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Articles 1 - 30 of 50
Full-Text Articles in Law
Demand-Side Bidding Will Reduce The Level And Volatility Of Electricity Price, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Demand-Side Bidding Will Reduce The Level And Volatility Of Electricity Price, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions As A Means Of Organizing Behavior In Posted-Offer Market Experiments, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions As A Means Of Organizing Behavior In Posted-Offer Market Experiments, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments With Public And Private Information In Markets With Asymmetric Information, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Fixed Revenue Auctions: Theory And Behavior, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Fixed Revenue Auctions: Theory And Behavior, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Bart J Wilson
In this paper, we study auctions in which the revenue is fixed but the quantity is determined by the auction mechanism. Specifically, we investigate the theory and behavior of English quantity clock, Dutch quantity clock, last-quantity sealed bid, and penultimate-quantity sealed bid auctions. For theoretically equivalent fixed quantity and fixed revenue auctions, we find that fixed revenue auctions are robust to all the previously observed empirical regularities in fixed quantity auctions.
Exclusionary Bundling And The Effects Of A Competitive Fringe, Bart Wilson, Anil Caliskan, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Exclusionary Bundling And The Effects Of A Competitive Fringe, Bart Wilson, Anil Caliskan, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Language Games Of Reciprocity, Bart Wilson
The Effectiveness Of Low Price Matching In Mitigating The Competitive Pressure In Low Friction Electronic Markets, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
The Effectiveness Of Low Price Matching In Mitigating The Competitive Pressure In Low Friction Electronic Markets, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power As A Catalyst For Countercyclical Markups, Bart Wilson
What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power As A Catalyst For Countercyclical Markups, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Cost Structures And Nash Play In Repeated Cournot Games, Bart Wilson, David Davis, Robert Reilly
Cost Structures And Nash Play In Repeated Cournot Games, Bart Wilson, David Davis, Robert Reilly
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Strategic Buyers, Horizontal Mergers And Synergies: An Experimental Investigation, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Strategic Buyers, Horizontal Mergers And Synergies: An Experimental Investigation, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Fixed Revenue Auctions, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Collusion In Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Collusion In Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Menu Costs And Nominal Price Friction: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson
Menu Costs And Nominal Price Friction: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Economics Works! Experiments In High School Classrooms, Bart Wilson, Stephen Jackstadt, Paul Johnson
Economics Works! Experiments In High School Classrooms, Bart Wilson, Stephen Jackstadt, Paul Johnson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Raising Revenues For Charity: Auctions Versus Lotteries, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis, L. Razzolini, R. Reily
Raising Revenues For Charity: Auctions Versus Lotteries, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis, L. Razzolini, R. Reily
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Experimental Economics And Antitrust: What Can We Learn From Laboratory Markets?, Bart Wilson
Experimental Economics And Antitrust: What Can We Learn From Laboratory Markets?, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Discriminatory Price Auctions In Electricity Markets: Low Volatility At The Expense Of High Price Levels, Vernon Smith, Stephen Rassenti, Bart Wilson
Discriminatory Price Auctions In Electricity Markets: Low Volatility At The Expense Of High Price Levels, Vernon Smith, Stephen Rassenti, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Second Chance Offers Vs. Sequential Auctions: Theory And Behavior, Bart Wilson, Timothy Salmon
Second Chance Offers Vs. Sequential Auctions: Theory And Behavior, Bart Wilson, Timothy Salmon
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Experimental Methods And Antitrust Policy, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Experimental Methods And Antitrust Policy, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Auction Markets For Evaluations, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Auction Markets For Evaluations, Bart Wilson, Cary Deck
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
A Comparative Approach To Coordination: How Apes, Monkeys And Humans Respond To An Assurance Game With Equivalent Procedures, Bart Wilson, Sarah Brosnan
A Comparative Approach To Coordination: How Apes, Monkeys And Humans Respond To An Assurance Game With Equivalent Procedures, Bart Wilson, Sarah Brosnan
Bart J Wilson
Our research directly compares coordinated decision making across the entire primate lineage, including a new-world monkey, an old-world monkey, an ape, and humans, to help understand how decision making is different between these species. We find that the ability to coordinate on a mutually beneficial decision does vary across species, that there is variability within each taxonomic group, and that this variation overlaps between groups. Each species represents a continuum, with pairs of each species ranging from random outcomes to those which coordinate on the payoff dominant outcome. What differs is the frequency of payoff dominant outcomes within each species.
Market Power And Price Movements Over The Business Cycle, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds
Market Power And Price Movements Over The Business Cycle, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds
Bart J Wilson
This paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly-pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton's time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly-pricing model.
Bidding Strategies In Single-Unit Auctions, Bart Wilson
Bidding Strategies In Single-Unit Auctions, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Discriminatory Price Auctions In Electricity Markets: Low Volatility At The Expense Of High Price Levels, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Discriminatory Price Auctions In Electricity Markets: Low Volatility At The Expense Of High Price Levels, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Imcremental Commitment And Reciprocity In A Real Time Public Goods Game, Bart Wilson, Robert Kurzban, Keving Mccabe, Vernon Smith
Imcremental Commitment And Reciprocity In A Real Time Public Goods Game, Bart Wilson, Robert Kurzban, Keving Mccabe, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Exchange, Theft And The Social Formation Of Property, Bart Wilson, Erik Kimbrough, Vernon Smith
Exchange, Theft And The Social Formation Of Property, Bart Wilson, Erik Kimbrough, Vernon Smith
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, And Asymmetric Outcomes, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, And Asymmetric Outcomes, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
An Experiment On Protecting Intellectual Property, Bart Wilson
An Experiment On Protecting Intellectual Property, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether the protection of intellectual property (IP) incentivizes people to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, foregoing the production of other rivalrous goods. In the contrasting treatment with no IP protection, participants are free to resell and remake non-rivalrous knowledge goods originally created by others. We find that creators reap substantial profits when IP is protected and that rampant pirating is not uncommon when there is no IP protection. But most importantly, we find that IP protection in and of itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for generating wealth from the discovery of knowledge goods.
How Applicable Is The Dominant Firm Model Of Price Leadership, Bart Wilson
How Applicable Is The Dominant Firm Model Of Price Leadership, Bart Wilson
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.
Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Bart Wilson, Karl Schurter
Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Bart Wilson, Karl Schurter
Bart J Wilson
No abstract provided.