Law Commons^™

The Social Construction Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The closer one looks at SOX and its origins in the financial scandals of the early 2000s, the blurrier the picture, which lets commentators see what they want to see and draw inferences accordingly. That is why social construction is so crucial. My aim in this paper is to illuminate the social nature of SOX's diffusion into practice. I will leave to the reader the judgment about whether this has been or will be good or bad, and for whom. If I seem to challenge SOX's critics more than its supporters, it is because the critics have been more venomous …

Developing Governance And Regulation For Emerging Capital And Securities Markets, Ali A. Ibrahim

Georgetown Law Graduate Paper Series

No abstract provided.

Convergence Of Corporate Governance And Islamic Financial Services Industry: Toward Islamic Financial Services Securities Market, Ali A. Ibrahim

Georgetown Law Graduate Paper Series

This paper briefly discusses the significance of corporate governance for the Islamic financial services industry. Furthermore, it predicts that the Islamic financial services industry is likely to converge to modern governance practices. The paper also argues that the industry needs to have a homogenous and specialized regional securities market to realize its true potential.

Federalism In Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, And State Regulation Of Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this brief Essay, I offer some thoughts on both the theory and the politics underlying the federalism question. My comments will touch on some of the controversies and also look at a somewhat quieter question, the state regulation of insider trading. Over the course of the last few years, judges in California and Delaware have traveled markedly different routes on questions involving the states' role in regulating insider trading. A California court of appeal has recently expanded the reach of the state insider trading statute to cover a claim alleging misconduct in California by an executive of a Delaware …

Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law's "Duty Of Care As Responsibility For Systems", Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Revisiting section 3.4.2 of Clark's Corporate Law ('Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems") reminds us, however, that the internal controls story actually goes back many decades, and that many of the strategic issues that are at the heart of section 404 have long been contentious. My Article will briefly update Clark's account through the late 1980s and 1990s before returning to Sarbanes-Oxley and rulemaking thereunder by the SEC and the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). My main point builds on one of Clark's but digs deeper. Internal controls requirements, whether federal or state, are incoherent unless …

Reflections On Scienter (And The Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart That Never Happened), Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This paper considers what research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics has to say about one of the basic "state of mind" constructs in the law of fraud: scienter. It takes a clinical approach, examining the securities fraud case that never happened against Martha Stewart. In granting a judgment of acquittal in Stewart's favor on the securities fraud charge, the court seemingly misunderstood the law of scienter, which turns on awareness rather than purpose. But that simply provides an opportunity to think about what awareness means in the context of financial transactions. From publicly available sources, interesting inferences can be …

Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Welcome and Introduction to the Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, November 9, 2004 at Fordham University School of Law.

Fordham Law School, with the support of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, inaugurated the A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture Series in the fall of 2000 with the timely insights of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (the "SEC" or the "Commission") then-Chair Arthur Leavitt. Since then, the Sommer Lecture has continued to bring to Fordham such heavyweights as Mary Schapiro, President of National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Regulation, Inc., SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, and …

Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article focuses on independent directors and the processes of mutual fund corporate governance. To be clear, I believe (and research shows) that disinterested directors do add value as a form of shareholder protection, and this fact justifies the SEC's efforts to strengthen their role. But they are far from a panacea. While that point alone is almost trite, exploring some of the unique features of mutual fund governance shows why judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to governance in other kinds of corporations. Yet that is exactly what Burks and its progeny have done. …

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …

Panel Presentation: Securities Regulation And Corporate Responsibility, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What I want to do is talk about the big picture, as John suggested, and consider the likely spillover effects of Sarbanes-Oxley. I want to do this in a discretely administrative law-oriented way, taking two themes that were very visible and driving forces behind the legislation. The first, as Mary suggested in her opening remarks, is a question about federalism. It has been common for the last twenty years, at least, to trot out - as John just did - a distinction between federal and state spheres of competency. The SEC is on the disclosure side, while the substance of …

Oath Taking, Truth Telling, And Remedies In The Business World: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On Energy And Commerce, 107th Cong., July 26, 2002 (Statement Of Sherman Cohn, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Sherman L. Cohn

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Are Judges Motivated To Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine?, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

‘How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does – Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions’, by Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati, confronts the reader with a theory about judicial behavior in the face of complex, "unexciting" cases such as those involving securities fraud. The story is simple: few judges find any opportunity for personal satisfaction or enhanced reputation here, so they simply try to minimize cognitive effort, off-loading much of the work that has to be done to their clerks. The evidence that Bainbridge and Gulati offer is the creation of some ten or …

Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow: The Sec's Pursuit Of Managerial Accountability, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My aim in this paper is not to justify at length an expansive "new corporation law" perspective, though I do believe in it. Nor do I want to try to resolve a controversial question that the new learning admittedly leaves open: which jurisdictional body should set the disclosure and antifraud standards insofar as they are designed to promote better corporate governance? To say that corporate and securities law are largely unitary does not necessarily mean that centralization of authority in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is the right choice. Perhaps the states, foreign countries, or stock exchanges …

Hester Prynne, Lydia Bennet, And Section 306 Stock: The Concept Of Tainting In The American Novel, The British Novel, And The Internal Revenue Code, Stephen B. Cohen, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Did Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel, The Scarlet Letter, inspire Section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code? This code provision adopts a peculiarly Hawthorne-like solution to a tax avoidance scheme known as the "preferred stock bailout." Section 306 taints the stock used in the scheme as "Section 306 stock." Special rules then govern all subsequent dispositions of the tainted stock. With its concept of a taint that can dog a stock from acquisition to disposition, Section 306 might have been designed by a novelist rather than a tax technician.

Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability In A Continuous Disclosure Environment, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article is an effort to rethink civil liability in capital-raising transactions by large capitalization issuers. After a brief digression about who should set liability standards, the article then addresses two related questions. The first deals with a natural question: Should not the primary regulatory effort for large issuers be to assure continuous disclosure in the secondary marketplace, given the far larger volume of such trading in that market compared to that in primary transactions? Second, if we have developed a satisfactory regime of disclosure responsibilities for this setting, what more, if anything, in terms of liability protection, is needed …

Cross-Border Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Currently, there is no formal SEC policy on when U.S. insider trading rules (or indeed Rule l0b-5 generally) will be applied extraterritorially. If one can glean anything from SEC action during the last twenty years, it is that the trading site - the use of U.S. market mechanisms - that counts most. Certainly, neither the trader nor the issuer need be U.S.-based. What I wish to do in this paper is articulate what I think is sensible enforcement policy for a nation - whether the U.S. or any other - to adopt. By this, I do not want to focus …

Tax Metamorphosis, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My favorite course ever, fourth-year high school Latin, was also the most demanding. We translated all twelve books of Virgils epic poem, The _Eneid, line by dactylic hexameter line, and large chunks of Ovids Metamorphoses besides. The course was valuable in many ways, not least of which was that only my youthful reading of Ovid's Metamorphoses later enabled me to make sense of the U.S. Tax Court's otherwise inscrutable decision in Edwards v. Commissioner.

Taxing Stock Dividends And Economic Theory, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Since 1936, the Internal Revenue Code has treated elective stock dividends on common stock, which are taxed on receipt as shareholder ordinary income gain, differently from pro rata stock dividends on common, which are received tax-free. This difference in treatment was reenacted in Section 305 of the 1954 Code; and while the Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed many details of stock dividend taxation, the basic distinction between elective and pro rata stock dividends was, if anything, reinforced. The major purpose of the 1969 amendments to Section 305 was to impose a shareholder ordinary income tax on transactions with the …