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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
'Dynamic Competition' Does Not Excuse Monopolization, Jonathan Baker
'Dynamic Competition' Does Not Excuse Monopolization, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This comment on a forthcoming article by Keith Hylton and David Evans explains why considerations of "dynamic competition" do not argue against antitrust enforcement. While the prospect of achieving monopoly may foster innovation, that observation misleads as to appropriate antitrust policy unless qualified by the observation that the push of competition generally spurs innovation more than the pull of monopoly. Moreover, the longstanding doctrinal rule that mere monopoly pricing is not illegal should not be read as demonstrating that antitrust law values monopolies for their role in promoting innovation.
Paper Trail: Working Papers And Recent Scholarship, Jonathan Baker
Paper Trail: Working Papers And Recent Scholarship, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Editor’s Note: In this edition we review two papers by leading government economists, past, present, and perhaps future. The first paper, by Dennis Carlton and Ken Heyer, takes a cautious policy approach to single-firm conduct based on theory, empirical evidence, and “considerations of administrability and consistency with general and widely held presumptions” and sets out four “underlying principles” that should govern policy toward single-firm conduct. The second paper, on the role of market concentration in modern economic analysis of horizontal mergers, is by Jonathan Baker, in which he explains how market concentration can sensibly be used for merger analysis. Send …
2007 Patent Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Dean L. Fanelli, Victor N. Balancia, Robert J. Smyth, Carl P. Bretscher, Arthur M. Antonelli, Mark J. Sullivan, Kent E. Basson
2007 Patent Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Dean L. Fanelli, Victor N. Balancia, Robert J. Smyth, Carl P. Bretscher, Arthur M. Antonelli, Mark J. Sullivan, Kent E. Basson
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
2007 International Trade Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Munford Page Hall Ii, Michael S. Lee
2007 International Trade Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Munford Page Hall Ii, Michael S. Lee
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Role Of Market Definition In Unilateral Effects Analysis And In The Litigation Of Unilateral Effects Cases, Jonathan Baker, Kathryn Fenton, Richard Parker, Daniel Wall, Jeffrey Schmidt
The Role Of Market Definition In Unilateral Effects Analysis And In The Litigation Of Unilateral Effects Cases, Jonathan Baker, Kathryn Fenton, Richard Parker, Daniel Wall, Jeffrey Schmidt
Presentations
The Federal Trade Commission is planning to host a public workshop on February 12, 2008 to examine the application of unilateral effects theory to mergers of firms that sell competing, but differentiated products. ”Unilateral effects” as a formal theory of competitive harm was added to the joint FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992. The theory recognizes that, in some instances, mergers may create or enhance market power by allowing the merged firm to profitably raise prices, without accommodation of other rival market incumbents. While section 2.2 of the Guidelines explains that unilateral competitive effects can arise in a variety of …
Challenges Facing Investment Disputes: Reconsidering Dispute Resolution In International Investment Agreements, Susan Franck
Challenges Facing Investment Disputes: Reconsidering Dispute Resolution In International Investment Agreements, Susan Franck
Contributions to Books
International investment and international investment agreements have experienced a particular level of growth in the past few decades. With that growth and the granting of affirmative dispute resolution rights to foreign investors, international investment conflict has become increasingly highlighted; and one particular methodology - namely investment treaty arbitration - has become particularly visible. Reliance on this single option for resolving conflict has a unique set of systemic implications. This chapter therefore takes a more systemic look at investment treaty conflict and, in an effort to provide an appropriate historical and doctrinal framework, approaches to dispute resolution broadly. It asks for …
Merger To Monopoly To Serve A Single Buyer: Comment, Jonathan Baker
Merger To Monopoly To Serve A Single Buyer: Comment, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Efficiencies And High Concentration: Heinz Proposes To Acquire Bech-Nut (2001), Jonathan Baker
Efficiencies And High Concentration: Heinz Proposes To Acquire Bech-Nut (2001), Jonathan Baker
Contributions to Books
This chapter discusses the FTC’s court challenge, in 2001, to the proposed merger of two baby food producers, Heinz and Beech-Nut. The chapter describes the economic issues at stake in the litigation, with a particular focus on the possibility that efficiencies could justify a merger in an industry in which post-merger concentration would be high.