Law Commons^™

The Anti-Innovation Supreme Court: Major Questions, Delegation, Chevron, And More, Jack M. Beermann

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court of the United States has generally been a very aggressive enforcer of legal limitations on governmental power. In various periods in its history, the Court has gone far beyond enforcing clearly expressed and easily ascertainable constitutional and statutory provisions and has suppressed innovation by the other branches that do not necessarily transgress widely held social norms. Novel assertions of legislative power, novel interpretations of federal statutes, statutes that are in tension with well-established common law rules, and state laws adopted by only a few states are suspect simply because they are novel or rub up against tradition. …

Liu And The New Sec Disgorgement Statute, Andrew N. Vollmer

William & Mary Business Law Review

In early 2021, Congress enacted a new statute for enforcement cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The new statute resolved important questions about the availability of disgorgement as a remedy in SEC enforcement cases, but it created other questions. The purpose of this Article is to discuss one interpretive issue that is already arising in the federal courts of appeals.

That interpretive issue is whether “disgorgement” as authorized by the new statute must abide by equitable limitations the Supreme Court imposed on disgorgement relief in SEC cases in Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020). The …

Loper Bright And The Future Of Chevron Deference, Jack M. Beermann

William & Mary Law Review Online

This essay proposes that the Court overrule the Chevron two-step standard of review of agency statutory construction and replace it by reviving deference under the factors announced in the Skidmore case with a twist that preserves Chevron’s greatest virtue: agency freedom to alter its statutory interpretations so long as the agency remains within the zone of reasonable construction. This essay also proposes that the Court clarify the boundary between cases involving statutory construction and cases involving agency policy decisions that are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard articulated in cases such as Motor Vehicles and Overton Park. …

Supreme Court Litigators In The Age Of Textualism, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation has moved in a textualist direction over the last several decades, but there is little systematic information on how litigators’ briefing practices have changed during this era of textualist ascendancy. This Article examines thirty-five years’ worth of party briefs (over 8,000 briefs total), explores the briefs’ use of interpretive tools (including differences across categories of attorneys), and compares the briefs to the Court’s opinions.

This examination yields several valuable findings. Although the briefs show a textualist shift, they differ from the Court’s opinions in a few ways. The magnitude of the textualist shift …

Historians Wear Robes Now? Applying The History And Tradition Standard: A Practical Guide For Lower Courts, Alexandra Michalak

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Never before has the Supreme Court relied on the history and tradition standard to such a magnitude as in the 2021 term to determine the scope of a range of constitutional rights. [...] In reaffirming this standard, the Supreme Court provided no guidance to lower courts on how to apply and analyze the history and tradition standard. Along with balancing the lack of resources in deciding cases with the history and tradition framework, lower courts must face the reality that this standard presents ample opportunity for one-sided historical analysis. To combat the temptation of conducting unbalanced and cursory reviews of …

What Would Happen To All Of The Prior Chevron Cases In A Non-Chevron World?, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court Review Act: Fast-Tracking The Interbranch Dialogue And Destabilizing The Filibuster, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

This Essay presents an analysis of the Supreme Court Review Act, a bill that was recently introduced in Congress. The Act would create a streamlined legislative process for bills responding to new Supreme Court decisions that interpret federal statutes or restrict constitutional rights. By facilitating legislative responses to controversial cases, the Act would promote the “dialogue” that commentators and the courts themselves have used as a model for interbranch relations. The Essay describes how the proposed Supreme Court Review Act would work, discusses some of its benefits, addresses its constitutionality, and raises some questions about its implementation and effects.

Improving (And Avoiding) Interstate Interpretive Encounters, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

State courts often encounter the statutes of other states. Any encounter with another state’s statutes raises an interesting but inconspicuous question about choice of law. In particular, the interstate encounter presents a choice of interpretive law. Despite some universal practices in statutory interpretation, there are methodological differences across jurisdictions—both at the level of overall approach and in the details of particular interpretive canons. When a state court encounters the statute of a sister state, may the forum state use its own interpretive methods or must it instead use the methods of the enacting state?

The existing doctrine on this choice-of-law …

Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …

Unheralded And Transformative: The Test For Major Questions After West Virginia, Natasha Brunstein, Donald L. R. Goodson

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

Before the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in West Virginia v. EPA, the “major questions doctrine” was little more than a handful of cases that shared a few overlapping similarities. Although the Court explained in West Virginia that these “extraordinary” cases were all ones in which an agency had asserted “highly consequential power beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted,” the Court did not apply a consistent analysis across these earlier precedents. In other words, the doctrine lacked a framework to guide lower courts and litigants.

To our knowledge, no article written since West Virginia has explored …

Congressional Rules Of Interpretation, Jarrod Shobe

William & Mary Law Review

Many scholars argue that Congress should adopt federal rules of statutory interpretation to guide judicial interpretation. This Article uses a novel dataset to show that Congress has long used enacted rules of interpretation and has increasingly done so in recent decades. However, it has chosen to do so on a statute-by-statute basis in a way that has gone mostly unnoticed by scholars and judges. We developed a dataset by using computer code to search the U.S. Code dating back to 1946 for specific phrases indicating a rule of interpretation, then manually checked and classified each rule. These rules not only …

Allocation Of Property Appreciation: A Statutory Approach To The Judicial Dialectic, Lawrence Ponoroff

William & Mary Business Law Review

Many, perhaps the majority, of Chapter 13 cases end up being converted to Chapter 7. The converted Chapter 7 case is not a new case, it is a continuation of the case that was commenced with the filing of the original Chapter 13 petition. However, there are important structural differences between the two chapters, including over what constitutes property of the estate. This creates some thorny issues surrounding whether property of the estate as generally defined in section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code or property of the estate as specifically defined in Chapter 13 controls in determining the scope of …

Associations And Cities As (Forbidden) Pure Private Attorneys General, Heather Elliott

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court interprets Article III’s case-or-controversy language to require a plaintiff to show injury in fact, causation, and redressability. A plaintiff who meets that tripartite test has standing to sue and thus a personal stake in pursuing the litigation. Accordingly, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court prohibited pure private attorneys general: litigants who would sue without the requisite personal stake. This limitation extends to organizations. They, too, must show standing on their own account or, under Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, identify a member with Article III standing and show how the lawsuit is germane to …