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Articles 31 - 36 of 36
Full-Text Articles in Law
Imcremental Commitment And Reciprocity In A Real Time Public Goods Game, Bart Wilson, Robert Kurzban, Keving Mccabe, Vernon Smith
Imcremental Commitment And Reciprocity In A Real Time Public Goods Game, Bart Wilson, Robert Kurzban, Keving Mccabe, Vernon Smith
Bart J. Wilson
No abstract provided.
Turning Off The Lights, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Turning Off The Lights, Bart Wilson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith
Bart J. Wilson
No abstract provided.
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, And Asymmetric Outcomes, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, And Asymmetric Outcomes, Bart Wilson, Stanley Reynolds
Bart J. Wilson
No abstract provided.
Firm-Specific Cost Savings And Market Power, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Firm-Specific Cost Savings And Market Power, Bart Wilson, Douglas Davis
Bart J. Wilson
We report a policy experiment that illustrates a potential problem of using historical pass-through rates as a means of predicting the competitive consequences of projected firm-specific cost savings in antitrust contexts, particularly in merger analysis. The effects of cost savings on welfare can vary vastly, depending on how the savings affect the industry supply schedule. In a capacity-constrained price-setting oligopoly, we observe that cost savings can overwhelm behaviorally salient market power incentives when the savings affect marginal (high cost) units. However, cost savings of the same magnitude on an infra-marginal unit leave market power unchanged.
What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power As A Catalyst For Countercyclical Markups, Bart Wilson
What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power As A Catalyst For Countercyclical Markups, Bart Wilson
Bart J. Wilson
No abstract provided.
Menu Costs And Nominal Price Friction: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson
Menu Costs And Nominal Price Friction: An Experimental Examination, Bart Wilson
Bart J. Wilson
No abstract provided.