Law Commons^™

Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, Or Substitute?, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this brief Comment I make two points. First, the subconstitutional doctrines appear to have the advantage of allowing elected lawmakers to pursue whatever course they wish, as long as they satisfy the requirements of these subconstitutional doctrines. In practice, however, what appears to be a provisional invalidation based on subconstitutional law turns out to be - and, indeed, might be expected at the moment of decision to be - a final, unrevisable decision. Further, courts might strategically deploy these sub constitutional doctrines to avoid the sting of the charge that they are foreclosing legislative choice while effectively doing so. …

Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is an Essay about "the how" of constitutional interpretation. Much attention has been devoted to the question of how the Constitution is interpreted in courts. Rather little attention has been devoted to the question of how the Constitution is interpreted elsewhere in the government. The Constitution tells us that Congress, the President, and state legislators and courts must adhere to its terms, but it does not tell us how much interpretive power each actor should have, nor does it prescribe rules for each actor to use when interpreting the text. I argue that constitutional interpretation by Congress is, and …

"Shut Up He Explained", Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I of this Commentary examines the conversational model of politics. I argue that the virtues Bennett finds in the conversational model exist only when, and to the extent that, participants in civil and political society can engage in undominated conversation. The requirement that conversation be undominated generates a substantial set of social prerequisites, mostly dealing with equality. And yet, determining what social arrangements actually satisfy those prerequisites is itself a matter of constitutional controversy. Resolving such controversies through politics is no solution, because the political arena is where we seek to ensure that nondomination prevails in civil society, and, …

The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue In The Supreme Court?, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 1801, when William Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State James Madison to deliver his commission as justice of the peace, he initiated one of the most important cases in the Court's history. But why did Marbury choose the Supreme Court? Was there a lower federal court that could have granted the writ at the time? The short answer is "yes." Rather than making an unsuccessful attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, I have learned that he could have brought his suit in the then …

The Public Health Improvement Process In Alaska: Toward A Model Public Health Law, Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge Jr.

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this Article, we present the findings of our study on the improvement of public health law in Alaska. We examine and analyze the public health laws supporting the state's public health system. The fact that Alaska has attained statehood comparatively recently, and has a governing structure involving state, municipal, rural, and tribal entities presents unique opportunities for the State to improve its public health system and its supporting legal infrastructure

Impeachment As Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Constitutionalists have assumed, too quickly in my view, that symmetry should exist between the interpretive styles of the courts and Congress. This assumption, which I shall call the myth of interpretive symmetry, slights the many reasons why an interpretive method may work well in one area and not work as well in another. Instead of mapping out all these possible divergences, I illustrate the point with three examples: the roles of history, precedent, and moral philosophy. I show how, in each instance, arguments can be made to suggest that divergent institutional roles should be taken into account in formulating a …

The Vertical Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Standard understandings of the separation of powers begin with the concept of function. The author argues that function alone cannot predict important changes in structural incentives and thus serves as a poor proxy for assessing real risks to governmental structure. To illustrate this point, the article returns to proposals considered at the Constitutional Convention and considers difficult contemporary cases such as Morrison v. Olson, Clinton v. Jones, and the Supreme Court's more recent federalism decisions. In each instance, function appears to steer us wrong because it fails to understand separation of powers questions as ones of structural incentive …

A ‘Non-Power’ Looks At Separation Of Powers, Alan B. Morrison

Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture

On April 6, 1989, Dean, Alan B. Morrison of George Washington Law, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s ninth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "A ‘Non-Power’ Looks at Separation of Powers."

Dean Morrison is the Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service at GW Law. He is responsible for creating pro bono opportunities for students, bringing a wide range of public interest programs to the law school, encouraging students to seek positions in the non-profit and government sectors, and assisting students find ways to fund their legal education to make it possible for them to pursue careers …