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Full-Text Articles in Law
Exemplary Legal Writing 2021: Four Recommendations, Jed S. Rakoff, Lev Menand
Exemplary Legal Writing 2021: Four Recommendations, Jed S. Rakoff, Lev Menand
Faculty Scholarship
This is not the first great book that Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of Berkeley Law School, has authored, but it is perhaps his most chilling. For in 308 pages of tightly reasoned detail, he demonstrates beyond cavil how the Supreme Court of recent decades (and well before the addition of the Trump appointees) undertook to undercut most of the reforms by which the Warren Court had sought to reduce police misconduct.
A Skeptical View Of Information Fiduciaries, Lina M. Khan, David E. Pozen
A Skeptical View Of Information Fiduciaries, Lina M. Khan, David E. Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
The concept of “information fiduciaries” has surged to the forefront of debates on online-platform regulation. Developed by Professor Jack Balkin, the concept is meant to rebalance the relationship between ordinary individuals and the digital companies that accumulate, analyze, and sell their personal data for profit. Just as the law imposes special duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty on doctors, lawyers, and accountants vis-à-vis their patients and clients, Balkin argues, so too should it impose special duties on corporations such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter vis-à-vis their end users. Over the past several years, this argument has garnered remarkably broad support …
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The rules governing controlling shareholders sit at the intersection of the two facets of the agency problem at the core of public corporations law. The first is the familiar principal-agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control. With only this facet in mind, a large shareholder may better police management than the standard panoply of market-oriented techniques. The second is the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, which produces the potential for private benefits of control. There is, however, a point of tangency between these facets. Because there are costs associated with holding a …