Law Commons^™

Mercenary Criminal Justice, Ronald F. Wright, Wayne A. Logan

Ronald F. Wright

Lately, a growing number of bill collectors stand in line to collect on the debt that criminals owe to society. Courts order payment of costs; legislatures levy conviction surcharges; even private, for-profit entities get a piece of the action, collecting fees for probation supervision services and the like. And some of these collectors beckon even before a final bill is due, such as prosecutors who require suspects to pay diversion fees before they file any charges.

Government budgetary cutbacks during the Great Recession have led criminal justice actors to rely on legal financial obligations (LFOs) as a source of revenue …

The Worldwide Accountability Deficit For Criminal Prosecutors, Ronald Wright, Marc Miller

Ronald F. Wright

In democratic governments committed to the rule of law, prosecutors should be accountable to the public, just like other powerful government agents who make important decisions. The theoretical need for prosecutor accountability, however, meets practical shortcomings in criminal justice systems everywhere. Individual prosecutors everywhere express allegiance to the rule of law through the wise decisions made by each prosecutor and across offices as a whole. But the claim “trust us” does not in fact generate the level of public trust that one should expect in a government of laws. Institutional strategies to guarantee prosecutor accountability all fall short of the …

Public Defender Elections And Public Control Of Criminal Justice, Ronald F. Wright

Ronald F. Wright

Voters in the United States select some of the major actors in criminal justice, but not all of them. Among the major figures in the criminal courtroom, voters typically elect two of the three: the prosecutor and the judge, but not the public defender. Prosecutors in almost all the states are elected at the local level. The public defender, however, is typically not an elected official, even though the defender is a public employee with important budgetary and policymaking authority over criminal justice. Why the difference?

As it happens, we have some actual experience to draw upon in answering these …

How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, Ronald F. Wright

Ronald F. Wright

There are several methods for holding prosecutors accountable in this country. Judges enforce a few legal boundaries on the work of prosecutors. Prosecutors with positions lower in the office or department hierarchy must answer to those at the top. But none of these controls binds a prosecutor too tightly. At the end of the day, the public guards against abusive prosecutors through direct democratic control.

Does the electoral check on prosecutors work? There are reasons to believe that elections could lead prosecutors to apply the criminal law according to public priorities and values. Voters choose their prosecutors at the local …

Charge Movement And Theories Of Prosecutors, Ronald F. Wright, Rodney L. Engen

Ronald F. Wright

The charges filed at the start of a criminal case often move down to less serious charges that form the basis for a guilty plea and conviction. In this symposium essay, we build on our earlier work on charge movement based on data from North Carolina. After noting that charges move at different rates for different crimes, we explain the differences among crimes by looking to the structure of the substantive criminal law. Groups of crimes that offer deeper options to the negotiators (such as the many versions of assault) produce more frequent charge movement.

Assuming that the structure of …

The Black Box, Ronald F. Wright, Marc L. Miller

Ronald F. Wright

Classic accounts of prosecutorial discretion, from Herbert Wechsler through the present day, portray charging discretion as the antithesis of law. Scholars express particular concerns about racial and other nefarious grounds for prosecution, while others worry about the increased range of choices available to prosecutors when criminal codes become bloated with new crimes.

The familiar response to this problem features a call for greater external legal regulation. The external limits might come from judges who review prosecutorial charging decisions, or from legislatures reworking the criminal code. These external oversight projects, however, have failed.

This article explores some facets of internal regulation—efforts …

Dead Wrong, Ronald Wright, Marc Miller

Ronald F. Wright

DNA-driven exonerations offer many lessons for police, for prosecutors, and for legislatures. Many scholars have focused on novel procedures to identify and remedy wrongful convictions after they occur. Scholars have also concluded that in our administrative criminal justice system we need prosecutors who are driven less by testosterone and more by a balanced search for the truth.

In our view, the most enduring changes to the work of prosecutors will focus not on softening their adversarial perspective, but on enhancing and staying true to the traditional core of their work on the front end of the process—the charging decisions.

Accuracy …

Systematic Content Analysis Of Judicial Opinions, Ronald F. Wright, Mark A. Hall

Ronald F. Wright

Our article traces the use of “content analysis” — a standard research technique in political science, communications, and other fields — to study judicial opinions. As it turns out, this is a high-growth area that nobody has noticed. We collect over 130 examples of such research projects that other scholars performed between 1956 and 2006, and draw lessons from the ways that scholars have used this technique, for good and for bad. We document the growth of this research technique, and offer guidance to future scholars on how best to adapt the standard requirements of the technique to the specialized …

The Charging And Sentencing Effects Of Depth And Distance In A Criminal Code, Ronald F. Wright, Rod Engen

Ronald F. Wright

Today's conventional wisdom about criminal justice in the United States tells us that criminal codes do not matter much. The real impact of the criminal law appears not in the statute books but in the choices of criminal prosecutors who apply those laws. Moreover, decision-making by prosecutors takes on even greater importance in the context of late twentieth century reforms that have made sentencing more determinate and less discretionary. Scholars have argued that these legal changes have effectively increased prosecutorial influence over sentences.

Despite these claims, little is known about the actual use of prosecutorial discretion under these kinds of …

The Power Of Bureaucracy In The Response To Blakely And Booker, Ronald F. Wright

Ronald F. Wright

How will different jurisdictions respond to the recent Supreme Court decisions in Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker, which require jury fact-finding to support certain types of sentences? The best clues in predicting the answer to this question come from the people who know this world best, the sentencing bureaucracy. Sentencing commissions, mostly for benign reasons, hope to preserve their own place in the sentencing structure, or to expand their role if possible. The particulars shift from place to place, but this powerful tendency of bureaucracies for self-preservation offers a reliable way to predict the reactions of sentencing …

The Political Economy Of Up-Front Fees For Indigent Criminal Defense, Ronald F. Wright, Wayne A. Logan

Ronald F. Wright

In this article, we trace the origin and spread of state laws designed to make indigent criminal defendants pay, up-front, a portion of the costs of their state-appointed counsel. These co-pays, which can range from $10 to over $200, are part of the increasingly popular pay-as-you-go movement, requiring criminal defendants to defray the system costs of their prosecution and punishment.

On their face, such laws would appear to be a natural target of vigorous resistance by the defense bar. This turns out to be only half true, however, for it is often the leaders of public defense organizations, faced with …

Sentencing Commissions As Provocateurs Of Prosecutor Self-Regulation, Ronald F. Wright

Ronald F. Wright

This Article examines potential efforts by sentencing commissions to influence the work of prosecutors, especially the charges they select and the plea bargains they enter. The practical objections to prosecutorial guidelines issuing from a sentencing commission emphasize two problems: the linguistic impossibility of creating meaningful guidelines and the political impossibility of promulgating them. But experience in the states casts doubt on each of these objections. Some states have codified preexisting prosecutor guidelines, generated by prosecutors themselves, while other states have prompted prosecutors to develop their own internal guidance.

Prompted self-regulation of prosecutors will prove most effective when the ambitions for …

Trial Distortion And The End Of Innocence In Federal Criminal Law, Ronald F. Wright

Ronald F. Wright

This article starts with a troubling and unnoticed development in federal criminal justice: acquittals have virtually disappeared from the system in the last 15 years, and for all the wrong reasons. It seems likely that prosecutors have increased the "trial penalty" so much that defendants with meaningful defenses feel compelled to plead guilty, undermining the truth-finding function of the criminal process.

The article examines these federal developments in light of a proposed "trial distortion theory." The theory I develop here evaluates the quality of plea negotiation practices in a jurisdiction by asking whether the system produces outcomes (convictions, acquittals and …

The Wisdom We Have Lost: Sentencing Information And Its Uses, Marc L. Miller, Ronald F. Wright

Ronald F. Wright

Both federal and state experience in sentencing over the last three decades suggest that sentencing data and knowledge most often lead to wisdom when they are collected with particular uses and users in mind. Ironically, greater reliance on data and expertise can democratize the making and testing of sentencing policy. When data are collected and published with many different users in mind, a variety of participants in the sentencing process can join the Commission as creators of sentencing wisdom, including Congress, state legislatures, state sentencing commissions, sentencing judges, and scholars.

Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress envisioned federal …