Law Commons^™

In (Partial) Praise Of (Some) Compromise: Comments On Tebbe, Chad Flanders

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I want to begin by sketching a point of view that, at best, makes only an implicit showing in Tebbe's persuasive, thoughtful, and challenging book. That viewpoint looks something like this:2 religion is unique, not just in substance but also in form. Start with substance: religion is a way of looking at the world as not exhausted by secular values or concerns; for money, prestige, or for "utility" broadly construed, or even exhausted by morality. Religion asks, repeatedly of those who believe in it, to do seemingly impossible things. It counts on miracles. Religion sees the world and our lives, …

Criminals Behind The Veil: Political Philosophy And Punishment, Chad Flanders

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There is evidence everywhere that our criminal justice system is undergoing a crisis of practice. Increased police violence and the concomitant distrust of police in many communities, fear of aggressive enforcement tactics more generally, worries about widespread governmental surveillance and, above all, a concern with overcriminalization and mass incarceration-these are the dreary and familiar stuff of daily headlines. But, this crisis of practice in tum reflects a deeper crisis of how we theorize about criminal law. We lack, for the most part, any worked-out theory of what the policing and processing of crime should look like. Nor do we have …

Micro-Symposium On Orin Kerr's 'A Theory Of Law', Laura Appleman, Shawn Bayern, Adam D. Chandler, Robert Cheren, Miriam A. Cherry, Ross E. Davies, Lee Anne Fennell, Paul A. Gowder, Caitlin Hartsell, Kieran Healy, Robert A. James, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Orin S. Kerr, Jacob T. Levy, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Orly Lobel, Geoffrey A. Manne, Chad M. Oldfather, Ronak Patel, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Alexandra J. Roberts, Kent Scheidegger, Arthur Stock, Anders Walker

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For more than a century, careful readers of the Green Bag have known that “[t]here is nothing sacred in a theory of law...which has outlived its usefulness or which was radically wrong from the beginning...The question is What is the law and what is the true public policy?” Professor Orin Kerr bravely, creatively, and eloquently answered that question in his article, “A Theory of Law,” in the Autumn 2012 issue of the Green Bag. Uniquely among all theories of law that I know of, Kerr’s answer to the fundamental question of law and true public policy enables all scholars to …

The Mutability Of Public Reason, Chad Flanders

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Rawls's “public reason” has not been without its critics. One criticism is that public reason is “conservative.” Public reason must rely on those beliefs that are “widely shared” among citizens. But if public reason relies on widely shared beliefs, how can it change without departing from those beliefs, thus violating public reason? In part one of my essay, I introduce the conservatism objection and describe two unsatisfactory responses to it. Part two argues that there are aspects of public reason which diminish the force of the conservatism objection: first, that public reason is historical, and second, that it is mutable.

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

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How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy?

In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …

Bentham On Stilts: The Bare Relevance Of Subjectivity To Retributive Justice, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders

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In recent work, various scholars have challenged retributive justice theorists to pay more attention to the subjective experience of punishment, specifically how punishment affects the experiences and well-being of offenders. The claim developed by these “subjectivists” is that because people’s experiences with pain and suffering differ, both diachronically and inter-subjectively, their punishments will have to be tailored to individual circumstances as well.

Our response is that this set of claims, once scrutinized, is either true, but of limited significance, or nontrivial, but unsound. We don’t doubt the possibility that different people will react differently to the same infliction of punishment. …

The Possibility Of A Secular First Amendment, Chad Flanders

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In a series of articles and now in their new book, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, Lawrence Sager and Christopher Eisgruber (E&S) defend an interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment which, they write, "denies that religion is a constitutional anomaly, a category of human experience that demands special benefits and/or necessitates special restrictions." While not a book review in the traditional sense, my essay takes E&S's defense of a secular First Amendment as a starting point and asks, how did we get to the point where an interpretation of the First Amendment which denies that religion is …

Legality And Discretion, Stephen C. Thaman

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Volume II: This is an encyclopedia entry on legality and discretion.