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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Auction Markets For Evaluations, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck Aug 2014

Auction Markets For Evaluations, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck

Bart J Wilson

No abstract provided.


Market Power And Price Movements Over The Business Cycle, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds Aug 2014

Market Power And Price Movements Over The Business Cycle, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds

Bart J Wilson

This paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly-pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton's time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly-pricing model.


Verifiable Offers And The Relationship Between Auctions And Multilateral Negotiations, Bart Wilson, Charles Thomas Aug 2014

Verifiable Offers And The Relationship Between Auctions And Multilateral Negotiations, Bart Wilson, Charles Thomas

Bart J Wilson

We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second-lowest cost. We also compare the two institutions to previously studied first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non-verifiable offers. Second-price auctions yield the highest prices, followed in order by verifiable negotiations, non-verifiable negotiations and first-price auctions.


Teaching E-Commerce Through The Use Of Real-Time Interactive Laboratory Experiments, Bart Wilson, Roumen Vragov Aug 2014

Teaching E-Commerce Through The Use Of Real-Time Interactive Laboratory Experiments, Bart Wilson, Roumen Vragov

Bart J Wilson

No abstract provided.