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Articles 31 - 51 of 51
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout
The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout
Seattle University Law Review
This Symposium Article argues that the board-controlled corporation can be understood as a legal innovation that historically has functioned as a means of transferring wealth forward and sometimes backward through time, for the benefit of present and future generations. In this fashion the board-controlled corporation promotes both intergenerational equity and intergenerational efficiency. Logic and evidence each suggest, however, that the modern embrace of “shareholder value” as the only corporate objective and “shareholder democracy” as the ideal of corporate governance is damaging the corporate form’s ability to serve this economically and ethically important function.
Team Production Theory And Private Company Boards, Elizabeth Pollman
Team Production Theory And Private Company Boards, Elizabeth Pollman
Seattle University Law Review
In their path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout provided a new theory of the board of directors in a corporation. Drawing on the economic theory of team production, Blair and Stout argued that the board of directors serves as a mediating hierarchy for the firm as a whole, encouraging firm-specific investments from team members and reducing shirking and opportunistic behavior. While Blair and Stout provided a dramatically different view of the corporation from the conventional principal-agent account, they also delineated limitations to their proposed theory. Most importantly, they suggested that the …
Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja
Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja
Seattle University Law Review
In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Seattle University Law Review
In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …
Breaching The Accountability Firewall: Market Norms And The Reasonable Director, Joan Loughrey
Breaching The Accountability Firewall: Market Norms And The Reasonable Director, Joan Loughrey
Seattle University Law Review
This Article examines and evaluates the role of market norms in determining whether directors have acted reasonably and the appropriateness of setting a standard of reasonableness that reflects market norms. It argues that although there are situations in which a standard that reflects market norms may not be appropriate for determining the reasonableness of a director’s conduct, it is the best standard more often than not. While this Article focuses on the U.K. director’s duty of care, the question of whether compliance with market norms should be exculpatory arises every time legal or regulatory enforcement depends upon establishing that a …
The Third Way, Kent Greenfield
The Third Way, Kent Greenfield
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder supremacists argue that corporate management should be constrained by additional shareholder power to nominate directors, approve executive pay, or receive financial disclosures. Meanwhile, managerial and directorial apologists suggest that the way forward is to protect managerial prerogative. But, there is a third way: Managerial obligation could be increased without the obligation running solely to the holders of equity. This Article situates the current moment of intellectual churning in corporate law in a larger historical narrative and explains why we find ourselves in this moment. This Article then suggests what a third way might require in terms of conceptualization, process, …
The Evolution Of Corporate Governance In Japan: The Continuing Relevance Of Berle And Means, Takaya Seki, Thomas Clarke
The Evolution Of Corporate Governance In Japan: The Continuing Relevance Of Berle And Means, Takaya Seki, Thomas Clarke
Seattle University Law Review
The evolution of corporate governance in Japan towards international standards continues, though at a gradual pace that often concerns outsiders. The substance of Japanese corporate governance is often questioned due to a lack of understanding of the unique elements of the Japanese institutional system. Japanese companies are under a sustained assault from overseas investors to introduce a greater number of independent directors on boards, improve accountability, and enhance transparency. The majority of Japanese companies have taken what they regard as significant steps in this direction of accountability. In Japan, however, there is a different conception of the role of the …
State Capital: Global And Australian Perspectives, George Gilligan, Megan Bowman
State Capital: Global And Australian Perspectives, George Gilligan, Megan Bowman
Seattle University Law Review
The activities of state-related pools of capital need to be understood within the context of an era of globalization, in which economic and political ties between many jurisdictions are deepening, A variety of modes of governance are emerging that have a capacity for impacts of broad international scope. The rising influence of more proactive state-led capitalism is one of the shaping variables in how the global economy has been changing swiftly in recent decades, and the effects of the Global Financial Crisis have arguably accelerated these structural shifts. This Article identifies three discrete phenomena in the state capital arena. First, …
What Is A Corporation? Liberal, Confucion, And Socialist Theories Of Enterprise Organization (And State, Family, And Personhood), Teemu Ruskola
What Is A Corporation? Liberal, Confucion, And Socialist Theories Of Enterprise Organization (And State, Family, And Personhood), Teemu Ruskola
Seattle University Law Review
What is a corporation? An easy, but not very informative, answer is that it is a legal person. More substantive answers suggest it is a moral person, a person/thing, a production team, a nexus of private agreements, a city, a semi-sovereign, or a (secular) God. Despite the economic, political, and social importance of the corporate form, we do not have a generally accepted legal theory of what a corporation is, apart from the law’s questionable assertion that it is a “person.” In this Article, the author places the idea, and law, of the corporation in a comparative context and suggests …
Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta S. Karmel
Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta S. Karmel
Seattle University Law Review
At common law, an interested director was barred from participating in corporate decisions in which he had an interest, and therefore “dis-interested” directors became desirable. This concept of the disinterested director developed into the model of an “independent director” and was advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and court decisions as a general ideal in a variety of situations. This Article explores doubts regarding the model of an “independent director” and suggests that director expertise may be more important that director independence. The Article then discusses shareholder primacy and sets forth alternatives to the shareholder primacy theory of the …
"Quack Corporate Governance" As Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas Calcina Howson
"Quack Corporate Governance" As Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas Calcina Howson
Seattle University Law Review
From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all-encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case—wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States—that for the PRC this phenomenon …
Panelist Biographies, Introduction By Dana Gold, Editor's Note, Dana L. Gold
Panelist Biographies, Introduction By Dana Gold, Editor's Note, Dana L. Gold
Seattle University Law Review
This conference brought together nationally recognized scholars, attorneys, policymakers and activists from across the country who represent a depth of knowledge and range of viewpoints necessary to explore the intersection of corporate and First Amendment law. This discussion was sometimes heated, frequently politically surprising, and always robust. In this symposium issue, the Seattle University Law Review has captured the presentations and exchanges at this unique, multidisciplinary conference.
The Corporatization Of Communication, Eric Chiappinelli, Adam Candeub, Jeffrey Chester, Lawrence Soley
The Corporatization Of Communication, Eric Chiappinelli, Adam Candeub, Jeffrey Chester, Lawrence Soley
Seattle University Law Review
Our next panel discusses the corporatization of communication.
Curbing Shareholder Voting Groups With A New Philosophy For Washington's Business Corporation Act, Tilman Larson
Curbing Shareholder Voting Groups With A New Philosophy For Washington's Business Corporation Act, Tilman Larson
Seattle University Law Review
This Comment explores Washington's changing philosophy of shareholder voting and how the current developments to Washington's corporate law have impacted shareholder voting group rights. In light of Washington's corporate law history, the underlying reasons for the amendments, and case law, this Comment argues that the recent amendments have altered, rather than preserved, what has been historically the true philosophy underlying Washington corporate law: minority shareholder rights. Part II of this Comment tracks the evolution of voting group rights through past Washington law and until the present Washington Business Corporation Act. Part III discusses the underlying reasons for the amendments, addresses …
Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, Kent Greenfield, Daniel Greenwood, Erik Jaffe
Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, Kent Greenfield, Daniel Greenwood, Erik Jaffe
Seattle University Law Review
As Professor Winkler correctly stated, current doctrine emphasizes the rights of listeners rather than the identity of corporate speakers. My argument is, in effect, that this emphasis misses the key point. But I will not deal with listeners directly. I am simply going to assume, rather than argue, that if corporate advertising were ineffective in influencing voters or legislators, normal market processes would eliminate it. I'm going to take it for granted that when corporations speak, it makes a difference in the actual results.
Corporations And Commercial Speech, Ron Collins, Mark Lopez, Tamara Piety, David Vladeck
Corporations And Commercial Speech, Ron Collins, Mark Lopez, Tamara Piety, David Vladeck
Seattle University Law Review
Today's discussion will be about a rather famous case-actually, a non-case, Nike v. Kasky.
Corporations And Political Speech: Should Speech Equal Money?, David Skover, Lisa Danetz, Martin Redish, Scott Thomas
Corporations And Political Speech: Should Speech Equal Money?, David Skover, Lisa Danetz, Martin Redish, Scott Thomas
Seattle University Law Review
Welcome now to the panel on corporations and political speech. We will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence of campaign finance regulation and some of the more controversial issues raised by corporate involvement in the marketplace of political ideas and elections.
Protecting The Polity: Strategies For Reform, Dana Gold, Solange Bitol-Hansen, Charlie Cray, Bruce Freed
Protecting The Polity: Strategies For Reform, Dana Gold, Solange Bitol-Hansen, Charlie Cray, Bruce Freed
Seattle University Law Review
This session is Protecting the Polity: Strategies for Reform, and we frame this as additional strategies that are actually percolating in a concrete way out in the real world, not just in the world of academic theory, to promote citizen participation in a democracy that countenances corporate influence in the political process.
Keynote Speech, Mark Crispin Miller
Keynote Speech, Mark Crispin Miller
Seattle University Law Review
Corporations tend to work against immediate contact. They tend to discourage familial bonds and popular interaction. They are allergic to democracy. Because corporations are usually in the business of selling deviations of various kinds, they tend to want a world in which each one of us is completely walled off in a portable, wonderful land of communication technology. Corporations want a world where everything is done for us. A world where everything is presented to us through a corporate medium, so that what once looked like satire is now commonly represented as an admirable ideal. To that end, I am …
Corporate Personhood And The Rights Of Corporate Speech, Adam Winkler
Corporate Personhood And The Rights Of Corporate Speech, Adam Winkler
Seattle University Law Review
My objective here is to provide a little historical background on business corporations and their place in First Amendment law. In the course of that overview, I will also make a few observations that I believe can be helpful in thinking about corporate speech rights. First, I will argue that one aspect of the constitutional status of corporations-the notion of corporate personhood-has not played the central role in shaping corporate speech rights that some believe. Corporations have free speech rights, but they are more limited than those held by individuals. Second, I will argue that there is not a single …
Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, And Selective Waiver: Is A Half-Privilege Worth Having At All?, Colin P. Marks
Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, And Selective Waiver: Is A Half-Privilege Worth Having At All?, Colin P. Marks
Seattle University Law Review
This article will explore both the various problems that arise with a policy that essentially mandates waiver of the attorney-client privilege as well as the limited appeal of the selective waiver theory as a compromise position. It concludes that selective waiver is inadequate in addressing the many problems created by policies that coerce waiver and that a more desirable solution is to eliminate or amend the governmental policies that coerce waiver. Part II of this article explains and explores the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Part III explains the development of the selective waiver theory, …