Law Commons^™

The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein

Georgia Law Review

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …

Chevron And Stare Decisis, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In our contribution to this Chevron on Trial Symposium, we argue that the Supreme Court should not overrule Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and its companion case Relentless v. Department of Commerce. We based our argument largely on statutory stare decisis. In particular, Chevron deference is a bedrock precedent in administrative law, relied on by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts thousands of times since Chevron was decided in 1984. Congress, federal agencies, and the regulated public have also structured their affairs around the precedent. Conversely, the constitutional arguments against Chevron are unpersuasive, and the debate …

Rethinking Countercyclical Financial Regulation, Jeremy C. Kress, Matthew C. Turk

Georgia Law Review

The 2008 financial crisis exposed a longstanding problem in financial regulation: traditional regulatory strategies tend to be procyclical. That is, regulatory tools—most notably, bank capital requirements—incentivize excessive credit growth during economic expansions and insufficient lending during contractions. The procyclicality of U.S. financial regulation was a key driver of the housing bubble in the mid-2000s and the massive credit crunch that followed. To combat this phenomenon, Congress and the federal banking agencies attempted to mitigate procyclical boom-and-bust cycles by implementing regulatory approaches that were explicitly countercyclical. The Dodd-Frank Act and related post-crisis reforms included several countercyclical features that were designed to …

No [Concrete] Harm, No Foul? Article Iii Standing In The Context Of Consumer Financial Protection, Annefloor J. De Groot

Georgia Law Review

In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court held that a bare procedural violation of a federal consumer protection statute is not enough to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement because the alleged injury is not sufficiently concrete. This decision resulted in a sizeable circuit split regarding standing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, with some circuit courts interpreting the holding as narrowing the scope of standing for consumer protection claims, and others maintaining a broader interpretation, allowing plaintiffs to obtain redress for violations of consumer financial protections laws.

In its 2021 ruling in …

Clean Air Act Section 115: Is The Ipcc A 'Duly Constituted International Agency'?, Adam D. Orford

Scholarly Works

Does EPA’s receipt of the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) trigger the agency’s duties under Clean Air Act § 115? The law requires EPA to take action to prevent or eliminate air pollution endangering the public health or welfare of foreign nationals under certain circumstances. If triggered, the argument goes, the law could justify, or compel, EPA’s imposition of nationwide greenhouse gas regulation to combat climate change. One way to justify this, or compel it, is to trigger EPA’s duties “upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies from any duly constituted international agency.” This article …

Optimizing Whistleblowing, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Whistleblowers have exposed misconduct in settings ranging from public health to national security. Whistleblowing thus consistently plays a vital role in safeguarding society. But how much whistleblowing is optimal? And how many meritless claims should we tolerate to reach that optimum? Surprisingly, legislators and scholars have overlooked these essential questions, a neglect that has resulted in undertheorized, stab-in-the-dark whistleblower regimes, risking both overdeterrence and underdeterrence.

This Article confronts the question of optimal whistleblowing in the context of financial fraud. Design choices, which play out along two axes, have profound effects on the successful implementation of whistleblowing policy. One axis varies …

The Lost History Of Delegation At The Founding, Christine Chabot

Georgia Law Review

The new Supreme Court is poised to bring the administrative state to a grinding halt. Five Justices have endorsed Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States—an opinion that threatens to invalidate countless regulatory statutes in which Congress has delegated significant policymaking authority to the Executive Branch. Justice Gorsuch claimed that the “text and history” of the Constitution required the Court to replace a longstanding constitutional doctrine that permits broad delegations with a more restrictive one. But the supposedly originalist arguments advanced by Justice Gorsuch and like-minded scholars run counter to the understandings of delegation that prevailed in the Founding …

Agents Of Bioshield: The Fda, Emergency Use Authorizations, And Public Trust, Kirstiana Perryman

Georgia Law Review

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic spurred the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to utilize the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) procedure more than ever before. The pandemic pushed the relatively obscure procedure into public consciousness, making it a frequent topic of discussion and debate. The EUA procedure permits the FDA Commissioner to authorize the introduction of drugs, devices, or biological products into interstate commerce for use in an actual or potential emergency. To issue an authorization, the FDA Commissioner must determine that it is “reasonable to believe,” based on the “totality of the evidence,” that the product “may be effective.” This standard …

How Chevron Deference Fits Into Article Iii, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, along with Professor Philip Hamburger, assert that Chevron deference-under which courts defer to reasonable agency statutory interpretations-violates Article III. Chevron does so because, they argue, it either permits agencies, not courts, "to say what the law is" or requires judges to forgo independent judgment by favoring the government's position. If they are correct, Congress could not require courts to accept reasonable agency statutory interpretations under any circumstances. This Article does what these critics, perhaps surprisingly, do not do-situates challenges to Chevron within the broad landscape of the Court's current Article III …

The Clean Air Act Of 1963: Postwar Environmental Politics And The Debate Over Federal Power, Adam D. Orford

Scholarly Works

This Article explores the development of the Clean Air Act of 1963, the first law to allow the federal government to fight air pollution rather than study it. The Article focuses on the postwar years (1945-1963) and explores the rise of public health medical research, cooperative federalism, and the desire to harness the powers of the federal government for domestic social improvement, as key precursors to environmental law. It examines the origins of the idea that the federal government should "do something" about air pollution, and how that idea was translated, through drafting, lobbying, politicking, hearings, debate, influence, and votes, …

Judicial Review In Expedited Removal Proceedings: Applying Sims V. Apfel To Assess The Role Of Issue Exhaustion, Emily C. Snow

Georgia Law Review

For noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings, obtaining
judicial review of removal orders is an uphill battle. Some
barriers to judicial review are statutory: noncitizens must first
exhaust their administrative remedies, and they may seek
review only in a federal circuit court of appeals. Other barriers
are judicial—i.e., imposed by courts, not statutes.
A circuit split has emerged over one of these judicially
imposed barriers to judicial review. Some courts have held that
expedited removal proceedings do not accommodate legal
challenges to removal. In those circuits, noncitizens preserve the
opportunity for judicial review even when they do not raise a
legal …

The Expressiveness Of Regulatory Trade-Offs, Benjamin M. Chen

Georgia Law Review

Trade-offs between a sacred value—like human life—
against a secular one—like money—are considered taboo.
People are supposed to be offended by such trade-offs and to
punish those who contemplate them. Yet the last decades in the
United States have witnessed the rise of the cost-benefit state.
Most major rules promulgated today undergo a regulatory
impact analysis, and agencies monetize risks as grave as those
to human life and values as abstract as human dignity.
Prominent academics and lawmakers advocate the weighing of
costs and benefits as an element of rational regulation. The
cost-benefit revolution is a technocratic coup, however, if …

Coequal Federalism And Federal-State Agencies, Dave Owen, Hannah J. Wiseman

Georgia Law Review

Dividing authority between the federal government and the
states is central to the theory and practice of federalism.
Division is the defining feature of dual federalism, which
dominates the U.S. Supreme Court’s federalism
jurisprudence. Recent academic theories of federalism
emphasize overlap and interaction but still assume that
federal and state actors will work within separate institutions.
Each approach can be problematic, yet assumptions of
separation remain the bedrock of federalism. This Article
discusses a different form of federalism: coequal federalism.
Under coequal federalism, federal- and state-appointed
officials collaborate within a single agency that makes
decisions binding on the federal government …

The Other Hobbs Act: An Old Leviathan In The Modern Administrative State, Jason N. Sigalos

Georgia Law Review

The Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act is a
little-known statute, one that is often mistaken for a
federal criminal statute with a similar name.
The lesser-known Hobbs Act requires aggrieved parties
to challenge certain agency orders in a federal court of
appeals within sixty days of the order’s promulgation.
However, if no party does so, are later parties bound by
a potentially unlawful agency order in subsequent
enforcement actions? The U.S. Supreme Court recently
dodged this question in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton
& Harris Chiropractic, Inc. That case concerned a suit
between two private parties under the Telephone
Consumer …

Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson

Scholarly Works

This Article presents our comparative findings of how courts in five other countries review agency statutory interpretation. These comparisons permit us to understand and participate better in current debates about the increasingly controversial Chevron doctrine in American law, whereby courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that an agency administers. Those debates concern, among other things, Chevron 's purported inevitability, functioning and normative propriety. Our inquiry into judicial review in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia provides useful and unexpected findings. Chevron, contrary to some scholars' views, is not inevitable because only one of these countries has …

The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon

Scholarly Works

Litigation systems create dangers of unfairness. Citizens worry, and should worry, about exploitive settlements in aggregate litigation, potential biases in administrative proceedings, and troubling power imbalances in criminal trials. Public confidence in adjudicative processes has eroded to an all-time low. This Article explores the untapped potential of adding independent watchdog entities to address systemic threats to the integrity of government decisionmaking. These entities, which I call “guardian trustees,” do not fit within the traditional framework of our adversary system. Though guardian trustees already operate in bankruptcy proceedings, they have thus far received little attention in scholarly literature. This Article begins …

Regulating Impartiality In Agency Adjudication, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

Which should prevail—the Take Care Clause of Article II or the Due Process Clause? To Justice Breyer’s chagrin, the majorities in Lucia v. SEC and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB expressly declined to resolve whether the U.S. Constitution condones SEC administrative law judges’ and other similarly situated agency adjudicators’ current statutory protection from at-will removal. The crux of the problem is that, on one hand, senior officials may use at-will removal to pressure agency adjudicators and thereby potentially imperil the impartiality that due process requires. On the other hand, Article II limits Congress’s ability to cocoon executive officers, including potentially …

Hiding The Ball: The Proposed Regulatory Accountability Act & Restricting Agency ‘Propaganda’, Benjamin A. Torres

Georgia Law Review

The Senate’s Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA)
seeks to substantially amend the Administrative
Procedure Act, the law governing federal agency
processes. The bill’s sponsors argue, in part, that the
RAA would improve administrative transparency and
accountability. One of the least-discussed provisions,
§ 3(c)(6), “Prohibition on Certain Communications,”
would prohibit agencies from advocating for or against
a proposed regulation during the comment period, an
indispensable component of notice-and-comment
rulemaking that affords the public a voice in the
rulemaking process. This Note recommends that
agencies should be able to exhibit their preferences at all
stages of rulemaking, because, as policymakers, agencies
should inform …

The Operational And Administrative Militaries, Mark P. Nevitt

Georgia Law Review

Admiral James Stavridis collapsed in his chair, exhausted. The four-star Navy admiral had just finished a six-month whirlwind tour of over thirty nations, flying on a state-of-the-art military aircraft surrounded by an enormous staff. He met with leaders from every member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the heads of Russia and Israel, and several prospective U.S. and NATO allies. Not surprisingly, he met with each nation’s senior military leaders and ministers of defense in an effort to strengthen military-to-military relations and reinforce the bonds of the Atlantic Alliance that date back to General Eisenhower and the end of …

Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The Founders sought to protect federal judges’ impartiality primarily because those judges would review the political branches’ actions. To that end, Article III judges retain their offices during “good behaviour,” and Congress cannot reduce their compensation while they are in office. But Article III has taken a curious turn. Article III generally does not prohibit Article I courts or agencies from deciding “public rights” cases, i.e., when the government is a party and seeking to vindicate its own actions and interpretations under federal law against a private party. In contrast, Article III courts generally must resolve cases that concern “private …

Towards Optimal Enforcement, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

In Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, Professor Michael Sant'Ambrogio argues that a hybrid private/public enforcement model in agency proceedings may provide the best hope of achieving optimal federal law enforcement. In other words, a blunderbuss approach of choosing public enforcement or private enforcement (whether in judicial or agency proceedings) is unlikely to prove ideal. He identifies various tools--such as agencies' role in the review or initiation of proceedings, or the use of class-wide proceedings--that Congress or agencies can use to calibrate agency enforcement to its optimal design. I consider three additional tools that may optimize enforcement goals with hybrid public …

Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

In his prominent 1975 law-review article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored how courts (and agencies) should respond when the Due Process Clause required, in the Supreme Court’s exceedingly vague words, “some kind of hearing.” That phrase led to the familiar (if unhelpful) Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, in which courts weigh three factors to determine how much process or formality is due. But the Supreme Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored facet of due process—the requirement for impartial adjudicators. As it turns out, Congress and agencies have broad discretion to fashion not …

Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, And The Supreme Court, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Popular Media

How might a new U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh review federal agency statutory interpretations that come before him on the Court?

To find at least a preliminary answer, we can look to his judicial behavior while serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—and there is plenty of relevant Kavanaugh judicial behavior to observe. Since starting his service on the D.C. Circuit in 2006, Judge Kavanaugh has participated in the disposition of around 2,700 cases and has authored more than 300 opinions. Over a third of those authored opinions involved administrative law.

The Politics Of Selecting Chevron Deference, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative law: When do federal circuit courts decide to use the Chevron deference framework and when do they select a framework that is less deferential to the administrative agency's statutory interpretation? The question is important because the purpose of Chevron deference is to give agencies-not judges-policy-making space within statutory interpretation. We expect, nonetheless, that whether to invoke the Chevron framework is largely driven by political dynamics, with judges adopting a less deferential standard when their political preferences do not align with the agency's decision. To provide insight, …

Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler

Georgia Law Review

This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …

Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of agency statutory …

Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

For hundreds of years prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Anglo-American legislatures used qui tam legislation to enforce legal constraints on government officials. A qui tam statute allows a private informer to collect a statutory fine for illegal conduct, even if the informer lacks the particularized injury normally required for Article III standing. This essay explores whether qui tam regulation should be revived as a means of ensuring executive branch legal accountability."

Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler

Scholarly Works

This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this Essay explores how …

If Established By Law, Then An Administrative Judge Is An Officer, Jennifer L. Cotton

Georgia Law Review

Administrative Judges (AJs) are a large and often overlooked group of federal agency adjudicators. While courts have examined Article II Appointments Clause challenges to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), courts have yet to encounter a legal challenge to the constitutionality of AJs’ appointment procedures. The constitutionality of any federal government actor’s appointment is dependent upon whether that actor is an “officer” or an “employee” under the Article II Appointments clause. It is apparent that the current “significant authority” test that the Supreme Court has espoused to distinguish between officers and employees is unworkable. This Note endeavors to set forth a bright-line …