Law Commons^™

Collaborative Divorce: What Louis Brandeis Might Say About The Promise And Problems?, Susan Saab Fortney

Susan S. Fortney

No abstract provided.

The Thinning Vision Of Self-Determination In Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price Of Institutionalization?, Nancy A. Welsh

Nancy Welsh

Ethical codes for mediators describe party self-determination as “the fundamental principle of mediation,” regardless of the context within which the mediation is occurring. The definition of self-determination, however, is a matter of dispute. Based on a review of the debate surrounding the promulgation and revision of ethical codes for court-connected mediators in Florida and Minnesota, this Article demonstrates that a vision of self-determination anchored in party-centered empowerment is yielding to a vision that is more reflective of the norms and traditional practices of lawyers and judges, as well as the courts’ strong orientation to efficiency and closure of cases through …

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts and …

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …

Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, Stephen Yelderman

Stephen Yelderman

As a general rule, judges and scholars believe settlement is a good thing. But for nearly a century, the Supreme Court has said that patent litigation is categorically different, since it offers the chance to increase competition by freeing the public from the burdens of a monopoly. Based on this theory, and in the hopes of seeing more patent litigation fought to completion, the Court has overturned long-standing common-law doctrines, declined to enforce otherwise-valid contracts, and—in the recent case of Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc—subjected patent settlements to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. Similar reasoning has resulted in legislative …

A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …

Advising Clients To Apologize, Jonathan R. Cohen

Jonathan R. Cohen

The article argues that lawyers should consider the possibility of advising clients to apologize for harms they commit, as in some cases apology may best serve their client's interests. The articles discusses some of the pros and cons to apology in the legal setting, as well as barriers that may inhibit apologies.

The Dumping Dragon: Analysing China's Evolving Anti-Dumping Behaviour, Umair H. Ghori

Umair H. Ghori

China is a major target for anti-dumping measures by both developed and developing countries. Its rapid industrial transition to higher value-added sectors brings it in direct conflict with the US and the EU. Anti-dumping measures have consistently been employed by the US and the EU to protect their domestic markets from encroaching Chinese exports. In the initial few years of joining the WTO, China rarely initiated any complaint in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), while facing several complaints itself. This approach has now evolved. China appears to have acquired the knowledge and capacity to access the WTO DSM for …

Party Autonomy In Tort Theory And Reform, Christopher Robinette

Christopher J Robinette

Cognitive Fallacies Reading List, Curtis E.A. Karnow

Curtis E.A. Karnow

Reading list of books, articles, reports, and other material relating to cognitive fallacies, i.e., errors in reasoning which affect us all, including lawyers and judges. These errors in turn affect lawyers’ competence and judges’ ability to provide fair, impartial and well-reasoned decisions.

Protocols For International Arbitrators Who Dare To Settle Cases, Harold Abramson

Harold I. Abramson

The best time to settle an international business dispute can be after the international arbitration proceeding has been commenced. Just like in court litigation, parties may be ready to settle only after the adjudicatory process has begun and even has progressed. In court, judges commonly open the door to settlement; they hold settlement conferences and even actively participate in settlement negotiations. But arbitrators rarely open the door to settlement; when they do, they risk losing their jobs. So, what can international arbitrators safely do? What dare they do? In this article, the author explores the dilemma presented when one neutral …

Commercial Arbitration And Settlement: Empirical Insights Into The Roles Arbitrators Play, Thomas Stipanowich, Zachary Ulrich

Thomas J. Stipanowich

A wide-ranging new Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution Survey of experienced arbitrators, conducted with the cooperation of the College of Commercial Arbitrators, reflects the growing professionalization of commercial arbitration, increasing competition for cases, and many other trends in arbitration practice. It also shows that a grower percentage of arbitrated cases are being settled prior to award or to the start of hearings, and offers a strong rationale for greater emphasis on the role of arbitrators in setting the stage for or facilitating settlement. Early settlement of a dispute can be a uniquely effective way of minimizing cost and cycle time …

Antitrust Settlements, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

For Reconciliation, Thomas Shaffer, Andrew Mcthenia

Thomas L. Shaffer

No abstract provided.

Solving The Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Manadatory Summary Judgment, David Rosenberg, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

The nuisance-value settlement problem arises whenever a litigant can profitably initiate a meritless claim or defense and offer to settle it for less than it would cost the opposing litigant to have a court dismiss the claim or defense on a standard motion for merits review like summary judgment. The opposing litigant confronted with such a nuisance-value claim or defense rationally would agree to settle for any amount up to the cost of litigating to have it dismissed. These settlement payoffs skew litigation outcomes away from socially appropriate levels, undermining the deterrence and compensation objectives of civil liability. Yet current …

Fisheries Dispute Settlement Under The Law Of The Sea Convention: Current Practice In The Western And Central Pacific Region, Martin Tsamenyi, Ben Milligan, Kwame Mfodwo

Professor Ben M Tsamenyi

No abstract provided.

Future Conduct And The Limits Of Class-Action Settlements, James Grimmelmann

James Grimmelmann

This Article identifies a new and previously unrecognized trend in class-action settlements: releases for the defendant’s future conduct. Such releases, which hold the defendant harmless for wrongs it will commit in the future, are unusually dangerous to class members and to the public. Even more than the “future claims” familiar to class-action scholars, future-conduct releases pose severe informational problems for class members and for courts. Worse, they create moral hazard for the defendant, give it concentrated power, and thrust courts into a prospective planning role they are ill-equipped to handle.

Courts should guard against the dangers of future-conduct releases with …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Christopher C. French

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …

Adr's Place In Foreclosure: Remedying The Flaws Of A Securitized Housing Market, Lydia Nussbaum

Lydia R. Nussbaum

Millions of Americans lost their homes during the foreclosure crisis, an unprecedented disaster still plaguing local and national economies. A primary factor contributing to the crisis has been the failure of conventional foreclosure procedures to account for the new realities of securitization and the secondary mortgage market, which transformed the traditional borrower-lender relationship. To compensate for the shortcomings of conventional foreclosure procedures and stem the tide of residential foreclosure, state and local governments turned to ADR processes for a solution. Some foreclosure ADR programs, however, have greater potential to avoid unnecessary foreclosures than others. This article comprehensively examines the key …

Apology And Organizations: Exploring An Example From Medical Practice, Jonathan R. Cohen

Jonathan R. Cohen

In this Article, I focus on injuries committed by members of organizations, such as corporations, and examine distinct issues raised by apology in the organizational setting. In particular, I consider: (i) the process of learning to prevent future errors; (ii) the divergent interests stemming from principal-agent tensions in employment, risk preferences and sources of insurance; (iii) the non-pecuniary benefits to corporate morale, productivity and reputation; (iv) the standing and scope of apologies; and (v) the articulation of policies toward injuries to others.

The Role Of Judicial Discretion In Dispute Settlement, James Andreoni, Ray D. Madoff

Ray D. Madoff

We consider two common modes of judicial resolution: judicial discretion, where the judge or jury has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy, and winner take all where the remedy is pre-determined by the governing substantive law. We analyze these systems in light of the fact that pre-trial bargainers have been shown to have excessive confidence in their own positions. We find theoretically that winner-take-all rules magnify the effects of over-confidence and diminish the likelihood of settling relative to judicial discretion. We confirm our model with a laboratory experiment showing significantly fewer pre-trial agreements under winner-take-all. These results imply that increasing …

Recognition Of Palestinian Statehood: A Clarification Of The Interests Of The Concerned Parties, Winston Nagan, Aitza Haddad

Winston P Nagan

This paper reviews the history of the claims to statehood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people, from the period of the League of Nations mandate to the current move to secure UN approval of a Palestinian State. The article examines the claims to statehood in international law and examines the problem in the broader context of claims about human rights and humanitarian violations, the Israeli claims to security and legitimacy and the US claims for its mediation goal to ensure that the problem does not descend into a legal vacuum in which the fundamental interests of all parties in security …

An Empirical Study Of Settlement Conference Nuts And Bolts: Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, Compromise And Fear, Peter R. Robinson

Peter R. Robinson

No abstract provided.

Rough Justice, Alexandra Lahav

Alexandra D. Lahav

This Essay offers a new justification for rough justice. Rough justice, as I use the term here, is the attempt to resolve large numbers of cases by using statistical methods to give plaintiffs a justifiable amount of recovery. It replaces the trial, which most consider the ideal process for assigning value to cases. Ordinarily rough justice is justified on utilitarian grounds. But rough justice is not only efficient, it is also fair. In fact, even though individual litigation is often held out as the sine qua non of process, rough justice does a better job at obtaining fair results for …

Tort Arbitrage, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

The economic models of bargaining and tort law have not been integrated into a coherent theory that reflects the operational realities of the dispute resolution process and the negligence standard. Applying a theory of bargaining based on asset pricing principles of financial economics, this Article argues that there is systematic devaluation of tort claims in the civil litigation system. This results because in essence the parties value different tort transactions, even when they are tied together in a common dispute and view the facts and laws similarly. For the party that can mitigate the risk exposure, the discount to value …

The Effect Of Risk On Legal Valuation, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

From a financial economic perspective, the governing condition of a meritorious civil action is the uncertainty of outcome. Expectation and outcome deviate, and the spread is the measure of uncertainty (or variance). During litigation each party has an option to settle or select trial. The decision standard can be seen as an option strike price and a finding of liability as an “in-the-money” call option. This apparent optionality suggests the application of an option pricing model to legal valuation, and a small but growing body of scholarship endorses this concept. However, option theory is not the only concept. Under an …

A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert Rhee

Robert Rhee

Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …

Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering Of Public Adjudication, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Private resolution and public adjudication of disputes are commonly seen as discrete, antipodal processes. There is a generally held understanding of the dispute resolution processes. The essence of private dispute resolution is that the parties can arrange the disputed rights and entitlements per agreement and without judicial intervention. In public adjudication, however, the sovereign mandates the substantive and procedural laws to be applied, many of which cannot be changed by either a party’s unilateral decision or both parties’ mutual consent. Neither approach allows a party an option to unilaterally alter important aspects of the process, such as the standards of …

Why Barring Settlement Bars Legitimate Suits: A Reply To Rosenberg And Shavell, Ted M. Sichelman

Ted M. Sichelman

Professors David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell recently proposed granting defendants an "option to bar settlement" to discourage frivolous suits filed for a mere "nuisance-value" settlement. By exercising this option, a defendant could prevent judicial enforcement of any ensuing settlement agreement between the parties. Rosenberg and Shavell contend that if courts were to foreclose settlement, a plaintiff would drop its nuisance-value suit, because its costs of litigating to judgment would exceed its expected benefits. They conclude that because defendants would only exercise the option if faced with a nuisance-value suit, adopting it would be socially beneficial. Although an option to bar …