Law Commons^™

Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, Sarah P. Woo

Sarah P Woo

With falling home prices and home foreclosures currently acknowledged as a severe problem in the U.S., more attention needs to be paid to the contributing phenomenon of residential developers undergoing liquidation, which has left behind a trail of partially-completed or abandoned properties. In order to understand this phenomenon, we analyzed 222 residential developers that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between November 2007 and December 2008. We find that only a very small proportion of these developers, as compared to previous similar large studies, confirmed a reorganization plan. Most cases ended in liquidations. In the sample, 72.5% of the cases showed …

Unethical Protection? Model Rule 1.8(H) And Plan Releases Of Professional Liability, George Kuney

Scholarly Works

The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct address the propriety of attorneys obtaining releases from their clients of either past claims or future claims against themselves. Under the applicable Model Rule, both types of releases require the involvement, or the opportunity for involvement, of independent counsel to review and advise the client on the issue.

Releases in chapter 11 plans typically cover insiders, members of the creditors’ committee, and the debtor’s and committee’s counsel. Few courts or disciplinary bodies of the various state bars have addressed the ethical issues that arise when counsel insert into a plan of …

The Shadow Bankruptcy System, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This article exposes and explores a puzzle at the heart of the current economic crisis: The surprising under-use, and increasing misuse, of Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the principal legal system for salvaging troubled businesses.

The answer offered here: The rise of the shadow bankruptcy system. “Shadow bankruptcy” describes the severely under-regulated non-bank financial institutions (e.g., hedge funds, private equity funds and investment banks) that increasingly dominate and manipulate Chapter 11 reorganizations.

Like the “shadow banking” system for which it is named, shadow bankruptcy thrives on and promotes opacity and undisclosed, possibly perverse, incentives. Shadow bankruptcy players …

Unethical Protection? Model Rule 1.8(H) And Plan Releases Of Professional Liability, George Kuney

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct address the propriety of attorneys obtaining releases from their clients of either past claims or future claims against themselves. Under the applicable Model Rule, both types of releases require the involvement, or the opportunity for involvement, of independent counsel to review and advise the client on the issue.Releases in chapter 11 plans typically cover insiders, members of the creditors’ committee, and the debtor’s and committee’s counsel. Few courts or disciplinary bodies of the various state bars have addressed the ethical issues that arise when counsel insert into a plan of reorganization …

The Success Of Chapter 11: A Challenge To The Critics, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook

Michigan Law Review

Although Chapter 11 has served as a model for bankruptcy reform around the world, the conventional wisdom has been that it is characterized by a relatively low success rate and endless delay. The data from large samples of Chapter 11 cases filed in 1994 and 2002 demonstrate that this characterization is wrong. Nearly all troubled companies choose Chapter 11 over Chapter 7 liquidation, which means that the system serves a critical screening function to eliminate hopeless cases relatively quickly. Almost half the unsuccessful cases were jettisoned within six months and almost eighty percent were gone within a year The cases …

Chrysler, Gm And The Future Of Chapter 11, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Although they caused great controversy, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies broke no new ground. They invoked procedures that are commonly observed in modern Chapter 11 reorganization cases. Government involvement did not distort the bankruptcy process; it instead exposed the reality that Chapter 11 offers secured creditors – especially those that supply financing during the bankruptcy case – control over the fate of distressed firms. Because the federal government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM cases, it possessed the creditor control normally exercised by private lenders. The Treasury Department found itself with virtually the same, unchecked power that the FDIC …

Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. 70 percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing, and few reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule to distribute value to equity holders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants, such as line-item budgets, in loans extended to firms in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors …

Is The Bankruptcy Code An Adequate Mechanism For Resolving The Distress Of Systemically Important Institutions?, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

The President and members of Congress are considering proposals that would give the government broad authority to rescue financial institutions whose failure might threaten market stability. These systemically important institutions include bank and insurance holding companies, investment banks, and other "large, highly leveraged, and interconnected" entities that are not currently subject to federal resolution authority. Interest in these proposals stems from the credit crisis, particularly the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That bankruptcy, according to some observers, caused massive destabilization in credit markets for two reasons. First, market participants were surprised that the government would permit a massive market player to …