Law Commons^™

Transnational Criminal Law Or The Transnational Legal Ordering Of Corruption?, Radha Ivory

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law

To date, “transnational criminal law” has been the dominant

paradigm for explaining and mapping rules on corruption in the

international legal literature. Transnational criminal law is presented as a

system of law descending from multilateral crime control treaties or a field or

order that emerges through international political processes of regime

formation. Transnational criminal lawyers identify and describe cross-border

legal rules, and seek to evaluate them against liberal norms of democratic

governance and individual civil and political human rights. This Article

details the limits of transnational criminal conceptions of “anticorruption”

through a study of proposed changes to Australian laws on …

Legal Instruments Of State Practice And International Initiatives Undertaken To Fight Corruption In The Banking And Financial Sector, N. D. Nodirxonova

International Relations: Politics, Economics, Law

In this article we analyze the legal aspects of leading international experience in countering corruption in bank and financial sectors. It must be noted that these issues have gained even more importance given the universal character of corruption related criminal activities. The trans-boundary character of this kind of crimes makes it significant to properly study and learn foreign expertise in the sphere. Having analyzed experience of various countries we have come up with relevant conclusions, regarding institutional base, legal tools, involvement of civil society actors, significance of transparency and etc.

Promises Unfulfilled: How Investment Arbitration Tribunals Mishandle Corruption Claims And Undermine International Development, Andrew T. Bulovsky

Michigan Law Review

In recent years, the investment-arbitration and anti-corruption regimes have been in tension. Investment tribunals have jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between investors and host states under international treaties that provide substantive protections for private investments. But these tribunals will typically decline to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if the host state asserts that corruption tainted the investment. When tribunals close their doors to ag-grieved investors, tribunals increase the risks for investors and thus raise the cost of international investment. At the same time, the decision to decline jurisdiction creates a perverse incentive for host states to turn a blind eye to …