Law Commons^™

Judicial Deference To Agency Action Based On Ai, Cade Mallett

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(N)Ons, And The Waters Wars, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Clean Water Act has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. This Article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States.” This is the key jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation. The multi-decade battle over Waters protections has both drawn on emergent antiregulatory moves and generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array …

The Kavanaugh Court And The Schechter-To-Chevron Spectrum: How The New Supreme Court Will Make The Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, Justin Walker

Indiana Law Journal

In a typical year, Congress passes roughly 800 pages of law—that’s about a seveninch

stack of paper. But in the same year, federal administrative agencies promulgate

80,000 pages of regulations—which makes an eleven-foot paper pillar. This move

toward electorally unaccountable administrators deciding federal policy began in

1935, accelerated in the 1940s, and has peaked in the recent decades. Rather than

elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats increasingly make the vast majority

of the nation’s laws—a trend facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in three

areas: delegation, deference, and independence.

This trend is about to be reversed. In the coming years, Congress will …

Judicial Review In An Age Of Hyper-Polarization And Alternative Facts, David A. Dana, Michael Barsa

San Diego Journal of Climate & Energy Law

This Article is organized as follows: Part I reviews the case law and commentary on judicial review of agency shifts in policy or practice, focusing on the technocratic case for deference and how recent political realities call such deference into question. Part II sets forth the background and history regarding fuel economy standards, leading to the Obama Administration’s adoption of standards in 2012 and the “midterm” review of those standards that Obama’s EPA declared final as of January 2017. Part II also reviews the legal issues surrounding Trump’s EPA’s “re-opening” of the midterm review. We suggest how courts could, and …

Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare and change business’ profitability or even viability. Nonetheless, it can seem like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doctrines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step” or “Chevron step zero.” To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in linguistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure …

International Norms In Constitutional Law, Michael Wells

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Deferential Review Of The U.S. Tax Court, After Mayo Foundation V. United States (2011), Andre L. Smith

Andre L. Smith

Deferential Review of the U.S. Tax Court, After Mayo examines whether the Chevron doctrine requires federal circuit courts of appeal to deferentially review the U.S. Tax Court decisions of law. Mayo Foundation v. US (2011) rejects tax exceptionalism and requires the U.S. Tax Court to defer to Treasury regulations carrying the force of law. But Mayo avoids dealing with whether Chevron applies to appellate review of the Tax Court. In “The Fight Over ‘Fighting Regs’ and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation”, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 643 (2012), Professor Leandra Lederman (Indiana) contends that deference belongs to the agency and not …

Judges! Stop Deferring To Class-Action Lawyers, Brian Wolfman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat

I represent a national non-profit consumer rights organization, as an amicus, in a federal appeal challenging a district court’s approval of a class-action settlement of claims under the federal Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA). My client maintains that the district court erred in finding that the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” which is the standard for class-action settlement approval under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, we argue that the district court committed a reversible legal error when it deferred to the class-action lawyers’ recommendation to approve the settlement because, in those lawyers’ view, it was fair, …

The Judicial Assault On The Clean Water Act, Mark Squillace

Publications

No abstract provided.

"Deference" Is Too Confusing – Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" And "Skidmore Weight", Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay suggests an underappreciated, appropriate, and conceptually coherent structure to the Chevron relationship of courts to agencies, grounded in the concept of "allocation." Because the term "deference" muddles rather than clarifies the structure's operation, this Essay avoids speaking of "Chevron deference" and "Skidmore deference." Rather, it argues, one could more profitably think in terms of "Chevron space" and "Skidmore weight." "Chevron space" denotes the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints – that is, its allocated authority. "Skidmore weight" …

From Chevron To Massachusetts: Justice Stevens's Approach To Securing The Public Interest, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

During the past three decades, one Supreme Court justice— John Paul Stevens—has authored two of the most significant administrative law decisions that speak to the judiciary’s role in checking agency interpretations of the statutes that they administer. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Justice Stevens’s landmark 1984 decision unanimously upheld the EPA’s construction of a term found in the Clean Air Act. Subsequently, in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Stevens’s 2007 opinion for a five-justice majority handed a major win to global environmental security by ordering the EPA to reconsider its refusal to regulate greenhouse …

Kruse V. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (Decided September 10, 2004), Jennifer Katehos

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion In Statutory Interpretation, Frank H. Easterbrook

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.