Law Commons^™

Rethinking "Original Intent", David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Although Dred Scott v. Sandford is one of the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions, it is not often taught or read. But its approach to constitutional interpretation is by no means outdated, and its historical importance has not diminished. So it seems a good example to consider.

Substance, Process And Outcome In Constitutional Theory, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Scholarship in philosophy proceeds at a slower pace than in the law. As Tom Lehrer, the poet laureate of a recent generation, might have said, the law biz travels on a faster track. Or so it seems to a philosopher who has recently been treading the tracks of constitutional lawyers.

And so it is with apprehension that I take as my text a book that was published as long ago as 1980. As the title of this lecture might suggest to someone with so long a memory, the book is John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.' That work provoked an …

Church-State Relations And Religious Convictions, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Since the title of my talk is hardly self-explanatory, I want to begin by outlining my topic. My overall concern is with the proper place of religious convictions in lawmaking in our society. My special focus is on the place of religious convictions in the political resolution of churchstate issues.

The Connection Between Law And Morality: Comments On Dworkin, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Our discussions yesterday seemed haunted by a contrast--never quite formulated--between Natural Law and Legal Positivism. The standard interpretation turns on the idea of a "necessary connection" between law and morality. Positivism has often been understood to hold, and Natural Law to deny, that there can be unjust laws.

Vietnam Amnesty – Problems Of Justice And Line-Drawing, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

The troublesome issue of pardon for crimes connected with the Vietnam War raises some of the most complex and difficult questions in the philosophy of law. What are the purposes of criminal punishment? Under what conditions is violation of obligations imposed by law morally justified? When, and on what conditions, is it proper to excuse those who have violated the law for conscientious reasons? How much should decisions whether to pardon turn on what offenders "deserve" and how much should they turn on what will be socially acceptable and promote future social harmony? How far should the desirability of dispositions …

On Justifying Enforced Requirements: A Reply To Baier, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

There are limits to the possible subjects of justification. Typically, it concerns human behavior and things that human intervention can affect. Failing special circumstances, it makes no sense to speak of justifying the weather. There may be other limits to the class of possible subjects for justification; for example, it is sometimes said that a thing cannot be justified unless it has been indicted, though it is not clear how this claim should be taken. For there simply may be no point in bothering to justify something that is not suspect in some way, and the relevant condition can generally …

The Nature Of The Contract Argument, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

As truth is the first virtue of belief, so justice is of social institutions. That is John Rawls's view, and it seems true, at any rate, of the law. Official acts, laws, and legal arrangements generally are characterized as just or unjust, while other moral categories are much less frequently invoked. Justice seems inseparable from good law. It is therefore striking and important that justice has recently been regarded by prominent legal theorists as rationally disreputable--as, in Kelsen's words, "an irrational idea." Many divergent conceptions of social justice have been propounded, and it is held that there is no rational …

On Formal Justice, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

A number of legal and political theorists have suggested that public officials who fail to act within the law that they administer act unjustly. This does not mean that injustice is always likely to be done merely because it often happens to be done when officials depart from the law. Some writers have held that injustice is done whenever an official fails to act within the law, regardless of the circumstances. I shall call this type of view "formal justice."

Logic And Coercion In Bentham's Theory Of Law, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Unlike conventional moral standards and other social rules, laws can be deliberately laid down and changed by specified procedures. It therefore seems reasonable to think of laws as issuing from or adopted by lawmakers who are ordinary human beings. Since laws tell us what must or must not be done, and since there is some temptation to understand all laws on the same pattern, it is natural to think of them as either commands or prohibitions. This is indeed a traditional view.