Law Commons^™

Innovation And The Domain Of Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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Antitrust policy and the IP laws are both concerned with practices that restrain competition unnecessarily by reducing the size of the public domain beyond that which the Constitution contemplates, or as Congress intended for them to be expanded. In fact, antitrust has a dual role as promoter of competition in IP intensive markets. It regulates both restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. The first line protector of the competitive process in innovation is the IP statutes themselves. The Constitutional Mandate to Congress to create intellectual property regimes in order to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts is …

Restraints On Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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Beginning with the work of Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s and later elaborated by Robert W. Solow's work on the neoclassical growth model, economics has produced a strong consensus that the economic gains from innovation dwarf those to be had from capital accumulation and increased price competition. An important but sometimes overlooked corollary is that restraints on innovation can do far more harm to the economy than restraints on traditional output or pricing. Many practices that violate the antitrust laws are best understood as restraints on innovation rather than restraints on pricing.

While antitrust models for assessing losses that result …

Ip And Antitrust Policy: A Brief Historical Overview, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The history of IP/antitrust litigation is filled with exaggerated notions of the power conferred by IP rights and imagined threats to competition. The result is that antitrust litigation involving IP practices has seen problems where none existed. To be sure, finding the right balance between maintaining competition and creating incentives to innovate is no easy task. However, the judge in an IP/antitrust case almost never needs to do the balancing, most of which is done in the language of the IP provisions. The role of antitrust tribunals is the much more limited one of ensuring that any alleged threat to …

Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley

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Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challenges to agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the use or disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products they cover. But sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual property owner's refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhaps coupled with efforts to enforce the intellectual property right against infringers. The allegation may be that the intellectual property right is so essential to competition that it must be licensed across the board, or that a refusal to license it to one particular party was discriminatory, or that …

United States Antitrust Policy In An Age Of Ip Expansion, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The idea that there is a tension between antitrust and the intellectual property laws is readily exaggerated. The tension that exists results mainly from our uncertainty about the optimal amount and scope of IP protection. In general, antitrust draws clearer lines than intellectual property law does, although one should not push the point too far. Antitrust policy as manifested in the courts has achieved a fair amount of consensus today. By contrast, deep uncertainty remains about fundamental questions concerning the socially optimal outcome of IP disputes. In addition, while the antitrust statutes are for the most part public regarding provisions …

Ub Viewpoint – Aol/Microsoft Settlement Could Harm Consumers, Robert H. Lande

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No abstract provided.

The European Union’S Microsoft Case: No Time For Jingoism, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

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No abstract provided.

Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley

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The overwhelming majority of intellectual property lawsuits settle before trial. These settlements involve agreements between the patentee and the accused infringer, parties who are often competitors before the lawsuit. Because these competitors may agree to stop competing, to regulate the price each charges, and to exchange information about products and prices, settlements of intellectual property disputes naturally raise antitrust concerns. In this paper, we suggest a way to reconcile the interests of intellectual property law and antitrust law in evaluating intellectual property settlements. In Part I, we provide background on the issue. Part II argues that in most cases courts …

Why Are We So Reluctant To "Execute" Microsoft?, Robert H. Lande

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On June 28, 2001, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws repeatedly, relentlessly, and over a multi-year period. The court ruled eight separate times that Microsoft engaged in conduct that illegally maintained its monopoly in PC operating systems. Despite these strongly worded conclusions concerning Microsoft’s liability, the court was extremely cautious when it considered whether to break up the company. It held that divestiture was a “radical” remedy that should be imposed with “great caution.”

The Perfect Caper?: Private Damages And The Microsoft Case, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld

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As readers of crime novels know, there are many definitions of the perfect caper. Under most, the perpetrator gets to keep its ill-gotten gains and goes unpunished. Even if the perpetrator is arrested and brought to trial, he or she still typically escapes punishment completely due to a variety of unusual circumstances. This is essentially what Professors John E. Lopatka and William H. Page are arguing about Microsoft's actions. They assert that even though Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws, it will not be made to pay for its anticompetitive conduct, at least not by private plaintiffs.

After Microsoft Wins, Robert H. Lande

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No abstract provided.

Economic Pressure And Antitrust (With James A. Wilkinson), Henry H. Perritt Jr.

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No abstract provided.