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Full-Text Articles in Law
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson
Michigan Law Review
In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David Walker offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming …
New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt
New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt
Michigan Law Review
Corporate governance has been discussed in Europe for over 150 years. Indeed, in the 1840's, when the first Corporation Act was enacted in Prussia, three troubling features of the corporate organization form had already been discerned: (I) the vulnerability of small investors who lacked the influence and sophistication to. control the corporation; (2) the risk to creditors and the public created by the limited liability of the corporation, especially when combined with inadequate funds and poorly controlled management; and (3) the power that big corporations could amass economically, by monopolizing markets, and politically, by exerting influence on public opinion and …