Law Commons^™

Black Cat, White Cat: The Identity Of The Wto Judges, Louise Johannesson, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has been possible. They are typically ‘Geneva crowd’, that is, they are either current or former delegates representing their country before the WTO. This observation holds for both first- as well as second-instance WTO judges (e.g. Panelists and members of the Appellate Body). In that, the WTO evidences an attitude strikingly similar to the GATT. Whereas the legal regime has been heavily ‘legalized’, the people …

The Con Law Professor With Judicial Appointment Power, Theresa M. Beiner

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores whether, how or, perhaps, to what extent President Barack Obama’s time as a constitutional law professor at the University of Chicago is reflected in his approach to judicial appointments. Three things are striking about President Obama’s initial approach to judicial selection. First, he has appointed the most diverse bench of any President. Second, he has appointed judges rather slowly compared to his predecessors. And, finally, he has appointed a rather politically moderate bench. How might these particular and in some ways surprising aspects of President Obama’s judicial appointments reflect – or not reflect – his time as …

Economic Crisis And The Rise Of Judicial Elections And Judicial Review, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Almost ninety percent of state judges today face some kind of popular election. This uniquely American institution emerged in a sudden burst from 1846 to 1853, as twenty states adopted judicial elections. The modern perception is that judicial elections, then and now, weaken judges and the rule of law. When judicial elections swept the country in the late 1840s and 1850s, however, the key was a new movement to limit legislative power, to increase judicial power, and to strengthen judicial review. Over time, judicial appointments had become a tool of party patronage and cronyism.

Legislative overspending on internal improvements and …