Law Commons^™

Status Quo Kewenangan Perusahaan Asuransi Dalam Menerbitkan Produk Penjaminan Pasca Berlaku Efektifnya Undang-Undang No. 1 Tahun 2016 Tentang Penjaminan, Kalih Krisnareindra

"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI

Risk is something that is always exist in various type of business. Risk management commonly used the assistance of insurance companies to manage its risk by risk transfer. The current prevailing law allows the insurance industry to develop its products wider than the explicitly defined business lines in the regulation. Historically, the guarantee/surety business has been marketed jointly between insurance companies and guarantee/surety companies. This can be traced through laws and regulations that provide the authority to both type of companies to issue guarantee/surety products. But with the enactment of Law No. 1 of 2016 concerning Guarantees, there is an …

Pertanggungjawaban Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Terhadap Kasus Gagal Bayar Perusahaan Asuransi, Tumbur Halomoan

"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI

The development of the financial industry accompanied by close supervision in order to maintain stability in the financial industry. Financial Services Authority is an independent institution have special authority by the Law to overseen the financial industry. The financial industry is divided into two parts first the bank financial industry and the non-bank financial industry. One non-bank financial industry that is overseen by OJK. OJK in overseeing insurance is quite large starting from the granting of a company establishment license to the company's activities which are reported regularly by the insurance company. OJK not necessarily make the insurance industry run …

Third Party Moral Hazard And The Problem Of Insurance Externalities, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

Insurance can lead to loss or claim-creation not just by insureds themselves, but also by uninsured third parties. These externalities—which we term “third party moral hazard”—arise because insurance creates opportunities both to extract rents and to recover for otherwise unrecoverable losses. Using examples from health, automobile, kidnap, and liability insurance, we demonstrate that the phenomenon is widespread and important, and that the downsides of insurance are greater than previously believed. We explain the economic, social and psychological reasons for this phenomenon, and propose policy responses. Contract-based methods that are traditionally used to control first-party moral hazard can be welfare-reducing in …

The Case For Banning (And Mandating) Ransomware Insurance, Kyle D. Logue, Adam B. Shniderman

Law & Economics Working Papers

Ransomware attacks are becoming increasingly pervasive and disruptive. Not only are they shutting down (or at least “holding up”) businesses and local governments all around the country, they are disrupting institutions in many sectors of the U.S. economy — from school systems, to medical facilities, to critical elements of the U.S. energy infrastructure as well as the food supply chain. Ransomware attacks are also growing more frequent and the ransom demands more exorbitant. Those ransom payments are increasingly being covered by insurance. That insurance offers coverage for a variety of cyber-related losses, including many of the costs arising out of …

Mandatory Tax Penalty Insurance, Michael Abramowicz

Indiana Law Journal

In a mandatory tax penalty insurance regime, taxpayers would be required to find insurers to certify portions of their tax returns. A certifying insurer would be subject to a governmental auditing regime insurers of randomly selected filings would pay an amount equal to the inverse of the selection probability multiplied by the underpayment, or they would receive money from the government in the case of overpayment. The insurers function as private auditors with no incentive to underestimate their customers' tax liability. Such a regime will consume real resources, ultimately paid by taxpayers, and thus should not be imposed universally. But …

The Paradox Of Insurance, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we uncover a paradoxical phenomenon that has hitherto largely escaped the attention of legal scholars and economists, yet it has far-reaching implications for insurance law: loss-creation by uninsured parties caused by the presence of insurance. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that insurance can create significant negative externalities by inducing third parties to engage in antisocial, illegal and unethical activities in order to extract money from insureds or insurers. Moreover, as the amount and scope of insurance grows, so does its distortionary effect on third parties. We term this phenomenon the paradox of insurance. The risk …

Private Equity Value Creation In Finance: Evidence From Life Insurance, Divya Kirti, Natasha Sarin

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper studies how private equity buyouts create value in the insurance industry, where decentralized regulation creates opportunities for aggressive tax and capital management. Using novel data on 57 large private equity deals in the insurance industry, we show that buyouts create value by decreasing insurers' tax liabilities; and by reaching-for-yield: PE firms tilt their subsidiaries' bond portfolios toward junk bonds while avoiding corresponding capital charges. Previous work on affiliated or "shadow" reinsurance and capital management misses the important role that private equity buyouts play as recent drivers of these phenomenon. The trend we document is of growing importance in …

Remutualization, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

Policymakers need to rediscover the organizational form of business entity as a tool of financial regulation. Recent and classic scholarship has produced evidence that financial institutions organized as alternative entity forms – including investment bank partnerships and banks and insurance companies organized as mutual or cooperatives – tend to take less risk, exploit customers/consumer less, or commit less misconduct compared to counterparts organized as investor-owned corporations. This article builds off the work of Hill and Painter on investment banks organized as partnerships, Hansmann on the history and economics of banks and insurance companies organized as mutuals and cooperatives, and other …

The Promises And Pitfalls Of Harmonization: What Insurance Guarantee Schemes Tell Us About When Harmonization Works, Jordan Burton

Indiana Law Journal

In Part I, this Note considers the mechanisms of harmonization and the regulatory and fairness policy concerns that harmonization is designed to address. Part II explores some of the problems harmonization can create, with an eye toward how those problems manifest in the IGS context. Finally, Part III discusses how IGS address an urgent and inevitable problem that affects actors in the insurance market at every level. By analyzing comments on the Commission’s White Paper, Part III proposes that these three factors—convergence of stakeholder interest, inevitability, and urgency— are key to understanding when member states, EU citizens, and industry actors …

Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, Tom Baker, Benedict G. C. Dellaert

All Faculty Scholarship

Automated financial product advisors – “robo advisors” – are emerging across the financial services industry, helping consumers choose investments, banking products, and insurance policies. Robo advisors have the potential to lower the cost and increase the quality and transparency of financial advice for consumers. But they also pose significant new challenges for regulators who are accustomed to assessing human intermediaries. A well-designed robo advisor will be honest and competent, and it will recommend only suitable products. Because humans design and implement robo advisors, however, honesty, competence, and suitability cannot simply be assumed. Moreover, robo advisors pose new scale risks that …

The Forfeiture Of Coverage Defenses Rule: An Economic Analysis, Tom Baker, Ezra Friedman, Kyle D. Logue

Law & Economics Working Papers

In liability insurance, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to cover. Thus it is possible that an insurer that has a duty to defend a suit may not have the duty to cover the policyholder's liabilities in the suit. However, if the penalty for a breach of the duty to defend is limited to actual legal costs spent by the defendant, the insurer may have an incentive to refuse to defend, even when the duty to defend is clear. This occurs because the insurer will not internalize the consequences of an inadequate defense when it ultimately can …

The Forfeiture Of Coverage Defenses Rule: An Economic Analysis, Tom Baker, Ezra Friedman, Kyle D. Logue

All Faculty Scholarship

In liability insurance, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to cover. Thus it is possible that an insurer that has a duty to defend a suit may not have the duty to cover the policyholder's liabilities in the suit. However, if the penalty for a breach of the duty to defend is limited to actual legal costs spent by the defendant, the insurer may have an incentive to refuse to defend, even when the duty to defend is clear. This occurs because the insurer will not internalize the consequences of an inadequate defense when it ultimately can …

Everything’S Bigger In Texas: Except The Medmal Settlements, Tom Baker, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent work using Texas closed claim data finds that physicians are rarely required to use personal assets in medical malpractice settlements even when plaintiffs secure judgments above the physician's insurance limits. In equilibrium, this should lead physicians to purchase less insurance. Qualitative research on the behavior of plaintiffs suggests that there is a norm under which plaintiffs agree not to pursue personal assets as long as defendants are not grossly underinsured. This norm operates as a soft constraint on physicians. All other things equal, while physicians want to lower their coverage, they do not want to violate the norm and …

The Perverse Effects Of Subsidized Weather Insurance, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

This Article explores the role of insurance as a substitute for direct regulation of risks posed by severe weather. In pricing the risk of human activity along the predicted path of storms, insurance can provide incentives for efficient location decisions as well as for cost-justified mitigation efforts in building construction and infrastructure. Currently, however, much insurance for severe-weather risks is provided and heavily subsidized by the government. This Article demonstrates two primary distortions arising from the government’s dominance in these insurance markets. First, existing government subsidies are allocated differentially across households, resulting in a significant regressive redistribution favoring affluent homeowners …

Driverless Cars And The Much Delayed Tort Law Revolution, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

The most striking development in the American tort law of the last century was the quick rise and fall of strict manufacturers’ liability for the huge social losses associated with the use of industrial products. The most important factor in this process has been the inability of the courts and academic commentators to develop a workable theory of design defects, resulting in a wholesale return of negligence as the basis of products liability jurisprudence. This article explains the reasons for this failure and argues that the development of digital technology, and the advent of self-driving cars in particular, is likely …

Inference Under Stability Of Risk Preferences, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We leverage the assumption that preferences are stable across contexts to partially identify and conduct inference on the parameters of a structural model of risky choice. Working with data on households' deductible choices across three lines of insurance coverage and a model that nests expected utility theory plus a range of non-expected utility models, we perform a revealed preference analysis that yields household-specific bounds on the model parameters. We then impose stability and other structural assumptions to tighten the bounds, and we explore what we can learn about households' risk preferences from the intervals defined by the bounds. We further …

Liability Insurer Data As A Window On Lawyers’ Professional Liability, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

All Faculty Scholarship

Using the best publicly available data on lawyers’ liability claims and insurance – from the largest insurer of large law firms in the U.S., the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading insurance broker–this article reports the frequency of lawyers’ liability claims, the distribution and cost of claims by type of practice, the disposition of claims, and lawyers liability insurance premiums from the early 1980s to 2013. Notable findings include remarkable stability over thirty years in the distribution of claims by area of practice among both small and large firms, …

Mandatory Rules And Default Rules In Insurance Contracts, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue

All Faculty Scholarship

The economic analysis of contract law can be organized around two general questions: (1) what are the efficient or welfare-maximizing substantive rules of contract law; and (2) once those rules have been identified, when if ever should they be made mandatory and when should they be merely “default rules” that the parties can contract around if they wish? Much of contract theory over the past twenty years has been devoted to developing answers to those two questions. The same two questions can be posed with respect to the rules of insurance law. Although previous scholars have examined particular substantive doctrines …

Information & Equilibrium In Insurance Markets With Big Data, Peter Siegelman

Peter Siegelman

The presence of asymmetric information makes the behavior of insurance markets very difficult to predict. But I argue that the increasing use of Big Data by insurers will not result in forecasts of loss that are so accurate that they eliminate uncertainty, and with it, the possibility of insurance. Big Data techniques might lead to a “flip” in informational asymmetry, resulting in a situation in which insurers know more about their customers than the latter know about themselves. But the effects of such a development could actually be benign. Finally, the article considers the potential for Big (or at least, …

Insurance Agents In The Twenty-First Century: The Problem Of Biased Advice, Daniel Schwarcz, Peter Siegelman

Peter Siegelman

No abstract provided.

Insurance Law & Economics, Daniel Schwarcz, Peter Siegelman

Peter Siegelman

No abstract provided.

Behavioral Economics And Insurance Law: The Importance Of Equilibrium Analysis, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

Because choosing insurance requires consumers to assess risks and probabilities, the demand for insurance has proven to be fertile ground for identifying deviations from rational behavior. Consumers often shun the insurance against large losses that they rationally should want (e.g., floods); and they are attracted to insurance against small losses (extended warranties, low deductibles) that no rational individual should purchase. But the welfare consequences of behavioral anomalies in insurance are complex, because consumers’ irrational behavior takes place in a market profoundly shaped by informational asymmetries. Under some conditions, deviations from rational behavior may actually generate insurance market equilibria that produce …

Understanding Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue, Daniel Schwarcz

Articles

Insurance companies are in the business of discrimination. Insurers attempt to segregate insureds into separate risk pools based on the differences in their risk profiles, first, so that different premiums can be charged to the different groups based on their differing risks and, second, to incentivize risk reduction by insureds. This is why we let insurers discriminate. There are limits, however, to the types of discrimination that are permissible for insurers. But what exactly are those limits and how are they justified? To answer these questions, this Article (a) articulates the leading fairness and efficiency arguments for and against limiting …

Towards A Universal Framework For Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue, Daniel Schwarcz

Articles

Discrimination in insurance is principally regulated at the state level. Surprisingly, there is a great deal of variation across coverage lines and policyholder characteristics in how and the extent to which risk classification by insurers is limited. Some statutes expressly permit insurers to consider certain characteristics, while other characteristics are forbidden or limited in various ways. What explains this variation across coverage lines and policyholder characteristics? Drawing on a unique, hand-collected data-set consisting of the laws regulating insurer risk classification in fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions, this Article argues that much of the variation in state-level regulation of risk classification can in …

You Want Insurance With That? Using Behavioral Economics To Protect Consumers From Add-On Insurance Products, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

Peter Siegelman

No abstract provided.

Behavioral Economics And Insurance Law: The Importance Of Equilibrium Analysis, Peter Siegelman, Tom Baker

Peter Siegelman

No abstract provided.

Gambling On Our Financial Future: How The Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is A Safer Bet To Prevent Another Financial Collapse, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

The Market In Unmatured Tort Claims: Twenty-Five Years Later, Stephen G. Marks

Stephen G Marks

Twenty-five years ago, in 1989, Professor Robert Cooter, writing in the Virginia Law Review, proposed changes in the law that would facilitate the development of a market in unmatured tort claims. On this twenty-fifth anniversary of this groundbreaking paper, it is fitting to reexamine this proposal, speculate on why it has not been adopted, and to explore whether revisions in the proposal might lead to greater legislative acceptance. In this paper I reexamine the proposal as to its likely intended and unintended effects. This article argues that, for such a market in unmatured tort claims to work, three modifications must …

The Individual Mandate's Due Process Legality: A Kantian Explanation, And Why It Matters, Peter Brandon Bayer

Scholarly Works

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, one of the most controversial decisions of this young century, an intensely divided Supreme Court upheld the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's most provocative feature-the Individual Mandate-under Congress's taxing power. In so doing, the Court rejected what appeared to be the Individual Mandate's more applicable constitutional premise-Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce. Yet, neither the Constitution's Taxing Clause nor its Commerce Clause provide the ultimate answer as to whether Congress may regulate the multi-billion dollar healthcare market by compelling unwilling persons to buy private health insurance. The final determination of the …

The Split Benefit: The Painless Way To Put Skin Back In The Health Care Game, Christopher Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

This Article proposes a solution to the growth of health care costs, focusing on the sector of expensive, and often unproven, treatments. Political, legal, and market limits prevent insurers or physicians from rationing care or putting downward pressure on prices. Since the insurer bears the cost, the patient is also not sensitive to price, and thus consumes even low-value treatments.

The traditional cost-sharing solution is stymied by the patients’ limited wealth. When treatments can cost $25,000 or more, the median patient cannot be expected to pay a significant portion thereof. Instead, patients often enjoy supplemental insurance or exhaust their cost-sharing …