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Team Production Revisited, William W. Bratton Jan 2021

Team Production Revisited, William W. Bratton

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article reconsiders Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production model of corporate law, offering a favorable evaluation. The model explains both the legal corporate entity and corporate governance institutions in microeconomic terms as the means to the end of encouraging investment, situating corporations within markets and subject to market constraints but simultaneously insisting that productive success requires that corporations remain independent of markets. The model also integrates the inherited framework of corporate law into an economically derived model of production, constructing a microeconomic description of large enterprises firmly rooted in corporate doctrine but neither focused on nor limited by …


Addressing The Auditor Independence Puzzle: Regulatory Models And Proposal For Reform, Martin Gelter, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez Jan 2020

Addressing The Auditor Independence Puzzle: Regulatory Models And Proposal For Reform, Martin Gelter, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Auditors play a major role in corporate governance and capital markets. Ex ante, auditors facilitate firms' access to finance by fostering trust among public investors. Ex post, auditors can prevent misbehavior and prevent financial fraud by corporate insiders. In order to fulfill these goals, however, in addition to having the adequate knowledge and expertise, auditors must perform their functions in an independent manner. Unfortunately, auditors are often subject to conflicts of interest, for example, resulting from the provision of nonaudit services but also because of the mere fact of being hired and paid by the audited company. Therefore, even if …


The Conundrum Of Common Ownership, Jennifer G. Hill Jan 2020

The Conundrum Of Common Ownership, Jennifer G. Hill

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

The common ownership debate has become one of the most contentious issues in corporate law today. This debate is a by-product of major changes to capital market ownership structure, which have triggered concerns about the rise of institutional investors, the growth of index investing, and the rapid concentration of ownership in major international financial markets. The common ownership theory focuses on concerns about the incentives of large financial institutions holding widely diversified portfolios of shares in competing companies within a particular economic sector. Proponents of the common ownership theory argue that, even where institutional investors have relatively small ownership stakes, …


The Law And Practice Of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis Of China And The United States, Robin H. Huang, Randall S. Thomas Jan 2020

The Law And Practice Of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis Of China And The United States, Robin H. Huang, Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both China and the United States. On the books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical …


Singapore's Puzzling Embrace Of Shareholder Stewardship: A Successful Secret, Dan W. Puchniak, Samantha S. Tang Jan 2020

Singapore's Puzzling Embrace Of Shareholder Stewardship: A Successful Secret, Dan W. Puchniak, Samantha S. Tang

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the United Kingdom created the first stewardship code, which was designed to transform its rationally passive institutional investors into actively engaged shareholders. In the UK corporate governance context, this idea made sense. Institutional investors collectively own a sizable majority of the shares in most of the United Kingdom's listed companies. In turn, if the UK stewardship code could incentivize them to effectively monitor management to act as "good shareholder stewards"--the managerial short-termism and excessive risk-taking, which were identified as contributors to the GFC, could be avoided.

The United Kingdom's idea …


Diversity Of Shareholder Stewardship In Asia: Faux Convergence, Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh, Dan W. Puchniak Jan 2020

Diversity Of Shareholder Stewardship In Asia: Faux Convergence, Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh, Dan W. Puchniak

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Since the UK adopted the world's first stewardship code in 2010, stewardship codes have proliferated across Asia. Given the UK Code's prominence, it is tempting to assume that every other stewardship code performs the same function as the UK Code. This assumption belies the truth: all these codes--regardless of whether they have in fact drawn inspiration from the UK Code--have taken different trajectories due to each adopting its jurisdiction's distinctive institutional and legal context.

Using empirical evidence and in-depth case studies of stewardship in Japan and Singapore, this Article reveals how any reception of United Kingdom-style stewardship concepts is only …


Mixed Ownership Reform And Corporate Governance In China's State-Owned Enterprises, Jiangyu Wang, Tan Cheng-Han Jan 2020

Mixed Ownership Reform And Corporate Governance In China's State-Owned Enterprises, Jiangyu Wang, Tan Cheng-Han

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article provides an early assessment of the impact on corporate governance of the most recent wave of reform of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) announced by the CCP in 2013, officially known as the mixed-ownership reform (MOR). It offers a comprehensive and detailed account of the background, policy and regulatory frameworks, and rationale of the MOR in light of the history of ownership reform in China. It also conducts empirical studies of the change in ownership and board composition in over 30 SOEs which have recently completed their MOR experiments, as well as several case studies. It observes that MOR's …


China's "Corporatization Without Privatization" And The Late Nineteenth Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2017

China's "Corporatization Without Privatization" And The Late Nineteenth Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas C. Howson

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article analyzes the contemporary program of "corporatization without privatization" in the People's Republic of China (PRC) directed at China's traditional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through a consideration of long ago precursor enterprise establishments--starting from the last Chinese imperial dynasty's creation of "government-promoted/supervised, merchant-financed/operated" (guandu shangban) firms in the latter part of the nineteenth century. While analysts are tempted to see the PRC corporations with listings on international exchanges that dominate the global economy and capital markets as expressions of "convergence," this Article argues that such firms in fact show deeply embedded aspects of path dependency unique to the Chinese context …


Agreement In Principle: A Compromise For Activist Shareholders From The Uk Stewardship Code, David W. Roberts Jan 2015

Agreement In Principle: A Compromise For Activist Shareholders From The Uk Stewardship Code, David W. Roberts

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Equity ownership in the United States and Europe is now highly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, which gives rise to new problems of agency and corporate governance. These large investment intermediaries, such as mutual funds, specialize in maximizing beneficial owner value based on short-term performance benchmarks but lack the expertise and incentive to actively engage corporate boards on business strategy and governance matters. Instead, institutional investors are "rationally reticent," meaning that they are willing to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them. Activist shareholders may offer an endogenous solution to address "latent activism" in institutional intermediaries …


Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee M. Jones, Michelle Welsh Jan 2012

Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee M. Jones, Michelle Welsh

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant model of corporate governance, the principal function of the board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors, employees, and society at large. Despite general agreement on the importance of director oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts tout the importance of board …


Economics, Politics, And The International Principles For Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis Of Executive Pay At European Banks, Guido Ferrarini, Maria C. Ungureanu Mar 2011

Economics, Politics, And The International Principles For Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis Of Executive Pay At European Banks, Guido Ferrarini, Maria C. Ungureanu

Vanderbilt Law Review

In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay at banks and suggest that there is no strong support for regulating bankers' compensation structures. We also argue that detailed regulation of incentives would subtract essential decisionmaking powers from boards of directors and make compensation structures too rigid.

In Part II we note that political support for regulating bankers' pay has been strong and …


Common Agency And The Public Corporation, Paul Rose Oct 2010

Common Agency And The Public Corporation, Paul Rose

Vanderbilt Law Review

Under the standard agency theory applied to corporate governance, active monitoring of manager-agents by empowered shareholder-principals will reduce agency costs created by management shirking and expropriation of private benefits. But while shareholder power may result in reduced managerial expropriation, an analysis of how that power is often exercised in public corporation governance reveals that it can also produce significant costs: influential shareholders may extract private benefits from the corporation, incur and impose lobbying expenses, and pressure corporations to adopt inapt corporate governance structures. These costs strain the simple principal-agent model on which shareholder empowerment is based. This Article offers an …


On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch Mar 2008

On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Vanderbilt Law Review

In recent years, the California Public Employees Pension System ("CalPERS") has received extensive attention for its active participation in corporate governance. CalPERS's activities established it as a leader among activist institutions. CalPERS's Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Jeff Gordon, Keith Johnson, Un Kyung Park, Wayne Schneider, Damon Silvers, Randall Thomas, and John Wilcox for their valuable help in project design and for their useful comments.

Strategy was based on identifying underperforming companies with poor governance practices and then working to change …


The Evolving Role Of Institutional Investors In Corporate Governance And Corporate Litigation, Randall S. Thomas Mar 2008

The Evolving Role Of Institutional Investors In Corporate Governance And Corporate Litigation, Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Symposium volume of the Vanderbilt Law Review, sponsored by the Institute for Law and Economic Policy ("ILEP"), focuses on the critical role of institutional investors in the modern American corporation. The agency cost model of the corporation tells us that in a dispersed ownership system, such as the U.S. system, large, motivated shareholders can play an important role in reducing the agency costs of equity by closely monitoring the actions of corporate management.1 Activist investors can use their voting powers, their power to file suit, and their power to sell their interests in the firm, to align the interests …


Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway Towards Adopting Delaware Trilogy In Takeover Context, Danielle Quinn Jan 2008

Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway Towards Adopting Delaware Trilogy In Takeover Context, Danielle Quinn

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Note examines Dutch takeover law in light of the current inter-EU competition to attract entities to individual Member States. The recent hostile takeover of the Dutch bank, ABN AMRO, provides an excellent example of the Netherlands' opportunity to use its judiciary to solidify its reputation as a competitive, business-friendly jurisdiction. The Dutch Enterprise Chamber can aid the Netherlands in becoming the preeminent EU country--a similar status to Delaware's Chancery Court in the United States. Although the Enterprise Chamber attempted to introduce Delaware law in ABN AMRO, it unfortunately misapplied the law. As a result, the Dutch Supreme Court had …


The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Robert B. Thompson, Randall S. Thomas Jan 2004

The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Robert B. Thompson, Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt Law Review

Now, however, a new form of shareholder litigation has emerged that is distinct from derivative or securities fraud claims: class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director conduct in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this article show that these acquisition-oriented suits are now the dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber derivative suits by a wide margin.

Are these acquisition-oriented class actions just another deadbeat in the corporate governance debate? Should policymakers take action to cut back on the development of this new form of shareholder litigation? In this paper, we argue that, just as with …


Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, Robert B. Thompson, Hillary A. Sale Apr 2003

Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, Robert B. Thompson, Hillary A. Sale

Vanderbilt Law Review

State law gives corporate managers extremely broad power to direct increasingly large pools of collective business assets. Not surprisingly, economic incentives, norms, markets, and law all work to constrain the breadth of the power and the potential for abuse of what is other people's money.' State corporate law has occupied the center stage in the legal portion of this landscape, with federal securities law playing a supporting role-at least in the academic presentation of the debate. The New Deal's securities legislation eschewed a general federal corporations statute in favor of a more focused federal role emphasizing disclosure and antifraud protections …


Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism In Property, Liberty, And Corporate Governance, O. L. Reed Jan 2003

Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism In Property, Liberty, And Corporate Governance, O. L. Reed

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

In this Article, Professor Reed re-examines the importance of property as a formal legal institution. He continues by arguing that central to creating property is the right to exclude others from resources acquired without force, theft, or fraud. In countries where this right has been firmly established, per capita income far exceeds that of countries lacking a strong right to exclude. Professor Reed then asserts the importance to nation builders of appreciating the virtual semantic equivalence of the terms "property" and "liberty." Finally, he argues that both the specific and broad senses of corporate governance can be reduced to property …


Corporate Governance And Sustainable Peace: An Insider's View, Marina N. Whitman Jan 2003

Corporate Governance And Sustainable Peace: An Insider's View, Marina N. Whitman

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

The Author brings her 30 years of experience as a member of numerous corporate boards of directors to bear on the relationship between corporate governance and sustainable peace. In the Author's experience, over the last three decades corporate boards have become more diverse not only in terms of race and gender, but also through a greater focus on international participation. This diversity has led to concern for a broader set of stakeholders and, in many cases, these boards are presently conducting the affairs of their corporations in a more socially-responsible fashion. Despite these gains, however, the Author concedes that recent …


Adapting Corporate Governance For Sustainable Peace, Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani Jan 2003

Adapting Corporate Governance For Sustainable Peace, Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Acts of violence toward multinational corporations have important consequences for the way these companies will need to structure their approach to international business. This Article proposes four contributions that corporations can make to sustainable peace. By incorporating sustainable peace as a business objective, multinational corporations may be able to blend extant corporate governance principles with a goal that can significantly contribute to the reduction of violence in society.


Corporate Governance And Sustainable Peace, Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani Jan 2003

Corporate Governance And Sustainable Peace, Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

The Articles and Commentary in this Symposium are another step in a series of conferences exploring dimensions of business influence on sustainable peace. As is often the case with new intellectual initiatives, each step seems to open new doors of insight and new sets of questions. Other presentations delivered at this conference included discussions of how one could design architectural plans in keeping with company goals, while others focused on the development of compassion, forgiveness, and voice. Still others connected the topic to notions of ethical compliance models, dispute resolution, corporate citizenship, and economic development.

Beyond these notions, of course, …


Introduction To The Symposium "Convergence On Delaware: Corporate Bankruptcy And Corporate Governance", Robert K. Rasmussen, Charles M. Elson Nov 2002

Introduction To The Symposium "Convergence On Delaware: Corporate Bankruptcy And Corporate Governance", Robert K. Rasmussen, Charles M. Elson

Vanderbilt Law Review

Bankruptcy is back. The use of Chapter 11 by large, publicly held firms was a subject of much debate in the academic and popular press in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Firms such as Texaco, Revco, LTV, Federated Department Stores, Maxwell Communications, TWA, and Eastern Airlines all filed for bankruptcy during that time. The economic boom of the mid- and late 1990s, however, resulted in a relative dearth of high-profile bankruptcy cases. The recent economic downturn has moved corporate reorganizations back into the spotlight. The Chapter 11 filings by firms such as Enron, Global Crossing, the Loewen Group, …


Corporate Governance Reform And Reemergence From Bankruptcy: Putting The Structure Back In Restructuring, Charles M. Elson, Paul M. Helms, James R. Moncus Nov 2002

Corporate Governance Reform And Reemergence From Bankruptcy: Putting The Structure Back In Restructuring, Charles M. Elson, Paul M. Helms, James R. Moncus

Vanderbilt Law Review

A company's descent into bankruptcy may result from one or more troubling factors. Often the failing enterprise has adopted a poor business model, been led by deficient management, or labored under an unworkable capital structure. More often than not, a business failure is also accompanied by a less-than-ideal corporate governance structure within the organization. The failure to adopt an effective corporate governance model often leads to a sterile, inactive board of directors and may hasten a firm's demise. Conversely, proper corporate governance may prevent a business's slide into Chapter 11. Indeed, several studies have demonstrated a strong relationship between corporate …


Corporate Ownership Structure And The Evolution Of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons From The United Kingdom, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, David A. Skeel, Jr. Nov 2002

Corporate Ownership Structure And The Evolution Of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons From The United Kingdom, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, David A. Skeel, Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

The corporate world today subdivides into rival systems of dispersed and concentrated ownership, each characterized by different corporate governance structures. The United States falls into the former category, whereas major industrial rivals such as Japan and Germany are members of the latter. The past decade has seen intense academic debate over possible explanations for the different systems of ownership and control in key developed economies. Anecdotal evidence suggesting that market forces may be serving to destabilize traditional business structures and foster some form of convergence in a U.S. direction has given the controversy powerful current relevance.

For those seeking to …


The Role Of The Corporation In Fostering Sustainable Peace, Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani Mar 2002

The Role Of The Corporation In Fostering Sustainable Peace, Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article demonstrates that there is a plausible, conceptual relationship among corporate governance, business ethics, and sustainable peace. First, the Authors begin by outlining the benefits of and protests against globalization and the reciprocal benefits between geopolitical entities and economic activity. The Article then details specific historical events that foreshadow patterns in the relationship between business and sustainable peace. In looking more closely at those patterns, the Authors argue that through economic progress and mitigation of rivalries in the workplace, multinational corporations can contribute to sustainable peace. Thus, if this argument is correct, the stakes increase dramatically for corporations to …


Persuasion And Resistance: The Use Of Psychology By Anglo-American Corporate Governance Advocates In France, James A. Fanto Jan 2002

Persuasion And Resistance: The Use Of Psychology By Anglo-American Corporate Governance Advocates In France, James A. Fanto

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

The Author argues that in the 1990s Anglo-American corporate governance became the dominant model for large, public firms in the international business world, and that corporate governance professionals relentlessly promoted and exported Anglo-American corporate governance throughout the developed and developing world. Contending that it is an appropriate time--if only because the U.S. recession and international hostilities have tempered the "irrational exuberance" of capital market proponents--to examine critically the advocacy of Anglo-American corporate governance, the Author proposes that an important part of the critical assessment is to explain the momentum of the dominant model: to understand why Anglo-American corporate governance appeared …


Corporate Governance And The Global Social Void, Lee A. Tavis Jan 2002

Corporate Governance And The Global Social Void, Lee A. Tavis

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article argues that the components of globalization--economic integration, democratization, and global governance networks--are changing the nature of corporate governance and the prospects for peace. Multinational enterprises are the instruments of economic integration. As such, multinationals as a group deserve credit for the positive productivity-related wealth effects of the process. As the implementing institutions, these enterprises are also inextricably related to the inequality--the social void--resulting from globalization that threatens peace.

Hyper competition in the global product markets and the demands of the financial markets determine, to a large extent, the activities of the multinational. Alternatively, there is an evolving opportunity …


Terrorism And Globalization: An International Perspective, Linda Lim Jan 2002

Terrorism And Globalization: An International Perspective, Linda Lim

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Terrorism has little or nothing to do with globalization, just as it has little or nothing to do with Islam. Most of the many varieties of terrorism that afflict and have long afflicted the world are responses not to global phenomena, but to intensely local ones. Examples include particularly ethnic, nationalist, and religious fault lines such as violence by Catholics and Protestants in Ireland; Basques in Spain; the Hindu Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; Kashmiris, Sikhs, and Hindu nationalists in India; the Aum cult in Japan; and Uighurs in Xinjiang, China.

The terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center on …


Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking In Corporate Governance, Stephen M. Bainbridge Jan 2002

Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking In Corporate Governance, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article begins by briefly describing the role of the board both in law and in practice. Part II explores the distinction be- tween consensus and authority as modes of institutional decision- making. As hierarchical institutions, corporations rely far more heavily on authority than on consensus. Yet, at the apex of the hierarchy is a collegial body that functions mainly by consensus.

Part III is the core of the Article. In order to evaluate corporate law's preference for collective decisionmaking, we need to know whether group decisionmaking is superior to that of individuals. A wealth of experimental data suggests that …


Corporate Governance In The Cause Of Peace: An Environmental Perspective, Donald O. Mayer Jan 2002

Corporate Governance In The Cause Of Peace: An Environmental Perspective, Donald O. Mayer

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article examines the role of multinational corporations in creating global peace. Part I discusses the role of multinational corporations in the global economy, emphasizing the relationship between multinational corporations, governments, and the environment. Part II explores whether corporations have a moral duty to oppose ill-conceived laws and policy proposals and to support well-conceived laws that encourage efficiency and sustainability, but may hinder short-term profitability. Part III expands and further explores the argument set forth in Part II by examining the continuing dependency of the United States and other industrialized democracies on oil from the Middle East. Part IV concludes …