Law Commons^™

Where Did My Privilege Go? Congress And Its Discretion To Ignore The Attorney-Client Privilege, Don Berthiaume, Jeffrey Ansley

Don R Berthiaume

“The right to counsel is too important to be passed over for prosecutorial convenience or executive branch whimsy. It has been engrained in American jurisprudence since the 18th century when the Bill of Rights was adopted... However, the right to counsel is largely ineffective unless the confidential communications made by a client to his or her lawyer are protected by law.”[1] So said Senator Arlen Specter on February 13, 2009, just seven months before Congress chose to ignore the very privilege he lauded. Why then, if the right to counsel is as important as Senator Specter articulated, does Congress maintain …

Guilty By Proxy: Expanding The Boundaries Of Responsibility In The Face Of Corporate Crime, Amy J. Sepinwall

Amy J. Sepinwall

The BP oil spill and financial crisis share in common more than just profound tragedy and massive clean-up costs. In both cases, governmental commissions have revealed widespread wrongdoing by individuals and the entities for which they work. The public has demanded justice, yet the law enforcement response in both cases has been underwhelming. In particular, no criminal indictments have been sought for any of the corporations responsible for the Macondo oil rig explosion or the Wall Street banks involved in the financial meltdown.

This governmental restraint reflects a deep-seated ambivalence about corporate criminal liability. Though scholars have been debating the …

Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …

Legitimacy And Corporate Law: The Case For Regulatory Redundancy, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This article provides a democratic assessment of the corporate law making structure in the United States. It draws upon the basic democratic principle that those affected by legal rules should have a voice in determining the substance of those rules. Although other commentators have noted certain undemocratic aspects of corporate law, this Article is the first to present a comprehensive assessment of the corporate regulatory structure from the perspective of democracy. It departs from prior accounts by looking past the states' role to consider the ways that federal regulation shores up the legitimacy of the overarching structure. This focus on …

The Role Of Good Faith In Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This Article traces the development of the good faith doctrine in Delaware and links shifts in the doctrine to events occurring in the national economy and in Washington. It shows that in 2003 Delaware judges seemed open to the possibility of imposing liability on directors in a case (Disney) where facts suggested that the directors were overly passive in approving the terms of an employment contract for a senior corporate executive. After the 2001-2002 corporate governance scandals faded, however, the courts abandoned this course. A trio of decisions in Disney, Stone v. Ritter, and Lyondell reiterated what had long been …

Corporate Law And The Rhetoric Of Choice, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

Rhetorically, the notion of choice has always been a powerful one in politics and law. This essay is intended to offer a note of caution about its use. Despite its progressive hue of individual freedom, the rhetoric of choice increasingly tends to be a notion used to defend and uphold existing matrices of economic and social power. This is because the rhetoric of choice is an excellent way to support exiting power relationships. The assertion that people acting within such power relationships are simply choosing their current situation undermines efforts to change those relationships. The powerful stay powerful; the weak …

Reclaiming Corporate Law In A New Gilded Age, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

Corporate law matters. Traditionally seen as the narrow study of the relationship between managers and shareholders, corporate law has frequently been relegated to the margins of legal discussion and political debate. The marginalization of corporate law has been especially prevalent among those who count themselves as progressives. While this has not always been true, in the last generation or so progressives have focused on constitutional law and other areas of so-called public law, and have left corporate law to adherents of neoclassical law and economics. To the extent that the behavior of businesses has been a matter of concern, that …

The Secret Of Growth Is Financing Secrets: Corporate Law And Growth Economics, Robert D. Cooter, Hans Bernd Schaefer

Robert Cooter

Innovative businesses unite capital and new ideas, which requires overcoming the double trust dilemma -- investors fear losing their wealth and innovators fear losing their ideas. To overcome this dilemma, 17th century spice traders invented the joint stock company with an essential feature of modern corporations: entitlements to marketable shares of future profits. Using the corporate form, innovative business ventures can often be organized so that innovators expect to earn more from their share of profits than from stealing the investors’ money, and investors expect to earn more by preserving the company’s secrets than disseminating them. The corporation thus provides …

The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia

Frank J. Garcia

Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …

Save The Economy: Break Up The Big Banks And Shape Up The Regulators, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

Save the Economy: Break Up the Big Banks and Shape Up the Regulators

The U.S. economy is still reeling from the financial crisis that exploded in the fall of 2008. This article asserts that the big banks were major culprits in causing the crisis, by funding the non-bank lenders that created the toxic mortgages which the big banks securitized and sold to unwary investors. Paradoxically, banks which were then too big to fail are even larger today.

The article briefly reviews the history of banking from the Founding Fathers to the deregulatory mindset that has been present since 1980. It …

The Misuse Of Tax Incentives To Align Management-Shareholder Interests, James R. Repetti

James R. Repetti

The U.S. tax system contains many provisions which are intended to align management of large publicly traded companies more closely to stockholders. This article shows that many of the tax provisions that have been adopted are of questionable effectiveness because they fail to address the complexities of stockholder-management relations in attempting to motivate management to act in the best interests of stockholders. The article proposes that rather than Congress attempting to identify the best way that it can use the tax system to motivate management, Congress should eliminate tax provisions which subsidize management's inefficiencies in order to encourage stockholders, themselves, …

Understanding Csr: An Empirical Study Of Private Self-Regulation, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: The article is a study of an important burgeoning form of regulation—private self-regulation—in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Rather than taking a purely theoretical approach or a social scientific study relying publicly reported data, the article addresses the issue by way of interview based case studies. As a study in regulation it clarifies the difference between various types of self-regulation, trade associations’ codes as private self-regulation and government sponsored self-regulation. This distinction hampers efforts to understand the important aspects of motivation and compliance. This study provides empirical examination of compliance in private self-regulation. Given the impact and …

Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, Scott Fitzgibbon

Scott T. FitzGibbon

No abstract provided.

Checking The Staats: How Long Is Too Long To Give Adequate Public Notice In Broadening Reissue Patent Applications?, David M. Longo

David M. Longo

No abstract provided.

Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share Value In Publicly Traded Companies?, J.W. Verret, Thomas Stratmann

John W Verret

The field of corporate governance has long considered the costs of the separation of ownership from control in publicly traded corporations and the regulatory and market structures designed to limit those costs. The debate over the efficiency of regulations designed to limit agency costs has recently focused on the SEC’s new rule requiring companies to include shareholder nominees on the company financed proxy statement to facilitate insurgent challengers to incumbent board members in board elections. A recent vein of empirical literature has examined the stock price effects of events surrounding the new proxy access rule. We present a study that …

The Myth Of Investor Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act And The Office Of The Investor Advocate, Chelsea Ferrette

Chelsea P. Ferrette

Are security investors protected when investor advocacy is a form of regulation? This article asks that question and answers “no.” This article looks at the SEC’s Office of the Investor Advocate (“OIA”) mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The OIA’s prime-objective is the advocacy and protection of investors. The OIA plans to meet its objective by ensuring retail investors’ interests are adequately represented, assisting them in conflict resolution, and identifying areas where regulatory changes benefit investors. This article posits, however, that the OIA cannot achieve its goals, because, first, the ever-increasing complexity of financial securities; second, the conflicts of …

Strategic Management And The Role Of Legal Norms In Creating Corporate Value, Nadelle Grossman

Nadelle Grossman

Delaware corporate law currently requires that directors oversee their firm’s systems to monitor risk so that they can limit their firm’s losses from such risks. Corporate law does not, however, require either directors or officers to oversee the interrelated process of managing that firm’s strategy for gains. Yet managing both risk and strategy are essential to a firm in creating value. In fact, as I argue in the paper, the current focus by business courts and academic commentators only on risk management oversight to prevent losses could actually undermine a firm’s management of its strategy for gains. I therefore propose …

The Practical Soul Of Business Ethics: The Corporate Manager's Dilemma And The Social Teaching Of The Catholic Church, Leo L. Clarke, Bruce P. Frohnen, Edward C. Lyons

Edward C. Lyons

This Article focuses on and attempts to dispel an overly narrow view of the moral responsibilities of corporations and their managers. Many businessmen and lawyers, relying on prevailing approaches to business ethics, labor under the misperception that the moral ladder in the business world has only one rung: "Be honest." Americans, however, should, can and do expect more from the managers of our large corporations, and virtually every Fortune 100 company publicly espouses a "social responsibility" far exceeding mere honesty. Further, as is demonstrated, American jurisprudence is consistent with those expectations. This Article's thesis is that Catholic Social Teaching provides …

Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac: Legal Implications Of A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy

Michael E Murphy

A financial cooperative of mortgage originators is capable of assuming the core securitization functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as part of a scheme to dismantle these institutions. Such a cooperative would offer advantages in maintaining adequate capitalization and in providing an effective governance structure. A federally chartered, Subchapter T cooperative appears preferable for this purpose.

Strategic Management And The Role Of Legal Norms In Creating Corporate Value, Nadelle Grossman

Nadelle Grossman

Delaware corporate law currently requires that directors oversee their firm’s systems to monitor risk so that they can limit their firm’s losses from such risks. Corporate law does not, however, require either directors or officers to oversee the interrelated process of managing that firm’s strategy for gains. Yet managing both risk and strategy are essential to a firm in creating value. In fact, as I argue in the paper, the current focus by business courts and academic commentators only on risk management oversight to prevent losses could actually undermine a firm’s management of its strategy for gains. I therefore propose …

Eliminating Wall Street's Safety Net: How A Systemic Risk Premium Can Solve "Too Big To Fail", Jason Rudderman

Jason Rudderman

Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net: How a Systemic Risk Premium Can Solve “Too Big to Fail” The financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 sent the United States and the global economy into its worst recession since the great depression. Large, interconnected financial and non-financial institutions were at the center of the financial crisis. The institutions highly leveraged positions during the crisis led the government to take extreme measures, including bailing out some of these “too big to fail,” but failing institutions. The crisis led the United States Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank …

The Case Against The Dodd-Frank Act’S Living Wills: Contingency Planning Following The Financial Crisis, Nizan Geslevich Packin

Nizan Geslevich Packin

The Dodd-Frank Act’s “living will” requirement mandates that systemically important financial institutions develop wide-ranging strategic analyses of their business affairs, and submit comprehensive contingency plans for reorganization or resolution of their operations to regulators. The goal is to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the US and encourage last-resort planning, which will allow for a rapid and efficient response in the event of an emergency. Beyond the general framework set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act, very little is known about living wills; no legal literature currently exists on what the concept entails, and regulators have not yet created any …

A Pattern Of Unaccountability: Rating Agency Liability, The Dodd-Frank Act, And A Financial Crisis That Could Have Been Prevented, Stephen P. Alicanti

Stephen P Alicanti

By opining on the credit quality of structured debt products, credit rating agencies guide investment decisions and facilitate the debt capital markets. In the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007, loans were commonly issued to individuals with poor credit histories and insufficient income. After those loans were originated, investment banks packaged them into securitized debt products and sold sections (tranches) to investors. Many of those products received credit rating agencies’ highest endorsement of creditworthiness. Despite their high ratings, those products failed during the financial crisis and devastated individual investors, investment banks, and insurance companies. The financial shockwaves …

Legal Mechanization Of Corporate Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response To Professor Branson With Some Supplemental Thoughts, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Response argues that as ATS jurisprudence “matures” or becomes more sophisticated, the legitimate limits of the law regress. The further expansion within the corporate defendant pool – attempting to pin liability on parent, great grandparent corporations and up to the top – raises the stakes and complexity of ATS litigation. The corporate social responsibility discussion raises three principal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how a corporation chooses its self-interest versus the interests of others, when and how it should help others if control decisions may harm the shareholder owners, and how far the corporation must …

No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank And Consumer Financial Protection Act's "Abusive" Standard, Tiffany S. Lee

Tiffany S Lee

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act creates the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. This consumer watchdog will be responsible for the most powerful consumer protections in American history. Under section 1031(d) of the Act, the Bureau may ban acts and practices that are unfair, deceptive, or abusive. While the unfair and deceptive standards have existed for some time, “abusive” is a relatively new legal standard with limited jurisprudential history. Thus, ironically, critics assert that the inclusion of the abusive standard is itself an abuse of legislative power. This Article asserts that despite some criticism to …

Private Ordering With Shareholder Bylaws, Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, Marcus Hintze

D. Gordon Smith

Finding Shelter In A Time Of Crisis: A Process-Oriented Approach To Risk Management, Kristin Johnson

Kristin N Johnson

Success in financial markets rests on the effectiveness of a business’s risk management strategy: manage risks well and profits follow; fail to manage risks and a crisis ensues. It has long been evident that inadequate enterprise risk management policies, or internal risk-reducing strategies, create perilous consequences for a business. The recent financial crisis illustrates that the often disparate regulatory guidance and multiplicity of regulators who influence enterprise risk management policies were ill-suited to address conflicts and weaknesses in risk management accountability and enforcement mechanisms. During the crisis, a chorus of commentators demanded a federal solution to address the devastating economic …

Law And Venture Capital: The Case Of Japanese Entrepreneurs, Zenichi Shishido

Zenichi Shishido

The biggest difference in the incentive bargains made in the venture capital industries in the US and Japan is that American entrepreneurs abandon control while Japanese entrepreneurs do not. Years ago, this difference was thought to be caused by a lack of liquid IPO markets by some experts in the field. However, there are currently multiple liquid IPO markets in Japan, yet Japanese entrepreneurs are still reluctant to abandon control of their companies to venture capitalists. While there are likely to be many complementary reasons for this difference, it can be partly explained by the different legal systems in the …

Employment, Justice, And The Psychological Contract, Larry A. Dimatteo, Robert Bird, Jason Colquitt

Larry A DiMatteo

The manuscript is a interdisciplinary collaboration between contract law, employment law and management scholars and draws from the fields of law, management, and psychology. One of the authors is currently Editor-in-Chief of the top-tier level ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL. Because of his nationally-recognized expertise, the survey and statistical analysis is of the highest order.

After reviewing and noting the gaps in the employment and justice literatures, this article then presents the finding of a survey of 763 participants to measure whether certain variables—procedural and substantive fairness, as well as educating employees on the principle of employment at will—impact the propensities …

Delaware's "Expanding Duty Of Loyalty" And Illegal Conduct: A Step Towards Corporate Social Responsibility, David Rosenberg

David Rosenberg

Courts and legal scholars have long agreed that approval of illegal activity constitutes a violation of a corporate director’s fiduciary duties to the shareholders. While directors’ fiduciary obligations have traditionally been divided into the duties of care, loyalty and good faith, recent decisions in the Delaware courts have narrowed them down into a fairly broadly defined single duty of loyalty. Therefore, in order for shareholders to bring a lawsuit against directors for approving illegal activity, they must claim that the directors acted disloyally, even in situations where the directors believed that their decision would benefit the corporation and the shareholders. …