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Full-Text Articles in Law
Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The Sherman Act establishes free competition as the rule governing interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State laws can pose identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving Congress's goal to protect free competition.
The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected such preemption in Parker v. Brown, creating the "state action doctrine." Parker and its progeny hold that state-imposed restraints are immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose significant harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker's progeny …
Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese
Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …
Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of the Sherman Act. When the Court does speak, its pronouncements have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case. There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and increasing the prices of televised college football games. After announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason because they produced significant economic harm without offsetting benefits. In so …
Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in restraint of... commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the …
Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese
Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese
In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Federalism And State Restraints Of Interstate Commerce: An Essay For Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
Transaction cost economics ("TCE") has radically altered industrial organization's explanation for so-called "non-standard contracts, "including "exclusionary" agreements that exclude rivals from access to inputs or customers. According to TCE, such integration usually reduces transaction costs without producing anticompetitive harm. TCE has accordingly exercised growing influence over antitrust doctrine, with courts invoking TCE's teachings to justify revision of some doctrines once hostile to such contracts. Still, old habits die hard, even for courts of increasing economic sophistication. This Article critiques one such habit, namely, courts'continuing claim that firms use market or monopoly power to impose exclusionary contracts on unwilling trading partners. …
Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese
Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, …
Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese
Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently interventionist. Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the “extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.
This Essay draws …
Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese
Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Antitrust And The Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses In The New Economy, A. Benjamin Spencer
Antitrust And The Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses In The New Economy, A. Benjamin Spencer
Faculty Publications
On April 3, 2000, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson declared that the Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") had maintained monopoly power in the personal computer operating system market by anticompetitive means, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A case of enormous significance, Microsoft raises difficult questions regarding how antitrust laws should be applied to information technology ("IT') companies. Specifically, many characteristics of what has come to be called the "New Economy" - and of the IT companies within it - suggest that traditional monopolization analysis may need modification. As the U.S. has moved toward an information- based …
Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese
Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.