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Agreement In Principle: A Compromise For Activist Shareholders From The Uk Stewardship Code, David W. Roberts
Agreement In Principle: A Compromise For Activist Shareholders From The Uk Stewardship Code, David W. Roberts
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Equity ownership in the United States and Europe is now highly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, which gives rise to new problems of agency and corporate governance. These large investment intermediaries, such as mutual funds, specialize in maximizing beneficial owner value based on short-term performance benchmarks but lack the expertise and incentive to actively engage corporate boards on business strategy and governance matters. Instead, institutional investors are "rationally reticent," meaning that they are willing to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them. Activist shareholders may offer an endogenous solution to address "latent activism" in institutional intermediaries …