Law Commons^™

The Constitutionality Of Dna Sampling On Arrest, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

Every state now collects DNA from people convicted of certain offenses. Law enforcement authorities promote offender DNA databanking on the theory that it will identify offenders who commit additional crimes while or probation or parole, or after they have finished serving their sentences. Even relatively small databases have yielded such dividends. As these database searches uncover the perpetrators of rapes, murders, and other offenses, the pressure builds to expand the coverage of the databases.

Recent proposals call for extending not merely the scope of crimes for which DNA databanking would be used, but also the point at which the samples …

The Dynamics Of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, And Fit In Statistical And Econometric Studies, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This paper reviews the development of the law governing the admissibility of statistical studies. It analyzes the leading cases on scientific evidence and suggests that both the "reliability" and the "general acceptance" standards raise two major difficulties - the "boundary problem" of identifying the type of evidence that warrants careful screening and the "usurpation problem" of keeping the trial judge from closing the gate on evidence that should be left for the jury to assess.

The paper proposes partial solutions to these problems, and it applies them to statistical and econometric proof, particularly in the context of a recent antitrust …

Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This article, part of a symposium on the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v. McVey, questions that court’s rationales for refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to psychiatric testimony about the retrieval of repressed memories. It also challenges the court’s use of a “personal observations” exception to the heightened scrutiny standard of Frye v. United States. It proposes that a better solution to problems of scientific and expert evidence would be to adopt a sliding scale that attends to the use to which the evidence is put and the degree to which it has been shown to be …

Dna Typing: Emerging Or Neglected Issues, David H. Kaye, Edward J. Imwinkelried

Journal Articles

DNA typing has had a major impact on the criminal justice system. There are hundreds of opinions and thousands of cases dealing with DNA evidence. Yet, at virtually every stage of the process, there are important issues that are just emerging or that have been neglected.

At the investigative stage, courts have barely begun to focus on the legal limitations on the power of the police to obtain samples directly from suspects and to use the data from DNA samples in various ways. Issues such as the propriety of "DNA dragnets" (in which large numbers of individuals in a geographic …

How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert And Kuhmo, David H. Kaye, David L. Faigman, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders

Journal Articles

This essay is a response to Professor Edward Imwinkelried's article, "Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule into the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough is Enough When it is not the Best." The authors have two basic points. First, the authors wish to make it clear that they never proposed the "best evidence rule" that he so vigorously attacks, and they think his suggestion that they did so is strained. Second, they wish to reiterate that courts sometimes should do more than they have to ensure that expert testimony is reasonably sound. The important debate underway …

Guarding The Gate To The Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role To Remake Tort Causation Rules, Lucinda M. Finley

Journal Articles

The article looks at what trial judges are actually doing in toxic tort cases in the post-Daubert world; it reviews and critiques cases in which judges have in effect adopted a new rule of causation law that requires plaintiffs to rely on epidemiology, and in particular epidemiology that demonostrates an increase in relative risk of 2.0 or greater; the article considers the substantive as well as the normative implications of this legal treatment of epidemiology.

Dna Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, And The Courts, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

To help meet the challenge of presenting properly performed DNA tests within the post-Daubert legal framework, this article outlines the statistical procedures that have been employed or proposed to provide judges and juries with quantitative measures of probative value, describes more fully how the courts have dealt with these procedures, and evaluates the opinions and the statistical analyses from the standpoint of the law of evidence.

Specifically, the article outlines the procedure used to declare whether two samples of DNA "match," and how shrinking the size of the "match window," as some defendants have urged, will decrease the risk of …

After White V. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees To A Hollow Right To Confront Witnesses, Patricia W. Bennett

Journal Articles

The thrust of this Article is three-fold: (1) to discuss the historical aspects of the Confrontation Clause and its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, (2) to show that, with White v. Illinois, the Supreme Court lost its moorings with previous decisions and drifted into treacherous constitutional seas, and (3) to suggest a textual construction of the Confrontation Clause that would be harmonious with the hearsay rule while preserving the rights of the accused to face their actual accusers.

Proof In Law And Science, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This article addresses proof in both science and law. Both disciplines utilize proof of facts and proof of theories, but for different purposes and, consequently, in different ways. Some similarities exist, however, in how both disciplines use a series of premises followed by a conclusion to form an argument, and thus constitute a logic. This article analyzes the ways in which legal logic and scientific logic differ. Finding facts in law involves the same logic but quite different procedures than scientific fact-finding. Finding, or rather constructing, the law is also very different from scientific theorizing. But such differences do not …

The Admissibility Of Dna Evidence, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

In contrast to the widespread acceptance of red blood cell grouping, blood serum protein and enzyme analysis, and HLA typing, the evidentiary status of forensic applications of recombinant-DNA technology is in flux. A proper evidentiary analysis must attend to the fact that there is no single method of DNA typing. As with the more established genetic tests, the probative value of the laboratory findings depends both on the procedure employed and the genetic characteristics that are discerned. This paper describes some of these procedures and the theory that lies behind them, and then considers the developing case law. Given the …

Credal Probability, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This article responds to Paul Bergman and Al Moore's doubt that ideal triers of facts would be Bayesians. They argue that Bayes' rule, and probability theory in general, fails as a theoretical factfinding model. While probability has long been an accepted measure of belief in empirical propositions and the validity of inductive arguments, this articles addresses Bergman and Moore's doubts directly. It shows how their examples demonstrating the "frequentist" character of Bayesian methodology or the fallacies in Bayesian analysis are easily handled without a frequentist interpretation of probability. Then it shows that an ideal juror's partial beliefs will conform to …

Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports

Journal Articles

Part I of this article briefly describes feminist legal theory and its evolution. Part II then discusses the extent to which evidence as a whole is a gendered topic that reflects predominantly male traits and ideals, and Part III analyzes various specific evidentiary doctrines from a feminist perspective. Finally, Part IV examines way of incorporating feminist theories in teaching an evidence course.

What Is Bayesianism? A Guide For The Perplexed, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

Bayes' Theorem, Bayesian statistics and Bayesian inference have been the subject of sharp dispute in various writings about legal rules of evidence and proof. This article disentangles the many meanings of "Bayesianism." It sketches several competing interpretations of probability, some leading schools of statistical inference, and the elements of Bayesian decision theory. In the process, it notes the aspects of Bayesian theory that have been applied in studies of forensic proof.

Plemel As A Primer On Proving Paternity, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

Although in the past courts only permitted genetic evidence in paternity suits to prove that an accused man was not the father, with the advent of new genetic tests, which easily can exclude ninety to nitey-five percent of the population in most cases, the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah have held that various genetic tests may be used to prove paternity. While a positive move, the admissibility of genetic proof of paternity raises serious questions as to the manner in which this evidence should be presented in court. In the interests of efficiency, some jurisdictions seem to dispense …

The Validity Of Tests: Caveant Omnes, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

A great debate swirls about the use of polygraph tests in criminal cases. Similar concerns about individual privacy and freedom arise with proposals and projects involving widespread testing of government employees for drugs and deception. Required diagnostic testing for certain diseases - most notoriously, for AIDS - raises similar concerns. Incorrect conclusions about who has taken illicit drugs, who has AIDS, and who is lying can be devastating. Yet, perfect knowledge is unattainable. Errors are inevitable. Questions of what the tendency is for these tests to err, which measures are appropriate for deciding whether to use a screening test, and …

Is Proof Of Statistical Significance Relevant?, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

The classic treatises on evidence note that the court or jury must weigh the evidence, and upon weighing it, determine whether the plaintiff or the defendant prevails. Some courts, however, have indicated that statistical evidence should not be admitted unless it is subjected to a procedure known as 'hypothesis testing.' There are many rather mechanical procedures for performing these tests and a number of judges, attorneys, and law professors have suggested that hypothesis testing provides an objective, scientific means of settling disputed questions on which statistical evidence is brought to bear. Yet, many circumstances arise in which courts or administrators …

Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

The commentary on a paper by L.J. Cohen, prepared for a symposium on probability and inference in the law of evidence, shows that the legal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be understood simply as demanding a sufficiently high probability that the prosecution's narrative or story of the facts, which captures all the elements of the offense, is true. No separate measure of the "weight" of the totality of the evidence is required to understand the burden of persuasion. Any incompleteness in the evidence can be accounted for by a conditional probability that includes the presence of any …

Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

In most endeavors concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative information is welcomed. In law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or numerical evidence makes cases harder, not easier. Nevertheless, there are many cases and administrative proceedings, in such areas as environmental law, food and drug regulation, and civil rights, in which statistical data obtained by observation or experiment are readily accepted as assisting in the proper resolution of disputed issues of fact. When courts or administrators confront scientific and statistical evidence in these proceedings, they are not always certain of how to weigh the evidence or whether they should …

Federal Habeas Corpus And The Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone V. Powell, Philip Halpern

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Manual Of The Law Of Evidence, Geoffrey Bennett

Journal Articles

Reviewing: Phipson & Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence. 11th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 1980. 376 pp.

Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments And The Burden Of Proof: A Response To Dr. Cohen's Reply, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This article responds to L. Jonathan Cohen's critique of the author's position regarding the problem of naked statistical evidence. Cohen argues that the kind of probability at work in litigation does not conform to the axioms of mathematical probability. The author responds by suggesting that the familiar theory of probability needs no revision to account for the reluctance of a few courts to permit plaintiffs to prevail on the strength of background statistics alone. One need not adopt Dr. Cohen's esoteric mathematical structure to explain the burden of proof in civil cases. The article shows that whether or not one …

Mathematical Models And Legal Realities: Some Comments On The Poisson Model Of Jury Behavior, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

While a mathematical model cannot reflect all the elements of reality, modeling involves drastic simplifications, and those expounding the mathematical model would recognize the complexity of the elements. This article illuminates this cause with a mathematical model that seems to be in vogue, developed by the renowned mathematician Simeon Poisson. It reviews the Poisson model in order to enucleate its many assumptions. It also explains why these assumptions may introduce serious errors into the probabilities calculated according to the model. It also indicates one reason that even a relatively error free model would have limited usefulness in resolving the constitutional …

Probabilities And Proof: Can Hla And Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, David H. Kaye, Ira Mark Ellman

Journal Articles

Advancing medical technology has produced tests which offer the opportunity to resolve paternity disputes with more accuracy than unaided traditional evidentiary techniques are likely to obtain. Because the biology underlying the statistical evidence in paternity cases offers a wealth of previously unavailable information which is certain to revolutionize the adjudication of paternity suits, but it is important that the courts not become so mesmerized by these new sources of evidence that they neglect to subject them to traditional principles of evidence applicable to all testimony. Additionally, for some time scholars have disagreed on the proper application of a probability formula …

Judges, Repulsive Evidence And The Ability To Respond, Thomas L. Shaffer

Journal Articles

This is a sequel to Bullets, Bad Florins and Old Boots, which reported the attitudes of Indiana trial judges toward the trial lawyer's "arsenal of gadgetry." The opportunity presented in 1963 was the Indiana Trial Judges Seminar and a series of sessions within it on demonstrative evidence. The opportunity this year was a series of sessions on "The Court's Control Over Demonstrative Evidence" at the 1967 Indiana Judicial Conference. There were four of these sessions, all of them conducted by Judge Creighton R. Coleman of the 37th Judicial District of Michigan (Calhoun County). Each session was attended by a group …

Bullets, Bad Florins, And Old Boots: A Report Of The Indiana Trial Judges Seminar On The Judge's Control Over Demonstrative Evidence, Thomas L. Shaffer

Journal Articles

In the spring of 1963, the Indiana Judges Association, which represents about 100 of the 120 trial judges of Indiana, and the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice sponsored the first "Indiana Trial Judges Seminar" in Indianapolis. The seminar was divided into five subject areas of practical importance to trial judges, with each discussion led by a team of nationally-recognized experts and supplemented by a teacher of law who acted as reporter.

The opportunity to be a reporter on the subject area, "The Judge's Control Over Demonstrative Evidence," proved to be an uncommonly promising occasion for gathering empirical …