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Articles 1 - 30 of 155
Full-Text Articles in Law
Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers
Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers
Amicus Briefs
Amici curiae are administrative law scholars from universities around the United States.
They are: • William D. Araiza, Professor of Law and Dean of Brooklyn Law School; • Blake Emerson, Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law; • Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law at American University Washington College of Law; • Todd Phillips, Assistant Professor of Business Law at Georgia State University J. Mack Robinson College of Business; and • Beau Baumann, Doctoral candidate at Yale Law School.
Amici have a strong interest in how the Court’s decision will affect the field of administrative law and …
Comments On Federal Trade Commission Non-Compete Ban Proposed Rule, Matter No. P201200, Chaz D. Brooks
Comments On Federal Trade Commission Non-Compete Ban Proposed Rule, Matter No. P201200, Chaz D. Brooks
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Within signed law professors and law students submitted this letter to the Federal Trade Commission, writing in their individual capacities, not as agents of their affiliated institutions, in support of the Federal Trade Commission’s proposed rule to ban most non-compete clauses (the “Proposal”) as an unfair method of competition.
This letter offers comments in response to areas where the FTC has requested public comment. To make our views clear, this letter contains the following sections: I. Summary of the Proposal; II. The Commission Should Consider Expanding Its Definition of Non-Compete Clauses to Prevent Employers from Requiring Workers to Quit Before …
The Critical Contribution Of Independent Accountability Mechanisms (Iams) To The Global Governance Paradigm, Owen Mcintyre
The Critical Contribution Of Independent Accountability Mechanisms (Iams) To The Global Governance Paradigm, Owen Mcintyre
Perspectives
For several decades now, the environmental and social safeguard policies adopted by international financial institutions (IFIs), along with the related accountability frameworks provided by the independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs) established by each, have been at the very forefront of a global movement to extend good environmental and social governance values to the practice of international development finance. The complex of substantive and procedural standards of institutional conduct required under multilateral development bank (MDB) safeguard policies in respect of the assessment and implementation of bank-funded development projects or activities exemplifies the phenomenon of so-called “transnational” or “global” law - the rich …
On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker
On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The article explains why regressions of price on HHI should not be used in merger review. Both price and HHI are equilibrium outcomes determined by demand, supply, and the factors that drive them. Thus, a regression of price on the HHI does not recover a causal effect that could inform the likely competitive effects of a merger. Nonetheless, economic theory is consistent with the legal presumption that a merger is likely to have adverse competitive effects if it occurs in a concentrated market and makes that market more concentrated.
Protecting And Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role Of Antitrust Law, Jonathan Baker
Protecting And Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role Of Antitrust Law, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This essay provides a perspective on the role of antitrust law in protecting and fostering competition in the digital economy, with particular attention to online platforms. It highlights the danger of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct by dominant online platforms and describes ways that antitrust law can challenge and deter such conduct. The essay also identifies a number of difficulties that U.S. courts and enforcers face in challenging harmful exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms, and discusses some ways that regulation can supplement antitrust law in fostering competition.
Navigating The Transition To A More Innovation-Centric Antitrust (Review Of Richard J. Gilbert, Innovation Matters), Jonathan Baker
Navigating The Transition To A More Innovation-Centric Antitrust (Review Of Richard J. Gilbert, Innovation Matters), Jonathan Baker
Book Reviews
Review of Richard J. Gilbert Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy MIT Press 2020
“Sacrifice And Recoupment” In The Antitrust Analysis Of Patent Settlements: Actavis Through The Lens Of Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, And Trinko, Bryan Gant
American University Business Law Review
Patent settlements are typically procompetitive, benefiting not only the settling parties but also the courts and the general public. But in rare cases patent settlements might instead harm competition, and thus raise antitrust concerns. How are courts to determine when antitrust scrutiny should — and, more importantly, should not — be applied to patent settlements? The answer ostensibly came in the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. Under Actavis, antitrust scrutiny of patent settlements may “sometimes” be appropriate where there is a “large,” “unexplained” “reverse payment” from the patentee to the patent challenger. Unless, that is, the …
Hacking Antitrust: Competition Policy And The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, Charles Duan
Hacking Antitrust: Competition Policy And The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, Charles Duan
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal computer trespass statute that prohibits accessing a computer "without authorization or exceeding authorized access," has often been criticized for clashing with online norms, over-criminalizing common behavior, and infringing freedom-of-expression interests. These controversies over the CFAA have raised difficult questions about how the statute is to be interpreted, with courts of appeals split on the proper construction and the Supreme Courtset to consider the law in its current October Term 2020.
This article considers the CFAA in a new light, namely its effects on competition. Rather than merely preventing injurious trespass upon computers, …
Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, And The Prophylactic Role Of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, And The Prophylactic Role Of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
For decades, the major United States airlines have raised passenger fares through coordinated fare-setting when their route networks overlap, according to the United States Department of Justice. Through its review of company documents and testimony, the Justice Department found that when major airlines have overlapping route networks, they respond to rivals’ price changes across multiple routes and thereby discourage competition from their rivals. A recent empirical study reached a similar conclusion: It found that fares have increased for this reason on more than 1000 routes nationwide and even that American and Delta, two airlines with substantial route overlaps, have come …
Protecting And Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role Of Antitrust Law, Jonathan Baker
Protecting And Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role Of Antitrust Law, Jonathan Baker
Contributions to Books
This essay provides a perspective on the role of antitrust law in protecting and fostering competition in the digital economy, with particular attention to online platforms. It highlights the danger of anti-competitive exclusionary conduct by dominant online platforms and describes ways that antitrust law can challenge and deter such conduct. The essay also identifies a number of difficulties that U.S. courts and enforcers face in challenging harmful exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms, and discusses some ways regulation can supplement antitrust law in fostering competition.
Joint Response To The House Judiciary Committee On The State Of Antitrust Law And Implications For Protecting Competition In Digital Markets, Jonathan Baker, Joseph Farrell, Andrew Gavil, Martin Gaynor, Michael Kades, Michael Katz, Gene Kimmelman, A. Melamed, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton, Carl Shapiro
Joint Response To The House Judiciary Committee On The State Of Antitrust Law And Implications For Protecting Competition In Digital Markets, Jonathan Baker, Joseph Farrell, Andrew Gavil, Martin Gaynor, Michael Kades, Michael Katz, Gene Kimmelman, A. Melamed, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton, Carl Shapiro
Congressional and Other Testimony
Economic research establishes that market power is now a serious problem. Growing market power harms consumers and workers, slows innovation, and limits productivity growth. Market power is on the rise in a number of major industries, including, for example, airlines, brewing, and hospitals, where multiple horizontal mergers that were allowed to proceed without antitrust challenge have markedly increased concentration in important markets and facilitated the exercise of market power. Exclusionary conduct by dominant companies that stifles competition from actual and potential rivals — including nascent rivals with capabilities for challenging a dominant firm’s market power and firms with competing R&D …
The Not-So-Free Spirit Of Coachella: Coachella's Overbearing Radius Clause And The Sherman Antitrust Act, Holly Santapaga
The Not-So-Free Spirit Of Coachella: Coachella's Overbearing Radius Clause And The Sherman Antitrust Act, Holly Santapaga
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Labor, Trade, And Populism: How Ilo-Wto Collaboration Can Save The Global Economic Order, Sungjoon Cho, Cesar F. Rosado-Marzan
Labor, Trade, And Populism: How Ilo-Wto Collaboration Can Save The Global Economic Order, Sungjoon Cho, Cesar F. Rosado-Marzan
American University Law Review
Populists are trying to take down the global economic order and its institutions. While some of those forces might be fueled by racism, they also play to legitimate social concerns that include massive plant closings and deindustrialization, inadequate skills programs, and lack of decent jobs. Some of these problems also concern the Global South, as workers there face exploitation, unhealthy working conditions, and other social ills caused by global capitalism. In light of these problems, this Article argues that the International Labor Organization (ILO) should design new conventions on lead firm liability and mass layoffs. While other scholars and policymakers …
The Decline And Fall Of Circumstantial Evidence In Antitrust Law, Christopher R. Leslie
The Decline And Fall Of Circumstantial Evidence In Antitrust Law, Christopher R. Leslie
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Worldwide Frand Licensing Standard, Garry A. Gabison
Worldwide Frand Licensing Standard, Garry A. Gabison
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Valueact Partners And Hart-Scot-Rodino: Ending The Competition Between Investor Interest And Antitrust Law, Amy D'Avella
Valueact Partners And Hart-Scot-Rodino: Ending The Competition Between Investor Interest And Antitrust Law, Amy D'Avella
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
The New Social Contracts In International Supply Chains, David Snyder
The New Social Contracts In International Supply Chains, David Snyder
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This Article considers, from legal, practical, moral, and policy perspectives, Model Contract Clauses (MCCs) to protect the human rights of workers in international supply chains. The product of the ABA Business Law Section Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts, the MCCs are an effort to provide companies with carefully researched and well-drafted clauses to incorporate human rights policies into supply contracts (purchase orders, master vendor agreements, and the like). The Article discusses the impetus, goals, and strategies of the MCCs and explains the paradigm of the corporate, operational, and political landscape for which they are …
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Economic Commitments, Jonathan Baker
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Economic Commitments, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This article shows how the norm supporting governmental action to protect and foster competitive markets was harmonized with economic rights to contract and property during the 19th century, and with the development of the social safety net during the 20th century. It explains why the Constitution, as understood today, does not check the erosion of the entrenched but threatened national commitment to assuring competitive markets.
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Jonathan Baker
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
Video link: https://vimeo.com/352303633Audio link: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/audio/economics-big-data-privacy-competition-introductionThe Federal Trade Commission held the sixth session in its Hearings initiative, with two and a half days of sessions on November 6 – 8, 2018, at American University Washington College of Law, in Washington, D.C.The hearings examined the role that data play in competition and innovation and will also consider the antitrust analysis of mergers and firm conduct where data is a key asset or product.The Commission invited public comment on these issues, including the questions listed below. Comments were due January 7, 2019. If any entity has provided funding for research, analysis, or commentary …
Has The Us Economy Become More Concentrated And Less Competitive: A Review Of The Data, Jonathan Baker, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Joshua Wright, Gregory Werden
Has The Us Economy Become More Concentrated And Less Competitive: A Review Of The Data, Jonathan Baker, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Joshua Wright, Gregory Werden
Congressional and Other Testimony
FTC Chairman Joe Simons presented opening remarks, followed by a day of discussion by a distinguished set of panelists who discussed the following topics (some of which will be discussed on the rescheduled date):the current landscape of competition and consumer protection law and policy;whether the U.S. economy has become more concentrated and less competitive;the regulation of consumer data;antitrust law and the consumer welfare standard; andthe analysis of vertical mergers.This hearing was initially scheduled for September 13-14, 2018, but the second day sessions were rescheduled to November 1 due to inclement weather.
Extraterritoriality Of Antitrust Law: Applying The Supreme Court's Analysis In Rjr Nabisco To Foreign Component Cartels, Megan L. Masingill
Extraterritoriality Of Antitrust Law: Applying The Supreme Court's Analysis In Rjr Nabisco To Foreign Component Cartels, Megan L. Masingill
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Sec Regulation Of Foreign-Domiciled Investment Advisers: A Study Of The Policy Vision Inspiring The Unibanco Letter, John H. Walsh
Sec Regulation Of Foreign-Domiciled Investment Advisers: A Study Of The Policy Vision Inspiring The Unibanco Letter, John H. Walsh
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Cartel Ringmaster Or Competition Creator? The Ebooks Case Against Apple (2013), Jonathan Baker
Cartel Ringmaster Or Competition Creator? The Ebooks Case Against Apple (2013), Jonathan Baker
Contributions to Books
In 2013, a federal district court found that Apple had orchestrated a cartel agreement involving it and five major book publishers three years earlier, when Apple opened the iBookstore in conjunction with the introduction of its iPad tablet computer. According to the court, Apple organized collective action by the publishers to take away ebook pricing authority from Amazon, an aggressive discounter, and to raise the retail prices of ebooks.
This chapter describes the case from an economic point of view. It examines the competing views of the government and Apple over the competitive impact of various provisions in the iBookstore’s …
Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform Mfns, Jonathan Baker, Fiona M. Scott Morton
Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform Mfns, Jonathan Baker, Fiona M. Scott Morton
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive platform most favored nations (MFN) provisions (also termed pricing parity provisions) can help protect competition in online markets. An online platform imposes a platform MFN when it requires that providers using its platform not offer their products or services at a lower price on other platforms. These contractual provisions may be employed by online platforms offering hotel and transportation bookings, consumer goods, digital goods, and handmade craft products. They have been the subject of antitrust enforcement in Europe but have drawn only limited antitrust scrutiny in the U.S. Our paper explains why MFNs employed by online …
Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker
Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
Market concentration measures the extent to which market shares are concentrated between a small number of firms. It is often taken as a proxy for the intensity of competition. Indeed, in recent years changes in concentration have increasingly been used to argue that the intensity of competition is falling, that the growth of large firms with high market shares is driving up profits, damaging innovation and productivity, and increasing inequality. Some have argued that the competition rules need to be rewritten and a crackdown by overly antitrust agencies is required. The simplicity of this framing has found supporters across the …
Insider Trading Flaw: Toward A Fraud-On-The-Market Theory And Beyond, Kenneth R. Davis
Insider Trading Flaw: Toward A Fraud-On-The-Market Theory And Beyond, Kenneth R. Davis
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing On "Park Place" And How The Game Is Rigged, Mark S. Levy
Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing On "Park Place" And How The Game Is Rigged, Mark S. Levy
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.