Law Commons^™

Assuming The Risks Of Artificial Intelligence, Amy L. Stein

UF Law Faculty Publications

Tort law has long served as a remedy for those injured by products—and injuries from artificial intelligence (“AI”) are no exception. While many scholars have rightly contemplated the possible tort claims involving AI-driven technologies that cause injury, there has been little focus on the subsequent analysis of defenses. One of these defenses, assumption of risk, has been given particularly short shrift, with most scholars addressing it only in passing. This is intriguing, particularly because assumption of risk has the power to completely bar recovery for a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily engaged with a risk. In reality, such a defense …

An Education Theory Of Fault For Autonomous Systems, William D. Smart, Cindy M. Grimm, Woodrow Hartzog

Notre Dame Journal on Emerging Technologies

Automated systems like self-driving cars and “smart” thermostats are a challenge for fault-based legal regimes like negligence because they have the potential to behave in unpredictable ways. How can people who build and deploy complex automated systems be said to be at fault when they could not have reasonably anticipated the behavior (and thus risk) of their tools? Part of the problem is that the legal system has yet to settle on the language for identifying culpable behavior in the design and deployment for automated systems. In this article we offer an education theory of fault for autonomous systems—a new …

In Defense Of The Restatement Of Liability Insurance Law, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue

All Faculty Scholarship

For most non-contractual legal claims for damages that are brought against individuals or firms, there is some form of liability insurance coverage. The Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance is the American Law Institute’s first effort to “restate” the common law governing such liability insurance policies, and we are the reporters. In a recent essay funded by the insurance industry, Yale Law Professor George Priest launched a strident critique of the Restatement project, arguing that the rules adopted in the Restatement:

(a) are radically contrary to existing case law,

(b) have a naïve “pro-policyholder” bias that ignores basic economic insights …

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

All Faculty Scholarship

Top law firms are notoriously competitive, fighting for prime clients and matters. But some of the most elite firms are also deeply cooperative, willingly sharing key details about their finances and strategy with their rivals. More surprisingly, they pay handsomely to do so. Nearly half of the AmLaw 100 and 200 belong to mutual insurance organizations that require member firms to provide capital; partner time; and important information about their governance, balance sheets, risk management, strategic plans, and malpractice liability. To answer why these firms do so when there are commercial insurers willing to provide coverage with fewer burdens, we …

Encouraging Insurers To Regulate: The Role (If Any) For Tort Law, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Insurance companies are financially responsible for a substantial portion of the losses associated with risky activities in the economy. The more insurers can lower the risks posed by their insureds, the more competitively they can price their policies, and the more customers they can attract. Thus, competition forces insurers to be private regulators of risk. To that end, insurers deploy a range of techniques to encourage their insureds to reduce the risks of their insured activities, from charging experience-rated premiums to discounting premium rates for insureds who make specific behavioral changes designed to reduce risk. Somewhat paradoxically, however, tort law …

Duty In The Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort And Contract Norms When The Deal Breaks Down, Anthony J. Sebok, W. Bradley Wendel

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article begins by describing the market for investment in commercial litigationA Litigation-investment transactions share features of existing economic relationships, such as commercial lending, liability insurance, contingent fee-financed representation, and venture capital, but none of these existing practices furnishes a suitable analogy for regulating litigation investment. Like third-party insurance, litigation investment is a way to manage the risk associated with litigation while bringing to bear the particular subject matter expertise of a risk-neutral institutional actor. Insurance companies and litigation investors may be systematically in a better position to reduce the risk of litigation, either through risk pooling or information-cost advantages. …

Liability Cure-All For Insidious Disease Claims, Susan Frankewich

Pepperdine Law Review

Recent decisions handed down in various circuits have created virtual chaos in predicting the liability and damage amounts of insidious disease claims. At least three substantially divergent theories have been adopted to impute liability to the manufacturers of the disease catalysts. Additionally, a new trust fund concept has been used on a limited basis to reconcile differences in court decisions. The trust fund approach is relatively flexible and simple to apply in apportioning damages for insidious disease claims. The author examines and analyzes these three liability theories. In conclusion, the adoption of the trust fund concept is recommended.

The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial ex ante moral …

A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee

Michigan Law Review

This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system; rather it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost. By focusing only on offsetting escaped liability, the standard law and economics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between variance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement …

Risk Magnified: Standing Under The Statist Lens, Mary D. Fan

Articles

Why some harms count before the courts and others do not is a matter of acute expressive and practical impact. Judicial refusal to see claimed injuries is an effective denial of legal personhood and a bar from powerful judicial machinery. The issue of “erratic, even bizarre” judicial recognition of supplicants vexed Professor Joseph Vining as early as 1978. Recent scholarship argues that injuries are seen through a subjective lens, reflecting the relative privilege of the judiciary and their concomitant difficulties in perceiving injuries to minorities and the poor. This is a troubling contention. So long as another, objective explanation remains, …

Rights-Based Theories Of Accident Law, Gregory J. Hall

All Faculty Scholarship

This article shows that extant rights-based theories of accident law contain a gaping hole. They inadequately address the following question: What justifies using community standards to assign accident costs in tort law?

In the United States, the jury determines negligence for accidental harm by asking whether the defendant met the objective reasonable person standard. However, what determines the content of the reasonable person standard is enigmatic. Some tort theorists say that the content is filled out by juries using cost benefit analysis while others say that juries apply community norms and conventions. I demonstrate that what is missing from this …

Risky Business: Liability Of Product Sellers Who Offer Safety Devices As Optional Equipment, Richard C. Ausness

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This Article examines the question of whether (or when) product sellers should be allowed to offer optional safety equipment without fear of being held strictly liable for selling a defectively designed product. Part II of this Article examines several approaches to risk-bearing. At one end of the spectrum, the principle of personal autonomy dictates that consumers should decide how much risk they wish to accept. On the other hand, products liability law assumes that if consumers are allowed to subject themselves to greater risk, producers will be quick to take advantage of their inability to make rational decisions about what …

The Shifting Terrain Of Risk And Uncertainty On The Liability Insurance Field, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent sociological and historical work suggests that insurance risks often are not reliably calculable, except in hindsight. Insurance is “an uncertain business,” characterized by competition for premiums that pushes insurers into the unknown. This essay takes some preliminary steps that extend this insight into the liability insurance field. The essay first provides a simple quantitative comparison of U.S. property and liability insurance premiums over the last sixty years, setting the stage to make three points: (1) liability insurance premiums have grown at a similar rate as property insurance premiums and GDP over this period, providing yet another piece of evidence …

Insurance In Sociolegal Research, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Insurance has a long history in sociolegal research, most prominently as a window on accident compensation and related tort law in action. Recent work has extended that research, with the result that tort law in action may be the best mapped of any legal field outside criminal law. Sociological research has begun to explore insurance as a form of governance, with effects in many legal fields and across the economy. This essay reviews developments in both bodies of work. Part one examines the relationship between liability insurance and tort law in action using the metaphors of window and frame. Part …

Insufficient Activity And Tort Liability: A Rejoinder, David Gilo, Ehud Guttel

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In our article, Negligence and Insufficient Activity, we proposed that tort scholarship has overlooked the risk that injurers will behave strategically in setting their activity levels. Whereas the standard literature has predicted that injurers who are subject to a negligence regime will often invest efficiently in care but choose excessive activity levels, we showed that they may do exactly the opposite: injurers may deliberately restrict their activity to avoid investments in socially desirable precaution. After reviewing the conditions that may give rise to the risk of insufficient activity, we examined the ways in which the legal system can minimize the …

Activity Levels Under The Hand Formula: A Comment On Gilo And Guttel, Richard A. Epstein

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 277 (2009). Within the law and economics field, there often surfaces a near hypnotic attraction to the Hand formula as the one and only tool that drives tort law toward economic efficiency. Hand's intuition was, of course, that the test for efficiency requires a balancing of three variables. The burden of taking particular precautions is compared to the expected loss from some activity, which in turn consists of the likelihood of some particular harm multiplied by its anticipated severity. …

Another Theory Of Insufficient Activity Levels, Mark Grady

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). Professors David Gilo and Ehud Guttel have written an important article on the tendency of the negligence rule to produce inefficiently low activity levels. In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, the authors claim insufficient activity to be the "missing paradigm" in tort theory. Although I agree with Gilo and Guttel that this missing paradigm is central to negligence doctrine, I disagree with them about how insufficient activity levels arise.

Insufficient Analysis Of Insufficient Activity, Kenneth S. Abraham

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, David Gilo and Ehud Guttel argue that negligence law encourages inefficiently high and low levels of activity because negligence law ordinarily does not take activity levels into account. They suggest that the law should impose liability for failing to take safety precautions-even where precautions would not be cost-justified-whenever the threat of this liability negates the incentive for an actor to choose an insufficient level of activity. Until …

Dilution Of Liability And Multiple Tortfeasors In The Context Of Liability For Unrequested Precautions, Assaf Jacob

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A Response to Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. (2009). One of the more intriguing questions in tort law is the case of joint and several tortfeasors and the dilution-of-liability puzzle. When harm materializes and there are multiple potential tortfeasors, the law tends to limit the number of joint tortfeasors, focusing the final burden on a small number of actors. This limitation is achieved by several legal mechanisms, such as a no duty rule, a narrow interpretation of negligence, a restrictive implementation of the causal link (be it the but for …

Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws And Tort Deterrence, Jill R. Horwitz, Joseph Mead

Articles

Does tort law deter risky behavior in individuals? We explore this question by examining the relationship between tort immunity and volunteering. During the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state provided some degree of volunteer immunity. Congress followed with the 1997 Volunteer Protection Act. This article analyzes these acts, identifying three motivations for them: the chilling effects of tort liability, limits on liability insurance, and moral concerns. Using data from the Independent Survey’s Giving and Volunteering surveys, we then identify a large and positive correlation between immunity and volunteering. We next consider the implications of the findings for tort theory and …

Proposed Legislation: A (Second) Modest Proposal To Protect Virginia Consumers Against Defective Products, Peter Nash Swisher

University of Richmond Law Review

The purpose of this article is to suggest a viable, necessary, and eminently reasonable legislative alternative that the Virginia General Assembly should enact for legitimate and pressing public policy reasons in order to properly protect Virginia consumers from defective and unreasonably dangerous consumer products.Adopting this alternative would bring the Commonwealth of Virginia into the mainstream of twenty-first century American, and transnational, products liability law.

Operationalizing Deterrence Claims Management (In Hopsitals, A Large Retailer, And Jails And Prisons), Margo Schlanger

Articles

The theory that the prospect of liability for damages deters risky behavior has been developed in countless articles and books. The literature is far sparser, however, on how deterrence is operationalized. And prior work slights an equally important effect of damage actions, to incentivize claims management in addition to harm-reduction responses that are cost- rather than liabilityminimizing. This article works in the intersection of these two understudied areas, focusing on claims management steps taken by frequently sued organizations, and opening a window into the black box of deterrence to see how those steps may end up serving harm-reduction purposes as …

Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, And Tradeoffs: A Closer Look At The Controversy, Kenneth Simons

Faculty Scholarship

What is the proper role of cost-benefit analysis in understanding the tort concept of negligence or reasonable care? A straightforward question, you might think. But it is a question that manages to elicit groans of exasperation from those on both sides of the controversy.

For most utilitarians and adherents to law and economics, the answer is obvious: to say that people should not be negligent is to say that they should minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of preventing accidents. Under the economic formulation of the famous Learned Hand test, they should take a precaution …

Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger

Articles

Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their liability exposure in a number of ways. Prior scholarship has dwelled primarily on the possibility that they may respond to the threat of liability by augmenting the amount of care they take.1 Defendants (I limit myself to defendants for simplicity) will increase their expenditures on care, so the theory goes, when those expenditures yield sufficient liability-reducing dividends; more care decreases liability exposure by simultaneously making it less likely that the actors will be found to have behaved tortiously in the event of an accident and …

The Kindynamic Theory Of Tort, Christopher P. Guzelian

Indiana Law Journal

Commentators complain of two major deficiencies in modern tort law: (1) that liability concepts such as "negligence" or "duty " are so vacuously defined as to permit inadvertent subjectivity and error to hinder proper case adjudication, and (2) that tort is too slow in recognizing newly discovered risks and properly compensating nascent classes of injury. We accordingly report on the Kindynamic Theory, an emerging philosophy that overcomes these twin deficiencies and sharpens understanding of poorly articulated tort intuitions

Kindynamics contends that causation is the cornerstone of tort, and that all risks are, at core, causal propositions. Contrary to its many …

Medical Malpractice And The Insurance Underwriting Cycle, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Virtues Of Uncertainty In Law: An Experimental Approach, Tom Baker, Alon Harel, Tamar Kugler

All Faculty Scholarship

Predictability in civil and criminal sanctions is generally understood as desirable. Conversely, unpredictability is condemned as a violation of the rule of law. This paper explores predictability in sanctioning from the point of view of efficiency. It is argued that, given a constant expected sanction, deterrence is increased when either the size of the sanction or the probability that it will be imposed is uncertain. This conclusion follows from earlier findings in behavioral decision research and the results of an experiment conducted specifically to examine this hypothesis. The findings suggest that, within an efficiency framework, there are virtues to uncertainty …

Snake-Oil Security Claims The Systematic Misrepresentation Of Product Security In The E-Commerce Arena, John R. Michener, Steven D. Mohan, James B. Astrachan, David R. Hale

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The modern commercial systems and software industry in the United States have grown up in a snake-oil salesman's paradise. The largest sector of this industry by far is composed of standard commercial systems that are marketed to provide specified functionality (e.g. Internet web server, firewall, router, etc.) Such products are generally provided with a blanket disclaimer stating that the purchaser must evaluate the suitability of the product for use, and that the user assumes all liability for product behavior. In general, users cannot evaluate and cannot be expected to evaluate the security claims of a product. The ability to analyze …

The Role Of Primary Assumption Of Risk In Civil Litigation In Minnesota, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

Assumption of risk has presented courts with considerable difficulty in defining its theoretical justification and its relationship to tort duty limitations and to the defense of contributory negligence. In Minnesota and elsewhere, assumption of risk has been applied inconsistently. Sometimes it seems to relate to the duty issue and sometimes it is linked to the defense of contributory negligence, but without a clear differentiation of which issue is involved. In Minnesota specifically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged that inconsistency and the difficulty in applying the concept in cases spanning several decades. This article focuses on primary assumption of risk, …

Homicide On Holiday: Prosecutorial Discretion, Popular Culture, And The Boundaries Of The Criminal Law, Carolyn B. Ramsey

Publications

This article discusses prosecutors' discretion to press criminal charges against individuals who cause death during recreational activities. Based on newspaper sources, published opinions, and unpublished materials from cases that resulted in plea bargains, Homicide on Holiday continues the author's exploration of the relationship between the American public, criminal prosecutors, and the nature of the prosecutors' public role. It shows that, despite popular culture's glorification of risk and a nationwide trend in tort law toward sheltering sports co-participants from civil negligence liability, an exhilarating trip down a ski slope is increasingly likely to land a skier in jail if he collides …