Law Commons^™

Lincoln, The Constitution Of Necessity, And The Necessity Of Constitutions, Michael Kent Curtis

ExpressO

Some invoke the legacy of Abraham Lincoln to justify largely unchecked executive power which in times of war trumps constitutional limits and guarantees of liberty. This article suggests that the Lincoln model is a poor one to follow: because some of his actions were inconsitent with democratic government, because the administration invoked the doctrine of necessity when many of the cabinet thought no necessity existed, and because in the end, Lincoln himself refused to follow his logic to its inevitable conclusion. It critiques two article by Michael Paulsen invoking Lincoln to justify largely unchecked executive power.

On The Legal Construction Of Ethnic Cleansing, Timothy V. Waters

ExpressO

On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing

Timothy William Waters, Univ. Mississippi School of Law

Abstract

What is the true shape of our commitment to prohibit ethnic cleansing? This Article explores that question by considering a case observers have universally decided does not constitute ethnic cleansing. It examines the recent controversy in the European Union, when Sudeten Germans demanded that the Czech Republic apologize for having expelled them after WWII before being admitted to the EU. Their demands were universally rejected and the legality of the expulsions was reconfirmed by all relevant actors. So what is the consequence for customary …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …