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Full-Text Articles in Law
Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Because third-party funding and sales of legal rights are equivalent in terms of their economics, I examine arrangements in which third-party sales of legal rights are permitted today; those arrangements include waiver, subrogation, and settlement agreements. These existing arrangements provide valuable lessons for the appropriate regulatory approach to third-party financing of litigation.
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …
The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer
The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
A pervasive problem in the settlement of liability litigation arises because liability insurers bundle their promise to indemnify the insured with a promise to represent the insured in settlement and litigation [see, e.g., Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 638 F.Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986)]. Standard policies not only require the insurer to pay for legal representation but, more importantly, give the insurer the privilege of controlling the litigation and settlement process. The problem is how to resolve the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured that may arise during settlement negotiations. This conflict is manifest when …
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
The articles in this issue are samples from the burgeoning economics of contract law. They demonstrate that lawyers a can bring economic models to bear on quite specific issues of co offer normative guidance regarding the structure of efficient The success of the symposium and the quality of the articles of this field will continue to flourish. The articles cover a fairly narrow range of contract law issues. The second through sixth articles all address topics involving remedies. Two of these loo at the optimal remedies to be provided by contract law, and the other three are concerned with remedies …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Law: A Testable Model Of Strategic Behavior, Robert Cooter, Stephen G. Marks, Robert Mnookin
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Law: A Testable Model Of Strategic Behavior, Robert Cooter, Stephen G. Marks, Robert Mnookin
Faculty Scholarship
Part I describes the framework of the model. Part II discusses the domination of psychological effects by tangible variables, which is the basis for comparative statics. Part III explains the table of predictions, and Part IV applies the predictions to externalities and rules for real-locating payoffs from trial. There is little mathematics in the text. The mathematical reader can refer to the Appendix for a brief presentation of our model, or to a companion paper on file with this Journal which develops the mathematics at length.