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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law
Judicial Deference To Agency Action Based On Ai, Cade Mallett
Judicial Deference To Agency Action Based On Ai, Cade Mallett
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(N)Ons, And The Waters Wars, William W. Buzbee
The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(N)Ons, And The Waters Wars, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The Clean Water Act has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. This Article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States.” This is the key jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation. The multi-decade battle over Waters protections has both drawn on emergent antiregulatory moves and generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array …
The Kavanaugh Court And The Schechter-To-Chevron Spectrum: How The New Supreme Court Will Make The Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, Justin Walker
Indiana Law Journal
In a typical year, Congress passes roughly 800 pages of law—that’s about a seveninch
stack of paper. But in the same year, federal administrative agencies promulgate
80,000 pages of regulations—which makes an eleven-foot paper pillar. This move
toward electorally unaccountable administrators deciding federal policy began in
1935, accelerated in the 1940s, and has peaked in the recent decades. Rather than
elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats increasingly make the vast majority
of the nation’s laws—a trend facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in three
areas: delegation, deference, and independence.
This trend is about to be reversed. In the coming years, Congress will …
Agency Statutory Abnegation In The Deregulatory Playbook, William W. Buzbee
Agency Statutory Abnegation In The Deregulatory Playbook, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
If an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power previously claimed, how should such a move—what this article calls agency statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Given the array of strategies an agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen? After all, it is always a perilous and likely doctrinally disadvantageous strategy for agencies. Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have utilized statutory abnegation claims as part of their justification for deregulatory shifts. Actions by agencies during 2017 and 2018, under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, …
A Gun To Whose Head? Federalism, Localism, And The Spending Clause, Daniel S. Cohen
A Gun To Whose Head? Federalism, Localism, And The Spending Clause, Daniel S. Cohen
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
President Trump’s executive order rescinding federal funds from “sanctuary jurisdictions” has brought a critical, but overlooked, question of constitutional law to the forefront of the political debate: how does the Spending Clause apply to local governments? The purpose of the Spending Clause is to empower the federal government to bargain with the states to enact policies it cannot enact itself. This power, however, is constrained within the confines of federalism. The Supreme Court has sought to restrict the Spending Clause by crafting the Dole-NFIB framework, a test to determine whether a federal grant has compromised federalism. At its …
The Virtues Of Abstention: Separation Of Powers In Al-Nashiri Ii, Nicholas A. Dimarco
The Virtues Of Abstention: Separation Of Powers In Al-Nashiri Ii, Nicholas A. Dimarco
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
Part I examines various scholarly approaches to judicial deference, then considers deference in the context of military commissions. In Part II, the history of military commissions in the United States is examined, paying particular attention to the extended dialogue among the coordinate federal branches that created the system currently in operation. The decision in Al-Nashiri II not to adjudicate a collateral attack on one of these commissions is the focus of Part III. That Part embraces the underlying jurisdictional challenge at stake in Al-Nashiri II, the development of abstention doctrine generally and as applied to the current commissions, …
The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman
The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman
John C. Eastman
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
The Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, yet Congress grants expansive lawmaking authority to federal agencies. As positive political theorists have long explored, Congress intends for federal agencies to faithfully exercise their delegated authority, but ensuring fidelity to congressional wishes is difficult due to asymmetries in information, expertise, and preferences that complicate congressional control and oversight. Indeed, this principal-agent problem has a democratic and constitutional dimension, as the legitimacy of administrative governance may well depend on whether the unelected bureaucracy is a faithful agent of Congress. Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation and the decades-long application of principal-agent …
Foreword — Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Peter M. Shane, Christopher J. Walker
Foreword — Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Peter M. Shane, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
This Foreword introduces a Fordham Law Review symposium held in March 2014 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The most-cited administrative-law decision of all time, Chevron has sparked thirty years of scholarly discussion concerning what Chevron deference means, when (or even if) it should apply, and what impact it has had on the administrative state. Part I of the Foreword discusses the symposium contributions that address Chevron’s scope and application, especially in light of City of Arlington v. FCC. Part II introduces the contributions that explore empirically and theoretically Chevron’s impact outside of …
The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker
The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …
Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove
Once More Unto The Breach: American War Power And A Second Legislative Attempt To Ensure Congressional Input, Jonathan T. Menitove
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Once again embroiled in an unpopular overseas armed conflict, the United States faces difficult questions concerning the constitutional use of military force. Records from the Constitutional Convention suggest the Framers intended to lodge America's power to go to war with the Congress. While American presidents' early use of military force displays deference to the legislature, more recent military actions illustrate the executive's dominance in making war. Notwithstanding a few early court decisions in Congress 's favor, the judiciary has been unhelpful in restoring the constitutional Framers' vision for the administration of the war power Congress, therefore, has been forced to …
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and the courts. As they note, the quality of agency deliberation matters to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules …
A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, Nina A. Mendelson
A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Federal agencies are increasingly taking aim at state law, even though state law is not expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer. Starting in 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued several notices saying that state laws would apply to national bank operating subsidiaries (incorporated under state law) to the same extent as those laws applied to the parent national bank. In 2003, the OCC specifically mentioned state consumer protection laws and took the position that the state laws were preempted and did not apply to mortgage lenders owned by national banks. In December 2006, …
The Statutory Commander In Chief, Neil Kinkopf
The Statutory Commander In Chief, Neil Kinkopf
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium: War, Terrorism and Torture: Limits on Presidential Power in the 21st Century. Convened by the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy and the Indiana University School of Law- Bloomington, prominent legal scholars, human rights advocates and government lawyers gathered in Bloomington on October 7, 2005.
The Dangers Of Deference: International Claim Settlement By The President, Ingrid Wuerth
The Dangers Of Deference: International Claim Settlement By The President, Ingrid Wuerth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
During the final months of the Clinton administration, the State Department entered into a trio of unprecedented international agreements with France (the "French Agreement"), Germany (the "German Agreement"), and Austria (the "Austrian Agreement"). These "sole" executive agreements, designed to resolve litigation pending in the U.S. courts that arose out of World War II and the Holocaust, were made without Senate ratification(as required for a treaty) or congressional authorization (as in a congressional- executive agreement). Although executive branch settlement of claims without Senate or congressional approval has a long history, these executive agreements mark an important departure from prior practice by …
Everything I Need To Know About Presidents I Learned From Dr. Seuss, Gary S. Lawson
Everything I Need To Know About Presidents I Learned From Dr. Seuss, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Oaths are out of fashion these days. This is an era in which it is widely considered unreasonable to expect the President of the United States to obey basic principles of law and justice, much less to honor something as abstract as an oath. Perjury the violation of a legally binding oath-is publicly defended as proof of the offender's humanity rather than his criminality. And one should not even mention in polite company something as gauche as honoring an oath of marriage. Those pesky vows of marital fidelity were, after all, just words.