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Articles 91 - 94 of 94
Full-Text Articles in Law
Statutory Interpretations And The Therapy Of The Obvious, Edward L. Rubin
Statutory Interpretations And The Therapy Of The Obvious, Edward L. Rubin
Vanderbilt Law Review
Arthur Koestler wrote that "the more original a discovery the more obvious it seems afterward."' The same may be said about theories of law, and specifically about Robert Katzmann's new book, Judging Statutes. Judge Katzmann's approach to statutory interpretation seems so plausible and balanced that it is hard to believe that anyone ever believed anything else. In this particular case, however, there is in fact an "anything else." It is, of course, Justice Antonin Scalia's campaign to displace intentionalist or purposivist approaches to interpretation with what has come to be called "textualism," and his related effort to rule out reliance …
Baptizing O'Brien: Towards Intermediate Protection Of Religiously Motivated Expressive Conduct, Daniel J. Hay
Baptizing O'Brien: Towards Intermediate Protection Of Religiously Motivated Expressive Conduct, Daniel J. Hay
Vanderbilt Law Review
Despite the relative prominence of religious expression in society' and its elevated status in constitutional law, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a consistent standard of review for neutral, generally applicable laws that indirectly burden religious expression. Since the late nineteenth century, the Court has vacillated between a highly deferential belief-action dichotomy and a more searching (albeit selectively applied) compelling interest test. Currently, the Court embraces a hybrid categorical-rational basis standard that relies in part upon a highly criticized assumption that the political process will be solicitous of minority religious practice. This retreat to rational basis has subordinated religious …
Proposed Legal Constraints On Private Student Lenders, Mary C. Nicoletta
Proposed Legal Constraints On Private Student Lenders, Mary C. Nicoletta
Vanderbilt Law Review
Many American high school graduates face a difficult choice: They can pursue higher education and the higher earnings it provides, but that means taking on debt that it may take them decades to pay back. Or they can forego a college degree and its attendant debt but be stuck earning lower wages for their entire lives. For many of these students, there is no viable third option. From an early age, many Americans have been told about the value of a college degree-without one, finding a job is difficult and lifetime income is severely depressed. Data relating educational attainment to …
Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent On The Meaning Of Federal Law?, Amanda Frost
Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent On The Meaning Of Federal Law?, Amanda Frost
Vanderbilt Law Review
The conventional wisdom is that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent when interpreting federal law. Upon closer inspection, however, the question of how state courts should treat lower federal court precedent is not so clear. Although most state courts now take the conventional approach, a few contend that they are obligated to follow the lower federal courts, and two federal courts of appeals have declared that their decisions are binding on state courts. The Constitution's text and structure send mixed messages about the relationship between state and lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court has never squarely …