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Full-Text Articles in Law
Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer
Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer
Faculty Scholarship
Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …
Is There A First-Drafter Advantage In M&A?, Adam B. Badawi, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Is There A First-Drafter Advantage In M&A?, Adam B. Badawi, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Market Information And The Elite Law Firm, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Market Information And The Elite Law Firm, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
As a subcategory of contract negotiations, corporate transactions present information problems that have not been fully analyzed. In particular, the literature does not address the possibility that parties may simply be unaware of value-increasing transaction terms or their outside option. Such unawareness can arise even for transactions that attract many competing parties, if the bargaining process is such that (1) the price terms are negotiated and fixed prior to the non-price terms, contrary to the standard assumption; and (2) some of the non-price terms remain private for some period of time.
A simple bargaining model shows that, when such unawareness …
Trust And The Srba Mediation, Francis E. Mcgovern
Trust And The Srba Mediation, Francis E. Mcgovern
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster
The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster
Faculty Scholarship
One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of …
Negotiations Goes To War, Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Paula B. Mccarron
Negotiations Goes To War, Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Paula B. Mccarron
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.