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Full-Text Articles in Law
Duty In The Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort And Contract Norms When The Deal Breaks Down, Anthony J. Sebok, W. Bradley Wendel
Duty In The Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort And Contract Norms When The Deal Breaks Down, Anthony J. Sebok, W. Bradley Wendel
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article begins by describing the market for investment in commercial litigationA Litigation-investment transactions share features of existing economic relationships, such as commercial lending, liability insurance, contingent fee-financed representation, and venture capital, but none of these existing practices furnishes a suitable analogy for regulating litigation investment. Like third-party insurance, litigation investment is a way to manage the risk associated with litigation while bringing to bear the particular subject matter expertise of a risk-neutral institutional actor. Insurance companies and litigation investors may be systematically in a better position to reduce the risk of litigation, either through risk pooling or information-cost advantages. …
Liability Cure-All For Insidious Disease Claims, Susan Frankewich
Liability Cure-All For Insidious Disease Claims, Susan Frankewich
Pepperdine Law Review
Recent decisions handed down in various circuits have created virtual chaos in predicting the liability and damage amounts of insidious disease claims. At least three substantially divergent theories have been adopted to impute liability to the manufacturers of the disease catalysts. Additionally, a new trust fund concept has been used on a limited basis to reconcile differences in court decisions. The trust fund approach is relatively flexible and simple to apply in apportioning damages for insidious disease claims. The author examines and analyzes these three liability theories. In conclusion, the adoption of the trust fund concept is recommended.
The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
All Faculty Scholarship
We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial ex ante moral …