicted enormous losses on the insurance industry and businesses. In the wake of the disruptions occurring in the insurance market at the time, the government enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 to create a “temporary” federal backstop against catastrophic losses. This program subsidized private risk with public funds through a cost-sharing program for which the government does not receive any compensation. The compelling need for the program was unclear even in the smoldering aftermath of 9/11. Yet in response to effective lobbying by the insurance industry and business interests, Congress has …


The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee May 2013

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …


Limited Liability Entities: State By State Guide To Llcs, Llps And Lps, Bradley Borden, Robert Rhee May 2012

Limited Liability Entities: State By State Guide To Llcs, Llps And Lps, Bradley Borden, Robert Rhee

Robert Rhee

To make your research more efficient Wolters Kluwer Law & Business is combining the former State Limited Liability Company and Partnership Laws and State Limited Partnership Laws title into one new resource entitled Limited Liability Entities: State by State Guide to LLCs, LLPs and LPs. Our new authors are Bradley Borden and Robert Rhee (see About the Authors). Volume 1, the first installment of Limited Liability Entities: State by State Guide to LLCs, LLPs and LPs, provides a comprehensive overview of limited liability entities. It begins with a detailed review of the history and evolution of limited liability entities. It …


Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2010

Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This chapter discusses the legal issues of rescue and corporate social responsibility during times of public crisis. It analyzes a corporate board’s fiduciary duty related to the management of a public crisis and the provision of aid to government and the public. The thesis is that American corporate law adequately provides corporate boards authority to assume broad principles of corporate social responsibility, and that during a public crisis this authority is specially recognized in the enabling statutes of corporate law and should be broadened even further to pursue the public good in exigent circumstances.


Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2010

Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This chapter discusses the legal issues of rescue and corporate social responsibility during times of public crisis. It analyzes a corporate board’s fiduciary duty related to the management of a public crisis and the provision of aid to government and the public. The thesis is that American corporate law adequately provides corporate boards authority to assume broad principles of corporate social responsibility, and that during a public crisis this authority is specially recognized in the enabling statutes of corporate law and should be broadened even further to pursue the public good in exigent circumstances.


Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2010

Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This chapter discusses the legal issues of rescue and corporate social responsibility during times of public crisis. It analyzes a corporate board’s fiduciary duty related to the management of a public crisis and the provision of aid to government and the public. The thesis is that American corporate law adequately provides corporate boards authority to assume broad principles of corporate social responsibility, and that during a public crisis this authority is specially recognized in the enabling statutes of corporate law and should be broadened even further to pursue the public good in exigent circumstances.


Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2010

Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This chapter discusses the legal issues of rescue and corporate social responsibility during times of public crisis. It analyzes a corporate board’s fiduciary duty related to the management of a public crisis and the provision of aid to government and the public. The thesis is that American corporate law adequately provides corporate boards authority to assume broad principles of corporate social responsibility, and that during a public crisis this authority is specially recognized in the enabling statutes of corporate law and should be broadened even further to pursue the public good in exigent circumstances.


Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert Rhee Dec 2009

Crisis, Rescue And Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, Robert Rhee

Robert Rhee

This chapter discusses the legal issues of rescue and corporate social responsibility during times of public crisis. It analyzes a corporate board’s fiduciary duty related to the management of a public crisis and the provision of aid to government and the public. The thesis is that American corporate law adequately provides corporate boards authority to assume broad principles of corporate social responsibility, and that during a public crisis this authority is specially recognized in the enabling statutes of corporate law and should be broadened even further to pursue the public good in exigent circumstances.


The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure And The Business Education Of Lawyers, Robert Rhee Dec 2009

The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure And The Business Education Of Lawyers, Robert Rhee

Robert Rhee

This essay suggests that a deficiency in legal education is a contributing cause of the regulatory failure. The most scandalous malfeasance of this new era, the Madoff Ponzi scheme, evinces the failure of improperly trained lawyers and regulators. It also calls into question whether the prevailing regulatory philosophy of disclosure of disclosure is sufficient in a complex market. This essay answers an important question underlying these considerations: What can legal education do to better train business lawyers and regulators for a market that is becoming more complex? One answer, it suggests, is a simple one: law schools should teach a …


Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee Dec 2009

Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …


The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure And The Business Education Of Lawyers, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2009

The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure And The Business Education Of Lawyers, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This essay suggests that a deficiency in legal education is a contributing cause of the regulatory failure. The most scandalous malfeasance of this new era, the Madoff Ponzi scheme, evinces the failure of improperly trained lawyers and regulators. It also calls into question whether the prevailing regulatory philosophy of disclosure of disclosure is sufficient in a complex market. This essay answers an important question underlying these considerations: What can legal education do to better train business lawyers and regulators for a market that is becoming more complex? One answer, it suggests, is a simple one: law schools should teach a …


Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2009

Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This conference paper suggests that the problem of corporate ethics cannot be reduced to the autonomous person. Although the greatest influence on action and choice is one's moral constitution, it does not follow that the agent's behavior is the same within or without the firm. Ethics is a function of corporate form. The theory of agency cannot dismiss the firm as a fiction or metaphorical shorthand since that which does not exist should not be able to cause ethical breakdowns in corporate action. Thus, the theory of the firm, which emphasizes profit and wealth maximization, should incorporate a richer, more …


Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee Jul 2009

Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …