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Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Christopher C. French
In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …
Tort Arbitrage, Robert J. Rhee
Tort Arbitrage, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
The economic models of bargaining and tort law have not been integrated into a coherent theory that reflects the operational realities of the dispute resolution process and the negligence standard. Applying a theory of bargaining based on asset pricing principles of financial economics, this Article argues that there is systematic devaluation of tort claims in the civil litigation system. This results because in essence the parties value different tort transactions, even when they are tied together in a common dispute and view the facts and laws similarly. For the party that can mitigate the risk exposure, the discount to value …