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Full-Text Articles in Law

Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, And Torrents Of E-Mail, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2011

Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, And Torrents Of E-Mail, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

This Foreword is meant as an initial foray into the question of what agencies should do with mass public comments, particularly on broad questions of policy. Part I discusses the extent to which congressional control, presidential control, and agency procedures themselves can ensure that agency decisions are democratically responsive. In view of shortcomings in both congressional and presidential control, I underscore the need to focus closely on rulemaking procedures as a source of democratic responsiveness. The possibility that agencies may be systematically discounting certain public submissions raises difficulties, and I present some examples. Part II makes a preliminary case that …


Another Word On The President's Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2011

Another Word On The President's Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

In this short symposium contribution, I attempt first to add some further evidence on the interpretive question. That evidence weighs strongly, in my view, in favor of Kagan's conclusion that the terminology does not communicate any particular congressional intent regarding presidential directive authority. Assessed in context, the "whole code" textual analysis presented by Stack does not justify the conclusion that Congress, by delegating to an executive branch official, meant to limit presidential control. Independent agencies excluded, interpreting the terms of simple and presidential delegations to speak to directive authority fails, in general, to make sense of the various statutes. Absent …


Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley Jan 2010

Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.


Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2010

Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Scholars and courts have divided views on whether presidential supervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For some, that the President can supervise administrative agencies is key to seeing agency action as legitimate, because of the President's accountability to the electorate. Others, however, have argued that such supervision may simply taint, rather than legitimate, an agency action. The reality is that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking, at least, appears to be both significant and opaque. This Article presents evidence from multiple presidential administrations suggesting that regulatory review conducted by the White House's Office of Management and Budget is associated …


Quick Off The Mark? In Favor Of Empowering The President-Elect, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2009

Quick Off The Mark? In Favor Of Empowering The President-Elect, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

The United States’s presidential transition period is too long. Between November 7, 2008, and January 20, 2009, the media quickly identified a “‘leadership vacuum.’” In contrast to those of President-elect Obama, President Bush’s approval ratings were at historic lows. One reporter commented in late November, “The markets, at least, seem to be listening to one [P]resident—and he’s not the one in the Oval Office,” and another noted that “everyone . . . ignores the actions of the lame duck.”


Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson Oct 2008

Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson

Michigan Law Review

It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …


A Renewed Role For Conservation In Environmental Policy, Amie Medley Jan 2008

A Renewed Role For Conservation In Environmental Policy, Amie Medley

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Not since President Carter's impassioned speeches in the 1970s, which warned Americans that their country's dependence on oil was "likely to get progressively worse through the rest of this century," has there been serious attention to the role conservation should play in addressing environmental issues such as climate change and sustainability. The next presidential administration should highlight the importance of individuals taking action in their homes and communities in order to decrease the unsustainable demand for natural resources.


A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2008

A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Federal agencies are increasingly taking aim at state law, even though state law is not expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer. Starting in 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued several notices saying that state laws would apply to national bank operating subsidiaries (incorporated under state law) to the same extent as those laws applied to the parent national bank. In 2003, the OCC specifically mentioned state consumer protection laws and took the position that the state laws were preempted and did not apply to mortgage lenders owned by national banks. In December 2006, …


Limiting Federal Agency Preemption: Recommendations For A New Federalism Executive Order, William Funk, Thomas Mcgarity, Nina A. Mendelson, Sidney Shapiro, David Vladeck, Matthew Shudtz, James Goodwin Jan 2008

Limiting Federal Agency Preemption: Recommendations For A New Federalism Executive Order, William Funk, Thomas Mcgarity, Nina A. Mendelson, Sidney Shapiro, David Vladeck, Matthew Shudtz, James Goodwin

Other Publications

The structure of the U.S. Constitution reflects a profound respect for the principles of federalism and state sovereignty. These principles require the federal government to recognize and encourage opportunities for state and local governments to exercise their authority, especially in areas of traditional state concern such as the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. However, over the last six years there has been a coordinated Executive Branch effortto use the regulatory process to shield certain product manufacturers from state tort liability. The Food and Drug Administration, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and Consumer Product Safety Commission, …


The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2008

The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and the courts. As they note, the quality of agency deliberation matters to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules …


Strange Bedfellows, David M. Uhlmann Jan 2008

Strange Bedfellows, David M. Uhlmann

Articles

Environmental protection has not been a priority for the Bush administration, but, contrary to popular perception, criminal prosecution of companies and officials accused of breaking environmental laws has flourished.


Slides: The Future Public Law Of Private Ecosystems, J. B. Ruhl Jun 2007

Slides: The Future Public Law Of Private Ecosystems, J. B. Ruhl

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

Presenter: J.B. Ruhl, Florida State University Law School

18 slides


Documents, Leaks, And The Boundaries Of Expression: Government Whistleblowing In An Over Classified Age, Susan Nevelow Mart Jan 2007

Documents, Leaks, And The Boundaries Of Expression: Government Whistleblowing In An Over Classified Age, Susan Nevelow Mart

Publications

No abstract provided.


Regulatory Beneficiaries And Informal Agency Policymaking, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2007

Regulatory Beneficiaries And Informal Agency Policymaking, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Administrative agencies frequently use guidance documents to set policy broadly and prospectively in areas ranging from Department of Education Title IX enforcement to Food and Drug Administration regulation of direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising. In form, these guidances often closely resemble the policies agencies issue in ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, guidances are generally developed with little public participation and are often immune from judicial review. Nonetheless, guidances can prompt significant changes in behavior from those the agencies regulate. A number of commentators have guardedly defended the current state of affairs. Though guidances lack some important procedural safeguards, they can help agencies supervise …


Guidance Documents And Regulatory Beneficiaries, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2006

Guidance Documents And Regulatory Beneficiaries, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Federal agencies rely heavily on guidance documents, and their volume is massive. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration recently catalogued over 2000 and 1600 such documents, respectively, issued between 1996 and 1999. These documents can range from routine matters, such as how employees should maintain correspondence files, to broad policies on program standards, implementation, and enforcement. Documents in the latter category include Education Department policies on Title IX implementation, Environmental Protection Agency policies on hazardous waste cleanup, the Food and Drug Administration's policies on food safety and broadcast advertising of pharmaceuticals, and many more.Although these …


Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2003

Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

This Article examines executive branch agency actions concluded just before a new President takes office, such as "midnight" rulemaking and late-term hiring and promotion, which Professor Mendelson collectively refers to as "agency burrowing." Congress, the media, and some commentators have portrayed such activities as unsavory power grabs that undermine the President-elect's ability to direct the functions of administrative agencies. Rather than dismissing agency burrowing out of hand, however, Professor Mendelson argues for a more nuanced approach. In some cases, burrowing can make positive contributions to the democratic responsiveness of agencies, agency accountability, and the "rule of law." A fuller analysis …


Catastrophic Terrorism- Thinking Fearfully, Acting Legally, Barry Kellman Jan 1999

Catastrophic Terrorism- Thinking Fearfully, Acting Legally, Barry Kellman

Michigan Journal of International Law

The time has come to move beyond howls of alarm to a public discussion of what policies should be adopted or reformed. That discussion should proceed even as crucial questions remain only partially answerable: How realistic is the possibility of catastrophic terrorism? How easy is it to make a catastrophic device that actually works? Why would any person or group want to kill hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of innocent victims?


Erisa Enforcement: Mandate For A Single Agency, Beverly M. Klimkowsky, Ian D. Lanoff Oct 1985

Erisa Enforcement: Mandate For A Single Agency, Beverly M. Klimkowsky, Ian D. Lanoff

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In Part I, this Article reviews the aspects of pensions that justify the attention of Congress during consideration of budgets and the federal deficit. Part II documents the initial administrative problems created by the congressional compromise that divided administrative responsibility between the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service. Although Reorganization Plan No. 4 solved some of the initial problems, the remaining problems are not amenable to resolution within a system of responsibility divided between separate agencies. The specific problems associated with enforcement are discussed in Part III, which identifies the total failure of enforcement as a major threat …


Environmental Considerations In Public Lands Mineral Leasing And Development I, Karin P. Sheldon Jun 1985

Environmental Considerations In Public Lands Mineral Leasing And Development I, Karin P. Sheldon

Public Lands Mineral Leasing: Issues and Directions (Summer Conference, June 10-11)

18 pages.

Contains 2 pages of references.


Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg Dec 1981

Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg

Michigan Law Review

This Article addresses the substantial legal problems posed by Executive Order 12,291. Part I argues that the Order, taken as a whole or separated into its procedural and substantive components, violates the constitutional separation of powers. Drawing on the analytic framework outlined by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case, Part I maintains that courts should demand clear congressional support for the Order's requirements. The available evidence, however, conclusively demonstrates Congress's intent to deny the President formalized, substantive control over administrative policymaking. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, moreover, the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) …


The Solicitor General And Intragovernmental Conflict, Michigan Law Review Dec 1977

The Solicitor General And Intragovernmental Conflict, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note considers the way in which the Solicitor General has resolved-and should resolve-such ambiguities in his role as advocate for the United States. First, the Note examines the accommodation of interests represented by the Solicitor General's responses to discordant obligations. Second, it analyzes the common law and statutory sources of the Solicitor General's responsibilities. Finally, the proper role of the Solicitor General is assessed, giving due consideration to his position .as mediator among interest groups within the government and to the institutional constraints to which he is subject.


Congressional Control Of Agency Privilege, Mark A. Luscombe Jan 1976

Congressional Control Of Agency Privilege, Mark A. Luscombe

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This note seeks to provide an introductory and largely historical analysis of "agency privilege:" the refusal of federal executive officials to furnish information and documents to congressional bodies absent the invocation of a claim of privilege by the President. After a brief survey of the origins of agency privilege in part I, the history and nature of the competing interests of congressional investigations and autonomy of executive departments and agencies will be discussed in part II. Part III explores the constitutional basis of the claim and analyzes other justifications proffered in specific circumstances. Part IV weighs the merits of various …


Scope Of Disclosure Of Internal Revenue Communications And Information Files Under The Freedom Of Information Act, Peter R. Spanos Jan 1975

Scope Of Disclosure Of Internal Revenue Communications And Information Files Under The Freedom Of Information Act, Peter R. Spanos

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article will discuss the proper scope of disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of the files and administrative and policy materials of the IRS, with particular attention to the following currently contested issues: (1) the extent to which IRS guideline documents and private letter rulings are subject to disclosure; (2) the proper scope of the FOIA exemption for "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency" as applied to the IRS; and (3) the scope of the exemption for "investigatory records …


Administrative Agencies And The Court, Frank E. Cooper Jan 1951

Administrative Agencies And The Court, Frank E. Cooper

Michigan Legal Studies Series

The limits which courts place on the powers of administrative tribunals have particular significance to practicing attorneys and law students. It is largely to the extent that such limits are imposed, that our government remains a government of laws and not a government of men.

The following pages have been written to describe the standards which the courts impose upon administrative agencies, thereby controlling and limiting their powers. More particularly, the writer has sought: (1) to bring together the leading cases in which the courts have laid down the principles that govern frequently litigated questions in contests between the agencies …