Law Commons^™

Means And Ends In City Of Arlington V. Fcc: Ignoring The Lawyer's Craft To Reshape The Scope Of Chevron Deference, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In last year's term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straightforward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article …

The Past, Present And Future Of Auer Deference: Mead, Form And Function In Judicial Review Of Agency Interpretations Of Regulations, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The law of judicial review of agency legal interpretations has undergone an important reshaping as a consequence of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp. That decision and the important follow-on decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Services have changed the understanding of the Court's landmark 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Chevron defined a new era of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but the Chevron era has itself been transformed.

These legal developments had seemed to have little consequential …

Reconciling Chevron, Mead, And The Review Of Agency Discretion: Source Of Law And The Standards Of Judicial Review, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Although the Supreme Court's watershed decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has been understood by many as defining the framework for judicial review of agency legal determinations, there have been longstanding questions about the application of the standards for reviewing administrative action. These questions have become more troublesome following the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corp. Mead established that Chevron review only applies when defined requirements are met and held that so-called Skidmore deference applies when Chevron deference does not apply. Surveying the aftermath of Mead and its effect on the …

Florida East Coast Railway And The Structure Of Administrative Law, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

A typical Administrative Law course presents the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. as establishing the rule that statutory text quite close to the magic words, "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," is needed to trigger the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) formal hearing requirements for a rulemaking. Florida East Coast Railway is a prime example of an underrated case because, even though the case is well known, its renown is a consequence only of its black letter rule about rulemaking procedures. Many scholars and practitioners do not appreciate the case for …

Treasury Regulations And Judicial Deference In The Post-Chevron Era, David A. Brennen

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Analysis of several post-Chevron cases indicates that every major Supreme Court case since 1984 involving the validity of a Treasury regulation is consistent with Chevron. Indeed, since 1984 every challenged Treasury regulation interpreting a statute in which Congress failed to address a specific tax issue has been upheld by the Court. In fact, no Supreme Court case since 1984 could be discovered in which the Court invalidated a Treasury regulation on the grounds that it was an unreasonable interpretation of a statute. Several post-Chevron Supreme

Court decisions, however, rejected the Treasury's application of a tax regulation to …

A Fresh Look At Agency "Discretion", John M. Rogers

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Lawyers who represent or litigate against government agencies must wrestle so frequently with the concept of agency "discretion" that they may be forgiven for believing that the term is devoid of intrinsic meaning—a chameleon deriving substance only from its particular context. For instance, mandamus will lie only for ministerial acts, as opposed to "discretionary" ones. Agency acts that are "by law committed to agency discretion" are not reviewable in court under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). However, agency actions are reviewed for "abuse of discretion." On the other hand, tort suits against the government will not be allowed for …