Law Commons^™

Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden

William & Mary Law Review

With legal sports betting viewed as a panacea for state budget woes across the United States, the underlying data that fuels the sports betting industry has emerged as an especially valuable asset. In the hopes of capitalizing on state laws that have now legalized sports betting, United States professional sports leagues have attempted to gain exclusive ownership rights over valuable sports betting data by asking legislators to mandate that bookmakers exclusively use data sold through the league. In addition, some sports leagues have imposed policies mandating that teams bundle together their collected data for purposes of selling it exclusively through …

Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Sherman Act establishes free competition as the rule governing interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State laws can pose identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving Congress's goal to protect free competition.

The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected such preemption in Parker v. Brown, creating the "state action doctrine." Parker and its progeny hold that state-imposed restraints are immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose significant harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker's progeny …

Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …

Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of the Sherman Act. When the Court does speak, its pronouncements have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case. There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and increasing the prices of televised college football games. After announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason because they produced significant economic harm without offsetting benefits. In so …

Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in restraint of... commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the …

No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao

William & Mary Law Review

The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …

Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

More Than Just A Toothache? N.C. Dental Leaves Medical Boards Vulnerable: A Look At Telemedicine Companies And Antitrust Challenges To State Prescription Drug Rules, Alexander R. Kalyniuk

William & Mary Business Law Review

Encouraged by technological advancements and favorable provisions within the Affordable Care Act, telemedicine companies that offer online doctor visits are thriving in the health care industry. Online doctor visits are a relatively new and cost-efficient method to provide medical care over long distances that do not require patients to step outside their homes. However, many state medical board scope-of-practice rules prohibit physicians from prescribing medications without an in-person physical examination of the patient, which impedes telemedicine companies from offering their online services in those states. To circumvent this barrier, telemedicine companies may have a prima facie case under § 1 …

In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Transaction cost economics ("TCE") has radically altered industrial organization's explanation for so-called "non-standard contracts, "including "exclusionary" agreements that exclude rivals from access to inputs or customers. According to TCE, such integration usually reduces transaction costs without producing anticompetitive harm. TCE has accordingly exercised growing influence over antitrust doctrine, with courts invoking TCE's teachings to justify revision of some doctrines once hostile to such contracts. Still, old habits die hard, even for courts of increasing economic sophistication. This Article critiques one such habit, namely, courts'continuing claim that firms use market or monopoly power to impose exclusionary contracts on unwilling trading partners. …

Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, …

Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently interventionist. Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the “extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.

This Essay draws …

Ncaa Scholarship Restrictions As Anticompetitive Measures: The One-Year Rule And Scholarship Caps As Avenues For Antitrust Society, Neil Gibson

William & Mary Business Law Review

By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting, anticompetitive measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking student athletes, this Note argues that despite the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana’s unfavorable ruling in Agnew v. NCAA, a Sherman Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and scholarships could be legally viable. In particular, just application of the quick look rule of reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could lead a court to find the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship caps as violative of …

Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs

William & Mary Law Review

Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …

Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …

Tying Conspiracies, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they are imposed by a single dominant firm. However, tying jurisprudence does not recognize that tie-ins can also occur as the result of a conspiracy among competitors. Consequently, antitrust doctrine fails to appreciate the unique anticompetitive dangers of concerted tying arrangements. After providing real-world examples of tying conspiracies, Professor Leslie explains how concerted tying arrangements present a far greater threat to competitive markets than traditional, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. Because tying jurisprudence evolved without considering the existence or effects of concerted tie-ins, the current test for evaluating the legality of tying arrangements …

The Procompetitive Interest In Intellectual Property Law, Thomas F. Cotter

William & Mary Law Review

When government recognizes intellectual property (IP) rights, it is often viewed as sanctioning the existence of private "monopolies," in contrast to the general antimonopoly thrust of the antitrust laws. And yet, on occasion IP law itself condemns conduct on the part of IP owners-or excuses otherwise infringing activity on the part of IP defendants-expressly for the purpose of promoting competition. It does so even though antitrust law -if one were to apply it at all under analogous circumstances-would not find anticompetitive harm without conducting a more thorough analysis of whether the antitrust defendant possesses power over a well-defined market. Salient …

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses In The New Economy, A. Benjamin Spencer

Faculty Publications

On April 3, 2000, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson declared that the Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") had maintained monopoly power in the personal computer operating system market by anticompetitive means, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A case of enormous significance, Microsoft raises difficult questions regarding how antitrust laws should be applied to information technology ("IT') companies. Specifically, many characteristics of what has come to be called the "New Economy" - and of the IT companies within it - suggest that traditional monopolization analysis may need modification. As the U.S. has moved toward an information- based …

Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …

Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Preventing Predatory Abuses In Litigation Between Business Competitors: Focusing On A Litigant's Reasons For Initiating The Litigation To Ensure A Balance Between The Constitutional Right To Petition And The Sherman Act's Guarantee Of Fair Competition In Business, Scott D. Helsel

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Anti Trust - Personal Liability Of Corporate Officers Participating In Sherman Act Violations, Paul Auster

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Law, Attempts To Monopolize A Method Of Doing Business, Daniel U. Livermore Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.