Law Commons^™

Moral Truth And Constitutional Conservatism, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

Conservative constitutionalism is committed to "originalism," that is, to interpreting the Constitution according to its original public understanding. This defining commitment of constitutional interpretation is sound. For decades, however, constitutional conservatives have diluted it with a methodology of restraint, a normative approach to the judicial task marked by an overriding aversion to critical moral reasoning. In any event, the methodology eclipsed originalism and the partnership with moral truth that originalism actually entails. Conservative constitutionalism is presently a melange of mostly unsound arguments against the worst depredations of Casey's Mystery Passage.

The reason for the methodological moral reticence is easy to …

A Pragmatic Justification Of The Judicial Hunch, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

Judges currently face a daunting task. On the one hand, they are increasingly aware of the indeterminacy of the law, while on the other hand, they face an explosion of fact. Judges are floating on shaky legal timbers in a sea of documents, deposition transcripts, affidavits, oral courtroom testimony, and expert opinions. The explosion of fact alone presents monumental problems for deciding cases without unduly simplifying or reducing this factual complexity. For example, both federal and state judges are implementing case management systems to deal with their crushing case loads and the increasing complexity of their cases. In addition, there …

Corrective Justice And The Revival Of Judicial Virtue, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

Judges must be wise. Sound judicial reasoning requires moral virtue. These sentiments about judging have been lost. They apparently belong to a bygone era. While many advocate self-restraint or prudence as judicial virtues, moral virtue has been conspicuously absent from the list. Except for avoiding obvious vices such as bribery, favoritism, prejudice, sloth, and arbitrariness, conventional wisdom maintains that being a good judge does not require being a good person. Even theorists sympathetic to a relationship between law and morality balk at making moral virtue a prerequisite of judicial decision making. Rather, many contend that judicial decision making is a …