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Full-Text Articles in Law
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this Review discusses the modem "nexus of contracts" approach to corporations and highlights how Greenfield's views differ. Part II examines corporate goals and purposes, suggesting that Greenfield overstates the impact of the shareholder-primacy norm and does not offer a preferable alternative. Part III critiques the means to the ends--Greenfield's proposals for changing the mechanics of corporate governance. Although several of his proposals are intriguing, they seem unlikely to achieve their pro-social aims. This Review remains skeptical, in part because-even given its problems-the U.S. "director-centric governance structure has created the most successful economy the world has ever seen." …
Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox
Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox
Michigan Law Review
The United States was hit by a wave of corporate scandals that crested between late 2001 and the end of 2002. Some were traditional scandals involving insiders looting company assets - the most prominent being Tyco, HealthSouth, and Adelphia. But most were what might be called "financial scandals": attempts by an issuer to maximize the market price of its securities by creating misimpressions as to what its future cash flows were likely to be. Enron and WorldCom were the most spectacular examples of these financial scandals. In scores of additional cases, the companies involved and their executives were sued by …
Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman
Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman
Michigan Law Review
While they often rely on the threat of penalties to produce deterrence, legal systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot implement such a regime in the form of equity compensation for directors. We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward regimes. While …
Mickey, Can You Spare A Dime? Disneywar, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, And Business Law Pedagogy, Kenneth M. Rosen
Mickey, Can You Spare A Dime? Disneywar, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, And Business Law Pedagogy, Kenneth M. Rosen
Michigan Law Review
American business executives are under fire. Recent, notorious difficulties at companies such as the Enron Corporation brought attention to these individuals. Notwithstanding the conclusion of the trials of some of those top executives, skepticism remains about the inner workings of U.S. corporations and the quality of corporate governance. Drawing special scrutiny from some quarters is the compensation granted to corporate officers and directors. For instance, the timing of certain stock option grants, a key component of some compensation packages, raised ire because of those options' supposed backdating and fortuitous proximity to increases in share prices. Further, some questioned more generally …
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer
Michigan Law Review
Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals: When Google went public in 2004, it used an Internet auction to sell its stock to shareholders. When Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984, it sold its stock only to Vermont residents. Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of exactly one dollar. Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut. What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastructure of …
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson
Michigan Law Review
In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David Walker offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming …
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
Michigan Law Review
Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted, but until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in union-friendly companies. In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union members, and labor-oriented investment funds are …
The Supervision Of Corporate Management: A Comparison Of Developments In European Community And United States Law, Alfred F. Conard
The Supervision Of Corporate Management: A Comparison Of Developments In European Community And United States Law, Alfred F. Conard
Michigan Law Review
In 1971, Eric Stein published an account of the remarkable progress of the European Economic Community (EEC) toward a harmonized law of business corporations. The progress was particularly striking from an American viewpoint, because the harmonization was achieved by moving toward the more rigorous of the various national standards, in contrast to the "race of laxity" or "race for the bottom" that has characterized the movement toward uniformity in the corporation laws of U.S. states.
New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt
New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt
Michigan Law Review
Corporate governance has been discussed in Europe for over 150 years. Indeed, in the 1840's, when the first Corporation Act was enacted in Prussia, three troubling features of the corporate organization form had already been discerned: (I) the vulnerability of small investors who lacked the influence and sophistication to. control the corporation; (2) the risk to creditors and the public created by the limited liability of the corporation, especially when combined with inadequate funds and poorly controlled management; and (3) the power that big corporations could amass economically, by monopolizing markets, and politically, by exerting influence on public opinion and …
The Continuing Debate On Corporate Governance, J. Kirkland Grant
The Continuing Debate On Corporate Governance, J. Kirkland Grant
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Modern Corporate Manager: Responsibility and Regulation by William A. Groening and The Limits of Corporate Power: Existing Constraints on the Exercise of Corporate Discretion by Ira M. Millstein and Salem M. Katsh
Restructuring The Corporate Board Of Directors: Fond Hope--Faint Promise?, Lewis D. Solomon
Restructuring The Corporate Board Of Directors: Fond Hope--Faint Promise?, Lewis D. Solomon
Michigan Law Review
Reforms, then, have been instituted, and an extensive literature on corporate reform has developed. It is time that we seriously examine the reforms and the literature to assess the accomplishments and possibilities of the corporate board of directors. This Article is a first step in that direction.
The Article begins by investigating the reasons for the impotence of corporate boards. It then examines two models of reformed boards and finds both models badly flawed. The Article proceeds to case studies of three corporations-Mattel, Inc., Northrop Corp., and Lockheed Corp.-which under court· order have attempted to reform their boards by increasing …
An Overview Of The Laws Of Corporations, Alfred F. Conard
An Overview Of The Laws Of Corporations, Alfred F. Conard
Michigan Law Review
During the twentieth century, legislatures found it necessary to enact great masses of additional legislation to deal with the special problems of corporations. People who worked with the entire group of relevant laws were known as "corporation lawyers." But, like Londoners, they continued to regard as "corporation laws" only those few that covered the same points embraced by the laws of the Victorian era. The others carried distinct sobriquets.
This usage leads to a confusion in speaking about the "laws of corporations," since they are so much broader than "corporation laws." It would be hard, though, for a reader to …
The Structure Of The Private Multinational Enterprise, Yitzhak Hadari
The Structure Of The Private Multinational Enterprise, Yitzhak Hadari
Michigan Law Review
From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, society has experienced the persistent tendency of business organizations to expand. Businesses evolved from the rural workshop to the urban factory; from the municipal firm to the regional firm and then to the national enterprise. More recently, enterprises have expanded even further, from national firms with small export outlets to huge multinational enterprises (MNEs) embracing business operations all over the globe coordinated under a single management. Yet, along with its beneficial results for the peoples of the world, each new economic era brings with it new problems as well.
The conflict between the …
Corporations - Officers And Directors - Agreement Interfering With Management By Board Of Directors, Edward H. Hoenicke S.Ed.
Corporations - Officers And Directors - Agreement Interfering With Management By Board Of Directors, Edward H. Hoenicke S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiffs, minority stockholders in a closely held corporation, asked that the court declare invalid an agreement between the majority stockholders and their "agent-directors" for the management of the business. The agreement provided that for ten years the stock of the parties to the agreement would be voted as a unit as any seven of the agents should direct or, if they could not agree, as directed by an arbitrator chosen by them. The agents were to be elected to the board of directors by the stockholders who appointed them. Under a cumulative voting provision, the parties to the agreement had …
Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith
Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith
Michigan Law Review
As suggested by the title to this paper, a discussion of the relationship between the directors of a corporation and the corporate entity is not within its scope. Neither is the lrelationship between the directors-and the entire body of the shareholders. These two subjects are generally treated in another branch of the law of corporations and generally are not governed by the same rules of law.' The purchase of shares of stock by a director from a nonofficial shareholder naturally brings into question the relationship between the director and the shareholder in his individual capacity, and not in his capacity …
Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson
Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson
Michigan Law Review
The movement in the field of co5perative commercial undertakings has been; school-book-like, a movement from the simple to the complex, from the common-la* sitaation of persons associating together to conduct a busines for profit to the modern statutory association and the corporation possessing an enormous capital ,derived from a host of individuals whose respective interests are represented -by various -classes -of transferable shares.