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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Effect Of Insider Trading Rules On The Internal Efficiency Of The Large Corporation, Robert J. Haft Apr 1982

The Effect Of Insider Trading Rules On The Internal Efficiency Of The Large Corporation, Robert J. Haft

Michigan Law Review

Academics have hotly debated these justifications for years, and none of the three has achieved universal acclaim. This Article suggests another perspective: Prohibiting insider trading may enhance business decision-making in large corporations. With the exception of proponents of the Business Property view, analysts have focused on how an insider trading rule affects the national securities markets and traders in those markets. The internal governance of the large corporation is a different matter, one deserving separate consideration.


The Sec And Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In Search Of A Purpose, Michigan Law Review Mar 1980

The Sec And Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In Search Of A Purpose, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Book Notice about The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose by Homer Kripke


Corruption And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Of 1977, Fredric Bryan Lesser Oct 1979

Corruption And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Of 1977, Fredric Bryan Lesser

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article first discusses the business activities and competing interests which prompted congressional action. Part II analyzes the FCPA and attempts to solve the ambiguities inherent in the criminalization provisions, thereby clarifying which activities are proscribed by the FCPA and what is meant by the Act's corruption requirement. Finally, Part III examines the possibilities for multinational agreements prohibiting bribery.


Foreign Bribes And The Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, Michigan Law Review May 1976

Foreign Bribes And The Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require most major corporations to disclose to investors all material information concerning company operations. Although they were not intended to regulate the conduct of business, these disclosure obligations can have a deterrent effect upon improper corporate activities. The recent revelation that a significant number of corporations have been making bribes and similar payments abroad has created interest in the feasibility of employing the disclosure requirements to curtail this practice. This Note will show that, despite recent pressures for change, the Securities and Exchange Commission has continued to view …


A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review Apr 1976

A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note engages in such a reassessment. It contends, first, that appraisal has not been an unreasonable burden on corporations and that adjustments in the appraisal procedure can eliminate remaining inequities. Next, it asserts that the stock market exception inadequately protects the dissenting shareholder, since a market might, for a variety of reasons, price a shareholder's stock at less than its intrinsic value. Finally, this Note concludes that an appraisal procedure with modifications, and not the stock market exception, reflects the appropriate balance of corporate and shareholder interests.


Financial Disclosure By Small Corporations, Russell J. Bruemmer Jan 1976

Financial Disclosure By Small Corporations, Russell J. Bruemmer

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This note will focus upon the desirability of compelling financial disclosure by corporations not subject to control under the existing federal securities legislation, which includes the vast majority of American corporations. While differing in degree and extent of application to corporations of varying sizes, the benefits derived from disclosure by large, widely-held corporations would also be obtained when disclosure is made by smaller, less widely-held corporations. The extension of federal or state disclosure requirements to corporations of all sizes and ownership dispersions, requiring them to place financial information before their shareholders at least once each year, is suggested.


Providing An Effective Remedy In Shareholder Suits Against Officers, Directors, And Controlling Persons, Michael H. Woolever Jan 1975

Providing An Effective Remedy In Shareholder Suits Against Officers, Directors, And Controlling Persons, Michael H. Woolever

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Corporate officers, directors, and controlling persons occupy a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation and its shareholders in the exercise of control over corporate affairs. This fiduciary obligation requires that officers, directors, and controlling persons act in good faith and perform their offices in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and not to their own advantage. When this duty is breached, a shareholder may bring an action against these fiduciaries, either in his own name or derivatively for the benefit of the corporation. Under present law, however, it may be impossible for an American court to secure jurisdiction …


Limiting The Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 And The Federal Securities Code, Michigan Law Review Jun 1974

Limiting The Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 And The Federal Securities Code, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

The Penn Central litigation, involving a large, publicly held corporation, illustrates the need to examine the reach of the federal antifraud provisions. This Note discusses the problem of defining the plaintiff class when the number of past and present shareholders who are potential plaintiffs is very great. Attention will center on the methods courts have used to limit the class of investors compensable under rule 10b-5. Also, the effect that enactment of present drafts of the American Law lnstitute's proposed Federal Securities Code would have on the composition of the plaintiff class in analogous actions will be discussed. Finally, the …


Perlman V. Feldmann: A Case Study In Contemporary Corporate Legal History, Jan G. Deutsch Jan 1974

Perlman V. Feldmann: A Case Study In Contemporary Corporate Legal History, Jan G. Deutsch

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The author gives the following introduction to this article: “When I was a law student, taking a course in introductory corporate law, what was heard around the halls was that most of corporate law would be learned if one understood Perlman v. Feldmann. I agree with that statement, and I have agreed more strongly each year I myself have taught introductory corporate law. Indeed, I now believe one would also learn a good deal about the significance of-the corporation in American life during the past two decades. Unfortunately, however, it seems to me-on the basis of having read everything …


Tender Offers For Corporate Control, Martin Lipton Dec 1973

Tender Offers For Corporate Control, Martin Lipton

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Tender Offers for Corporate Control by Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn


Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review Apr 1973

Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this Note to examine the adequacy of representation in a derivative suit and to consider the appropriateness of applying res judicata to foreclose the corporate cause of action. Discussion will focus on the following areas: (1) the problem of the inadequate plaintiff; (2) the efficacy of judicially created devices designed to ensure the adequacy of representation; and, (3) the feasibility of partially exempting the derivative cause of action from the operation of res judicata.


Proposed Sec Rules For Private Offerings: The Impact On Venture Capital Financing, Gregory A. Kearns Jan 1971

Proposed Sec Rules For Private Offerings: The Impact On Venture Capital Financing, Gregory A. Kearns

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In order to facilitate venture capital financing, corporations rely upon the private offering exemption from the registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. In an attempt to prevent this exemption from serving as a conduit for the flow of securities into the public securities markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed new rules regulating the resale of securities purchased in a private offering. These proposals would alter, among other things, the existing holding period, sales limitation, and financial information requirements. This article will examine the impact of the proposed *rules on venture capital financing of …


The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz Jan 1971

The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Proxy contests are generally fought for control of a corporation. The rules governing this form of corporate combat seek to provide shareholders with adequate information about the rival forces for control so that they can intelligently choose between them. The information furnished in proxy materials and discussions at annual meetings have traditionally been devoted almost entirely to subjects such as finance, production, acquisitions, and the like.


Trusts-Restraints On Alienation-Invalidity Of Voting Trust Wherein Voting Trust Certificates Were Made Inalienable, W. P. Sutter S.Ed. Mar 1950

Trusts-Restraints On Alienation-Invalidity Of Voting Trust Wherein Voting Trust Certificates Were Made Inalienable, W. P. Sutter S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Two stockholders, controlling a majority of the class B stock of the X corporation, transferred their stock to themselves jointly as trustees for a ten-year period. The trustees were to vote the stock as a unit, and had full voting powers on all matters affecting the corporation. Trustees agreed not to transfer the stock without the approval of both holders, and the holders agreed not to sell their stock or the voting trust certificates. Moreover, on the death of one holder-trustee, the other had an option to purchase all his interest in the stock. In an action in equity to …


Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith May 1921

Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith

Michigan Law Review

As suggested by the title to this paper, a discussion of the relationship between the directors of a corporation and the corporate entity is not within its scope. Neither is the lrelationship between the directors-and the entire body of the shareholders. These two subjects are generally treated in another branch of the law of corporations and generally are not governed by the same rules of law.' The purchase of shares of stock by a director from a nonofficial shareholder naturally brings into question the relationship between the director and the shareholder in his individual capacity, and not in his capacity …


Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook Apr 1921

Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook

Michigan Law Review

Stockholders' exemption from liability for corporate debts is a modern invention. It was not until 18x1 that New York extended that exemption to stockholders in manufacturing corporations.' Massachusetts did not grant it until 1830.2 England did not allow it to stockholders in business and manufacturing cornpanies until I855. s As President Eliot of Harvard has pointed out, this privilege of limited liability is "the corporation's most precious characteristic."'


Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson Mar 1921

Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson

Michigan Law Review

The movement in the field of co5perative commercial undertakings has been; school-book-like, a movement from the simple to the complex, from the common-la* sitaation of persons associating together to conduct a busines for profit to the modern statutory association and the corporation possessing an enormous capital ,derived from a host of individuals whose respective interests are represented -by various -classes -of transferable shares.


Corporations, Shareholders' Right To Have A Dividend Declared And Paid Out Of Surplus, Horace Lafayette Wilgus Jan 1919

Corporations, Shareholders' Right To Have A Dividend Declared And Paid Out Of Surplus, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Mich. 1919), 170, N. W. 668, the questions were not new, and with one exception, the decision was not unusual, but the sums involved were enormos. The Motor Company was incorporated in 1903, under the general manufacturing incorporating act of Michigan (P. A. 232, 1903), for the manufacture and sale of automobiles, motors and devices incident to their construction and operation, with an authorized Capital Stock of $150,000-$100,000 then paid up, $49,000 in cash, $40,000 in letters patent issued and applied for, and $11,000 in machinery and contracts. In 1908 the stock was increased …


Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Horace Lafayette Wilgus Jan 1910

Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

It is generally laid down in the encyclopedias and text books, and affirmed in many court opinions that "the doctrine that officers and directors [of corporations] are trustees of the stockholders, applies only in respect to their acts relating to the property or business of the corporation. It does not extend to their private dealings with stockholders or others, though in such dealings they take advantage of knowledge gained through their official position."1 Much of this doctrine is based upon the language of Chief Justice SHAW in Smith v. Hurd2 decided in 1847. He said: "There is no legal privity, …


Right Of Joint Adventurers Holding All The Stock Of A Corporation To A Dissolution And Accounting In Equity, Horace Lafayette Wilgus Jan 1910

Right Of Joint Adventurers Holding All The Stock Of A Corporation To A Dissolution And Accounting In Equity, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

The case of Jackson v. Hooper, in the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, decided February 28, 1910, by Judge DILL, (42 N. Y. Law Journal, March 8, 1910), overruling Vice Chancellor HOWELL, of the Court of Chancery (74 AtL. 130) presents interesting and unusual points in corporation and partnership law, and the jurisdiction of courts of equity over corporate affairs.


Corporation Liens On Stock, Edson R. Sunderland Jan 1910

Corporation Liens On Stock, Edson R. Sunderland

Articles

At common law a corporation had no lien upon its stock for assessments unpaid or for debts due it from its shareholders.6 There are therefore but four possible methods by which liens could be created in favor of the corporation upon the stock which it issues, (i) by statute, (2) by charter, (3) by by-law, (4) by contract.