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2011

Corporations

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Articles 1 - 30 of 195

Full-Text Articles in Law

Cancellazione Delle Società Di Capitali E Responsabilità Di Soci E Liquidatori, Valerio Sangiovanni Dec 2011

Cancellazione Delle Società Di Capitali E Responsabilità Di Soci E Liquidatori, Valerio Sangiovanni

Valerio Sangiovanni

No abstract provided.


"Because That's Where The Money Is": A Theory Of Corporate Legal Compliance, William Bradford Dec 2011

"Because That's Where The Money Is": A Theory Of Corporate Legal Compliance, William Bradford

william bradford

Upon his capture in 1934, the legendary bank robber Willie Sutton was asked by FBI agents, Why do you rob banks, Willie? Sutton, who believed the question to be rhetorical, replied, dryly, Because that's where the money is. In other words, Sutton understood his interrogator to be inquiring as to why he robbed banks rather than, say, homes, or gas stations, or church offering plates. Had he understood the query as intended - i.e., what was it about Willie Sutton the impelled Willie Sutton to crime when many others, struggling to survive the Great Depression, were not? - Sutton could …


Where Did My Privilege Go? Congress And Its Discretion To Ignore The Attorney-Client Privilege, Don Berthiaume, Jeffrey Ansley Nov 2011

Where Did My Privilege Go? Congress And Its Discretion To Ignore The Attorney-Client Privilege, Don Berthiaume, Jeffrey Ansley

Don R Berthiaume

“The right to counsel is too important to be passed over for prosecutorial convenience or executive branch whimsy. It has been engrained in American jurisprudence since the 18th century when the Bill of Rights was adopted... However, the right to counsel is largely ineffective unless the confidential communications made by a client to his or her lawyer are protected by law.”[1] So said Senator Arlen Specter on February 13, 2009, just seven months before Congress chose to ignore the very privilege he lauded. Why then, if the right to counsel is as important as Senator Specter articulated, does Congress maintain …


Guilty By Proxy: Expanding The Boundaries Of Responsibility In The Face Of Corporate Crime, Amy J. Sepinwall Nov 2011

Guilty By Proxy: Expanding The Boundaries Of Responsibility In The Face Of Corporate Crime, Amy J. Sepinwall

Amy J. Sepinwall

The BP oil spill and financial crisis share in common more than just profound tragedy and massive clean-up costs. In both cases, governmental commissions have revealed widespread wrongdoing by individuals and the entities for which they work. The public has demanded justice, yet the law enforcement response in both cases has been underwhelming. In particular, no criminal indictments have been sought for any of the corporations responsible for the Macondo oil rig explosion or the Wall Street banks involved in the financial meltdown.

This governmental restraint reflects a deep-seated ambivalence about corporate criminal liability. Though scholars have been debating the …


Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones Nov 2011

Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …


Legitimacy And Corporate Law: The Case For Regulatory Redundancy, Renee M. Jones Nov 2011

Legitimacy And Corporate Law: The Case For Regulatory Redundancy, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This article provides a democratic assessment of the corporate law making structure in the United States. It draws upon the basic democratic principle that those affected by legal rules should have a voice in determining the substance of those rules. Although other commentators have noted certain undemocratic aspects of corporate law, this Article is the first to present a comprehensive assessment of the corporate regulatory structure from the perspective of democracy. It departs from prior accounts by looking past the states' role to consider the ways that federal regulation shores up the legitimacy of the overarching structure. This focus on …


The Role Of Good Faith In Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, Renee M. Jones Nov 2011

The Role Of Good Faith In Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This Article traces the development of the good faith doctrine in Delaware and links shifts in the doctrine to events occurring in the national economy and in Washington. It shows that in 2003 Delaware judges seemed open to the possibility of imposing liability on directors in a case (Disney) where facts suggested that the directors were overly passive in approving the terms of an employment contract for a senior corporate executive. After the 2001-2002 corporate governance scandals faded, however, the courts abandoned this course. A trio of decisions in Disney, Stone v. Ritter, and Lyondell reiterated what had long been …


Investing In Distressed Italian Companies Under The Reformed Italian Bankruptcy Law - A Comparison With The Us Bankruptcy Code, Pierantonio Musso Nov 2011

Investing In Distressed Italian Companies Under The Reformed Italian Bankruptcy Law - A Comparison With The Us Bankruptcy Code, Pierantonio Musso

Pierantonio Musso

This article presents a scheme to profitably invest in distressed Italian companies by taking advantage of the Italian Bankruptcy Law in comparison with the US Bankruptcy Code. The risks connected to the insolvency proceeding are analyzed under their economic effects and foreseen in their general appearance. Specific remedies to avoid or mitigate the potential risks are provided. Singular advantages, available only in the proposed investment scheme under the Italian Law, are described. As a result the investment produces a less risky and more profitable outcome than an investment in a non-distressed and non-Italian target company.


Corporate Law And The Rhetoric Of Choice, Kent Greenfield Nov 2011

Corporate Law And The Rhetoric Of Choice, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

Rhetorically, the notion of choice has always been a powerful one in politics and law. This essay is intended to offer a note of caution about its use. Despite its progressive hue of individual freedom, the rhetoric of choice increasingly tends to be a notion used to defend and uphold existing matrices of economic and social power. This is because the rhetoric of choice is an excellent way to support exiting power relationships. The assertion that people acting within such power relationships are simply choosing their current situation undermines efforts to change those relationships. The powerful stay powerful; the weak …


Reclaiming Corporate Law In A New Gilded Age, Kent Greenfield Nov 2011

Reclaiming Corporate Law In A New Gilded Age, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

Corporate law matters. Traditionally seen as the narrow study of the relationship between managers and shareholders, corporate law has frequently been relegated to the margins of legal discussion and political debate. The marginalization of corporate law has been especially prevalent among those who count themselves as progressives. While this has not always been true, in the last generation or so progressives have focused on constitutional law and other areas of so-called public law, and have left corporate law to adherents of neoclassical law and economics. To the extent that the behavior of businesses has been a matter of concern, that …


Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, Jessica M. Erickson Nov 2011

Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Corporate law leaves no stone unturned when it comes to litigating corporate fraud. The legal system has developed a remarkable array of litigation options shareholder derivative suits, securities class actions, SEC enforcement actions, even criminal prosecutions all aimed at preventing the next corporate scandal. Scholars have long assumed that these different lawsuits offer different avenues for deterring the masterminds of corporate fraud yet this assumption has gone untested in the legal literature. This Article aims to fill that gap through the first empirical examination of the broader world of corporate fraud litigation. Analyzing over 700 lawsuits, the study reveals that …


The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin Nov 2011

The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, …


The Secret Of Growth Is Financing Secrets: Corporate Law And Growth Economics, Robert D. Cooter, Hans Bernd Schaefer Oct 2011

The Secret Of Growth Is Financing Secrets: Corporate Law And Growth Economics, Robert D. Cooter, Hans Bernd Schaefer

Robert Cooter

Innovative businesses unite capital and new ideas, which requires overcoming the double trust dilemma -- investors fear losing their wealth and innovators fear losing their ideas. To overcome this dilemma, 17th century spice traders invented the joint stock company with an essential feature of modern corporations: entitlements to marketable shares of future profits. Using the corporate form, innovative business ventures can often be organized so that innovators expect to earn more from their share of profits than from stealing the investors’ money, and investors expect to earn more by preserving the company’s secrets than disseminating them. The corporation thus provides …


When Parallel Tracks Cross: Applying The New Insider Trading Regulations Under Dodd-Frank Derails, Gregory J. Melus Oct 2011

When Parallel Tracks Cross: Applying The New Insider Trading Regulations Under Dodd-Frank Derails, Gregory J. Melus

Gregory J Melus

Abstract: When Parallel Tracks Cross: Applying the New Insider Trading Regulations under Dodd-Frank Derails On March 11, 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an administrative proceeding against former Goldman Sachs Director, Rajat Gupta for participating in the insider trading scheme of Raj Rajaratnam. The complaint was the first application of the SEC’s expanded authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to charge an unregistered entity for securities violations in an SEC enforcement hearing. This Comment argues that bringing an SEC administrative proceeding against Rajat Gupta would not succeed because the retroactive application of the Dodd-Frank law would fail the …


The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia Oct 2011

The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia

Frank J. Garcia

Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …


Save The Economy: Break Up The Big Banks And Shape Up The Regulators, Charles W. Murdock Oct 2011

Save The Economy: Break Up The Big Banks And Shape Up The Regulators, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

Save the Economy: Break Up the Big Banks and Shape Up the Regulators

The U.S. economy is still reeling from the financial crisis that exploded in the fall of 2008. This article asserts that the big banks were major culprits in causing the crisis, by funding the non-bank lenders that created the toxic mortgages which the big banks securitized and sold to unwary investors. Paradoxically, banks which were then too big to fail are even larger today.

The article briefly reviews the history of banking from the Founding Fathers to the deregulatory mindset that has been present since 1980. It …


The Misuse Of Tax Incentives To Align Management-Shareholder Interests, James R. Repetti Oct 2011

The Misuse Of Tax Incentives To Align Management-Shareholder Interests, James R. Repetti

James R. Repetti

The U.S. tax system contains many provisions which are intended to align management of large publicly traded companies more closely to stockholders. This article shows that many of the tax provisions that have been adopted are of questionable effectiveness because they fail to address the complexities of stockholder-management relations in attempting to motivate management to act in the best interests of stockholders. The article proposes that rather than Congress attempting to identify the best way that it can use the tax system to motivate management, Congress should eliminate tax provisions which subsidize management's inefficiencies in order to encourage stockholders, themselves, …


The Garcetti Virus, Nancy M. Modesitt Oct 2011

The Garcetti Virus, Nancy M. Modesitt

All Faculty Scholarship

In an era where corporate malfeasance has imposed staggering costs on society, ranging from the largest oil spill in recorded history to the largest government bailout of Wall Street, one would think that those who uncover corporate wrongdoing before it causes significant harm should receive awards. Employees are particularly well-placed to uncover such wrongdoing within companies. However, rather than reward these employees, employers tend to fire or marginalize them. While there are statutory protections for whistleblowers, a disturbing new trend appears to be developing: courts are excluding from the protection of whistleblowing statutes employees who report wrongdoing as part of …


Understanding Csr: An Empirical Study Of Private Self-Regulation, Benedict Sheehy Sep 2011

Understanding Csr: An Empirical Study Of Private Self-Regulation, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: The article is a study of an important burgeoning form of regulation—private self-regulation—in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Rather than taking a purely theoretical approach or a social scientific study relying publicly reported data, the article addresses the issue by way of interview based case studies. As a study in regulation it clarifies the difference between various types of self-regulation, trade associations’ codes as private self-regulation and government sponsored self-regulation. This distinction hampers efforts to understand the important aspects of motivation and compliance. This study provides empirical examination of compliance in private self-regulation. Given the impact and …


Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, Scott Fitzgibbon Sep 2011

Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, Scott Fitzgibbon

Scott T. FitzGibbon

No abstract provided.


Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac; Legal Implications For A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy Sep 2011

Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac; Legal Implications For A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy

Michael E Murphy

A financial cooperative of mortgage originators is capable of assuming the core securitization functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as part of a scheme to dismantle these institutions. Such a cooperative would offer advantages in maintaining adequate capitalization and in providing an effective governance structure. A federally chartered, Subchapter T cooperative appears preferable for this purpose.


Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac; Legal Implications For A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy Sep 2011

Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac; Legal Implications For A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy

Michael E Murphy

A financial cooperative of mortgage originators is capable of assuming the core securitization functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as part of a scheme to dismantle these institutions. Such a cooperative would offer advantages in maintaining adequate capitalization and in providing an effective governance structure. A federally chartered, Subchapter T cooperative appears preferable for this purpose.


Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac: Legal Implications Of A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy Sep 2011

Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac: Legal Implications Of A Successor Cooperative, Michael E. Murphy

Michael E Murphy

A financial cooperative of mortgage originators is capable of assuming the core securitization functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as part of a scheme to dismantle these institutions. Such a cooperative would offer advantages in maintaining adequate capitalization and in providing an effective governance structure. A federally chartered, Subchapter T cooperative appears preferable for this purpose.


Rating The Regulation Of Rating Agencies: Credit Rating Agency Reform In The Aftermath Of The Global Financial Crisis, Nan S. Ellis Sep 2011

Rating The Regulation Of Rating Agencies: Credit Rating Agency Reform In The Aftermath Of The Global Financial Crisis, Nan S. Ellis

Nan S Ellis

In this article, we identify five issues related to performance of credit rating agencies and consider the Dodd-Frank Act in light of these five interrelated issues. Others have commented on credit rating agency performance and offered proposed solutions. Our article is unique, however, in that it offers a comprehensive examination of these interrelated issues. We recognize that any regulatory reform must consider all aspects of the issue rather than to deal with isolated, incremental reform. Moreover, we offer an interdisciplinary approach which considers the relevant finance literature as well as legal commentary.


Electronic Discovery: A Survey Of E-Discovery, Its Effect On Corporate Constitutional Rights And Why Corporations May Receive The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Parallel Civil And Criminal Litigation, Percy Arnell King Sep 2011

Electronic Discovery: A Survey Of E-Discovery, Its Effect On Corporate Constitutional Rights And Why Corporations May Receive The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Parallel Civil And Criminal Litigation, Percy Arnell King

Percy Arnell King Esq.

Advancing technology has created more places to seek out relevant information than ever before which, has created a burden for corporations tasked with retaining this information to comply with applicable laws and the prospect of civil or criminal litigation. This article explores how the modern trend of storing information electronically and subsequent electronic discovery allowed in parallel civil and criminal trials is inherently unfair to corporations. Furthermore, corporations have been granted several rights derived from the Bill of Rights, and should also receive the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.


Checking The Staats: How Long Is Too Long To Give Adequate Public Notice In Broadening Reissue Patent Applications?, David M. Longo Sep 2011

Checking The Staats: How Long Is Too Long To Give Adequate Public Notice In Broadening Reissue Patent Applications?, David M. Longo

David M. Longo

No abstract provided.


Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share Value In Publicly Traded Companies?, J.W. Verret, Thomas Stratmann Sep 2011

Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share Value In Publicly Traded Companies?, J.W. Verret, Thomas Stratmann

John W Verret

The field of corporate governance has long considered the costs of the separation of ownership from control in publicly traded corporations and the regulatory and market structures designed to limit those costs. The debate over the efficiency of regulations designed to limit agency costs has recently focused on the SEC’s new rule requiring companies to include shareholder nominees on the company financed proxy statement to facilitate insurgent challengers to incumbent board members in board elections. A recent vein of empirical literature has examined the stock price effects of events surrounding the new proxy access rule. We present a study that …


Delaware’S Relevance In Chapter 22: Who Is “Courting Failure” Now?, Ruth S. Lee Sep 2011

Delaware’S Relevance In Chapter 22: Who Is “Courting Failure” Now?, Ruth S. Lee

Ruth S Lee

This study presents surprising new statistical evidence that contributes to the current “over-heated” academic debate about the Delaware courts’ role in Chapter 11 failure. In 2001, Professor LoPucki published an influential article suggesting that when large corporations file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, they fail at a dramatically higher rate in Delaware courts than in other jurisdictions. He attributed this to corruption. His article enraged many academics and practitioners, and ignited many articles in the past two decades. This study presents startling evidence that while Chapter 11s filed in Delaware courts did have much higher failure rates from 1991-1996, after …


The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance And Theory – Evidence From The Field And The Path Onward, P M Vasudev Sep 2011

The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance And Theory – Evidence From The Field And The Path Onward, P M Vasudev

Palladam M Vasudev

The article provides an overview of the development of the stakeholder idea, and presents the results from a survey of the American, British and Canadian corporations included in the Fortune 500 Global Corporations (2009) for their adoption of the stakeholder principle. The survey finds near-unanimous acceptance of the stakeholder vision. 97 percent of the US, UK, and Canadian companies included in the survey acknowledge the stakeholder principle in some form. The trend of adoption of the stakeholder model is unmistakable, and this has significant implications for corporate theory. The article also examines how the emerging ideas about stakeholders and the …


The Myth Of Investor Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act And The Office Of The Investor Advocate, Chelsea Ferrette Sep 2011

The Myth Of Investor Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act And The Office Of The Investor Advocate, Chelsea Ferrette

Chelsea P. Ferrette

Are security investors protected when investor advocacy is a form of regulation? This article asks that question and answers “no.” This article looks at the SEC’s Office of the Investor Advocate (“OIA”) mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The OIA’s prime-objective is the advocacy and protection of investors. The OIA plans to meet its objective by ensuring retail investors’ interests are adequately represented, assisting them in conflict resolution, and identifying areas where regulatory changes benefit investors. This article posits, however, that the OIA cannot achieve its goals, because, first, the ever-increasing complexity of financial securities; second, the conflicts of …