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Columbia Law School

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

2001

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Evaluation, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2001

Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Evaluation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This Article starts with the recognition that the average private benefits of control vary significantly across countries. But why? The simplest explanation ascribes this variation to differences in law between jurisdictions: for example, the law of jurisdiction X could privilege controlling shareholders by allowing them to extract benefits from their corporation in the form of above-market salaries or non-pro-rata payments in connection with self-dealing transactions. But, this explanation cannot fit all cases. To illustrate, if the substantive law is essentially similar between two jurisdictions while the private benefits of control appear to be significantly different, then some other explanation must …


Disclosure Norms, Eric L. Talley Jan 2001

Disclosure Norms, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this Article is to interrogate the relationship between judicial error and extralegal norms more formally, focusing particularly on typical corporate disclosure contexts. In so doing, I shall argue that this relationship is far less clear-cut than much of the literature suggests. Using a formal, game-theoretic model of information disclosure, I demonstrate that in the presence of judicial error, a society that benefits from extralegal norms of honest disclosure might ironically favor more expansive legal regulation than would a similarly situated society in which norms are weak or nonexistent. Thus, in contrast to the common argument that norms …


Tax Constraints On Indexed Options, David M. Schizer Jan 2001

Tax Constraints On Indexed Options, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Indexed stock option grants reward executives for outperforming a benchmark, such as the market as a whole or competitors in the same industry. These options offer superior incentives by limiting the influence of factors beyond an executive's control, such as general market and industry conditions. Yet indexed options are almost never used. Professor Saul Levmore seeks to explain this puzzle with norms. This comment on his article argues that tax plays a larger role in this puzzle than he acknowledges, although tax is not a complete explanation. Accounting and Professor Levmore's norms-based account are then briefly considered.