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Full-Text Articles in Law
Contracting On Litigation, Kathryn E. Spier, J.J. Prescott
Contracting On Litigation, Kathryn E. Spier, J.J. Prescott
Articles
Two risk-averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third-party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk-neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction-cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.
Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Because third-party funding and sales of legal rights are equivalent in terms of their economics, I examine arrangements in which third-party sales of legal rights are permitted today; those arrangements include waiver, subrogation, and settlement agreements. These existing arrangements provide valuable lessons for the appropriate regulatory approach to third-party financing of litigation.
Some Important Causes For Settlement In American Civil Litigation, Felipe Forte Cobo
Some Important Causes For Settlement In American Civil Litigation, Felipe Forte Cobo
LLM Theses and Essays
This paper focuses on pure economic disputes such as contract, real property and tort conflicts, in which the economic efficiency model is very accepted. In this limited scenario, the consensual resolution of disputes is always more efficient than decisions made by a third-party decision-maker, whether from a post-trial or pre-trial perspective.
Considering that lower transaction costs drive parties towards settlement, part II of this essay provides an overview of the American costs of legal disputes, framing several issues that might be determinative to settlements. Part III explores how two specific American procedural institutes – discovery and civil jury trial – …
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …
The Relational Contingency Of Rights, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein
The Relational Contingency Of Rights, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, we demonstrate, contrary to conventional wisdom, that all rights are relationally contingent. Our main thesis is that rights afford their holders meaningful protection only against challengers who face higher litigation costs than the rightholder. Contrariwise, challengers who can litigate more cheaply than a rightholder can force the rightholder to forfeit the right and thereby render the right ineffective. Consequently, in the real world, rights avail only against certain challengers but not others. This result is robust and pervasive. Furthermore, it obtains irrespectively of how rights and other legal entitlements are defined by the legislator or construed by …
Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis Of Confidential Settlements, Scott A. Moss
Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis Of Confidential Settlements, Scott A. Moss
Publications
Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settlement forbidding the parties from disclosing their allegations, evidence, or settlement amount. Confidentiality draws fierce criticism for harming third parties by concealing serious misdeeds like discrimination, pollution, defective manufacturing, and sexual abuse. Others defend confidentiality as a mutually beneficial pay-for-silence bargain that facilitates settlement, serves judicial economy, and prevents frivolous copycat lawsuits. This debate is based in economic logic, yet most analyses have been surprisingly shallow as to how confidentiality affects incentives to settle. Depicting a more nuanced, complex reality of litigation and settlement, this Article reaches several conclusions …
The Unexpected Value Of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, Joseph A. Grundfest, Peter H. Huang
The Unexpected Value Of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, Joseph A. Grundfest, Peter H. Huang
Publications
In this Article, we suggest that litigation can be analyzed as though it is a competitive research and development project. Developing this analogy, we present a two-stage real option model of the litigation process that involves sequential information revelation and bargaining over the surplus generated by early settlement. Litigants are risk-neutral and have no private information. The model generates results that, we believe, have analytic and normative significance for the economic analysis of litigation
From an analytic perspective, we demonstrate that negative expected value (NEV) lawsuits are analogous to out of the money call options held by plaintiffs and that …
Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley
Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley
All Faculty Scholarship
The overwhelming majority of intellectual property lawsuits settle before trial. These settlements involve agreements between the patentee and the accused infringer, parties who are often competitors before the lawsuit. Because these competitors may agree to stop competing, to regulate the price each charges, and to exchange information about products and prices, settlements of intellectual property disputes naturally raise antitrust concerns. In this paper, we suggest a way to reconcile the interests of intellectual property law and antitrust law in evaluating intellectual property settlements. In Part I, we provide background on the issue. Part II argues that in most cases courts …
A New Options Theory For Risk Multipliers Of Attorney's Fees In Federal Civil Rights Litigation, Peter H. Huang
A New Options Theory For Risk Multipliers Of Attorney's Fees In Federal Civil Rights Litigation, Peter H. Huang
Publications
Given the importance of private enforcement of federal civil rights laws, Congress and the courts have attempted to encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to accept meritorious civil rights cases through fee shifting and risk multipliers. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has essentially prohibited the use of risk multipliers, thus undercompensating attorneys for the risk of losing civil rights actions and discouraging the filing of such cases. In this Article, Professor Huang develops a new options-based theory of calculating attorney's fees. Professor Huang argues that a lawsuit consists of a sequence of options to continue with the case rather than a once-and-for-all irreversible …
The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer
The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
A pervasive problem in the settlement of liability litigation arises because liability insurers bundle their promise to indemnify the insured with a promise to represent the insured in settlement and litigation [see, e.g., Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 638 F.Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986)]. Standard policies not only require the insurer to pay for legal representation but, more importantly, give the insurer the privilege of controlling the litigation and settlement process. The problem is how to resolve the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured that may arise during settlement negotiations. This conflict is manifest when …
Agenda: Moving The West's Water To New Uses: Winners And Losers, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
Agenda: Moving The West's Water To New Uses: Winners And Losers, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)
Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado Law School professors Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Mark Squillace.
Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers will be the theme for this year's water conference, June 6-8 at the Law School in Boulder. The conference will consider the changing demands for water in the West and the need to reallocate a portion of the existing uses of water to new uses.
The first day will provide the background by looking at the most likely sources of water to meet these demands, including agriculture, federal water projects, interstate transfers, and …
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
The articles in this issue are samples from the burgeoning economics of contract law. They demonstrate that lawyers a can bring economic models to bear on quite specific issues of co offer normative guidance regarding the structure of efficient The success of the symposium and the quality of the articles of this field will continue to flourish. The articles cover a fairly narrow range of contract law issues. The second through sixth articles all address topics involving remedies. Two of these loo at the optimal remedies to be provided by contract law, and the other three are concerned with remedies …
Ogallala Ground Water, Morton W. Bittinger
Ogallala Ground Water, Morton W. Bittinger
Groundwater: Allocation, Development and Pollution (Summer Conference, June 6-9)
12 pages.
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Law: A Testable Model Of Strategic Behavior, Robert Cooter, Stephen G. Marks, Robert Mnookin
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Law: A Testable Model Of Strategic Behavior, Robert Cooter, Stephen G. Marks, Robert Mnookin
Faculty Scholarship
Part I describes the framework of the model. Part II discusses the domination of psychological effects by tangible variables, which is the basis for comparative statics. Part III explains the table of predictions, and Part IV applies the predictions to externalities and rules for real-locating payoffs from trial. There is little mathematics in the text. The mathematical reader can refer to the Appendix for a brief presentation of our model, or to a companion paper on file with this Journal which develops the mathematics at length.