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Full-Text Articles in Law

Evidence—Impeachment Of Witnesses—Showing Of General Reputation For Unchastity, George K. Faler Feb 1953

Evidence—Impeachment Of Witnesses—Showing Of General Reputation For Unchastity, George K. Faler

Washington Law Review

D, charged with carnal knowledge of a 17-year-old girl, attempted to impeach the credibility of the prosecutrix by offering testimony of two witnesses to the effect that her general reputation in the community for morality was bad. The trial court excluded this evidence, and D was convicted. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Evidence of general reputation for immorality is totally inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness. State v. Wolf, 40 Wn. 2d 648, 245 P. 2d 1009 (1952).


Recent Developments Under The Dead Man Statute, Douglas A. Wilson Aug 1947

Recent Developments Under The Dead Man Statute, Douglas A. Wilson

Washington Law Review

The "Dead Man Statutes" of the several states, which exclude testimony by interested parties in certain cases, stand in the unique position of being condemned by all the modern writers on the law of evidence. Yet this exception to the abrogation of the common law rule against testimony by interested parties still survives in the majority of the states, and furthermore, the courts are generally agreed that the statutes are to be strictly construed. However, in the application to a particular set of facts, such as whether the interested survivor may deny that a transaction took place, or whether the …


Bar Briefs; Errata, Anon Jan 1944

Bar Briefs; Errata, Anon

Washington Law Review

Contains news of local bar associations, law firms and lawyers and missing text from Judson Falknor's article on the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, published in the November 1943 journal.


The American Law Institute's Model Code Of Evidence, Judson F. Falknor Nov 1943

The American Law Institute's Model Code Of Evidence, Judson F. Falknor

Washington Law Review

In planning this necessarily brief statement concerning the Code of Evidence which has been approved by the American Law Institute, I found that I was confronted with a considerable problem of condensation. In the first place, what we have here is a Code, and necessarily the draftsmen have undertaken to cover the entire area of the law of evidence. In the second place, the treatment of many existing rules has been radical in character. And finally, it should be mentioned that a controversy arose between the reporter and his advisers on the one hand, and Mr. Wigmore, chief consultant, on …


Suggested Improvements In The Law Of Evidence, Alfred J. Schweppe, Edwin Gruber, Robert M. Jones, Charles M. Moriarty, Judson F. Falknor, Walter B. Beals Nov 1939

Suggested Improvements In The Law Of Evidence, Alfred J. Schweppe, Edwin Gruber, Robert M. Jones, Charles M. Moriarty, Judson F. Falknor, Walter B. Beals

Washington Law Review

The Washington Committee on Judicial Administration assigned a section of its membership to study the law of evidence in the state of Washington in the light of the Reports of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, published in July, 1938. The observations and recommendations of the Washington Section on the Law of Evidence appear in the following report.


Presumptions, Edmund M. Morgan Nov 1937

Presumptions, Edmund M. Morgan

Washington Law Review

Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair. The great Thayer attempted to bring order out of chaos by reducing the entire doctrine to a simple formula, for which he had very little authority in the judicial decisions, and which for a long time received no real judicial sanction but which later received much lip-service and recently has been rigorously applied in a few cases. Wigmore has been content to accept Thayer almost without qualification. Both …


Admissions, Edmund M. Morgan Jul 1937

Admissions, Edmund M. Morgan

Washington Law Review

In Greenleaf's first edition, he adopted the dictum of Mascardus that an admission is not evidence but a substitute for proof. This was repeated in the first fourteen editions following, was copied by Taylor, was accepted by Wharton, apparently acquiesced in by Thayer, and later strenuously insisted upon by Professor Gifford at Columbia. Unless the dictum be given the interpretation put upon it by Gifford, that it takes the place of proof so long as the jury does not disbelieve it, it would seem to mean that an extra-judicial admission stands on the same basis as an admission made in …


Res Gestae, Edmund M. Morgan Apr 1937

Res Gestae, Edmund M. Morgan

Washington Law Review

A multitude of cases creates chaos in this subject. Even so great a scholar and lawyer as Simon Greenleaf was unable to clarify the topic when the decisions were fewer and simpler. Mr. (afterwards Mr. Justice) Pitt Taylor, the author of Taylor on Evidence, copied Greenleaf word for word; but when in controversy with Mr. Chief Justice Cockburn over Bedinglield's case, had to confess that his text consisted of words "full of sound, signifying nothing". He insisted, however, that the definition which the Chief Justice had framed left him "enveloped in a fog, dense as that by which I am …


The Hearsay Rule, Edmund M. Morgan Jan 1937

The Hearsay Rule, Edmund M. Morgan

Washington Law Review

Any attempt to define a legal concept makes advisable an inquiry into its origin and evolution. If it be a substantive law concept, the social purpose that is designed to serve—whether the avoidance of evils or the creation or furtherance of positive benefits—must be considered. If it be a concept of procedural law, the functions it is, or is thought to be, designed to perform in the process of reaching the factual and legal bases for satisfactory determination of disputes between litigants must be examined. It is proposed, therefore, first to look briefly at the causes which brought the hearsay …


Admissibility Of Previous Consistent Statements By A Witness, Herald A. O'Neill Jul 1931

Admissibility Of Previous Consistent Statements By A Witness, Herald A. O'Neill

Washington Law Review

Today the courts are almost unanimous in holding that proof of statements made by a witness out of court similar to and in harmony with his testimony are inadmissible. "This rule of evidence," said Mr. Justice Holloway, speaking for the Supreme Court of Montana in the case of Fairleigh v.Kelley (1903), "became settled long ago." It is unquestionably supported by the decided weight of authority, and in fact, it may now be said that the rule is more than general—it is well nigh universal. There are, however, well settled exceptions to this general rule. In fact, the exceptions "have become …


Degrees Of Secondary Evidence, Story Birdseye Feb 1931

Degrees Of Secondary Evidence, Story Birdseye

Washington Law Review

One of.the most ancient of all legal doctrines is the "best evidence rule," although originally it had a much broader meaning than at present. According to the early view, it meant that only the best evidence which could be produced was admissible, it was applicable to all classes of evidence and not confined to documents. In its modern application, however, the best evidence rule amounts only to the requirement that the contents of a written instrument must be proved by the introduction of the writing itself, unless its absence is satisfactorily accounted for. The reason for this law of evidence …


Judicial Control Over The Sufficiency Of The Evidence In Jury Trials, Stanley B. Long Aug 1929

Judicial Control Over The Sufficiency Of The Evidence In Jury Trials, Stanley B. Long

Washington Law Review

One has only to read the first few chapters of Thayer's Prelimmary Treatise on Evidence to realize that the history of trial by jury, from its beginning until the present day, records a continuous struggle to prevent the rendition of unreasonable verdicts. When the jury was really a body of witnesses summoned to try the case on their own knowledge, rather than upon evidence produced in court, it was sought to control their verdict by attaint. By this proceeding a new jury would be summoned to re-examine the issue tried by the first jury, and if the second found that …


Admissibility In Federal Courts Of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained By Persons Other Than Federal Officers Or By Cooperation Between Such Persons And Federal Officers, Marion A. Marquis Oct 1928

Admissibility In Federal Courts Of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained By Persons Other Than Federal Officers Or By Cooperation Between Such Persons And Federal Officers, Marion A. Marquis

Washington Law Review

It is a firmly established rule in the federal courts, that evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure, within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, is not admissible providing timely steps are taken for its exclusion or return. However, that rule is limited in its application to federal officers or agents, so that quite generally it may be said, that evidence obtained by private,mdividuals or municipal or state officers, acting as such, is admissible in federal courts, regardless of the manner in which it is obtained.


Admissibility Of Evidence Of Reputation Of The Place In "Jointist" Cases, Alfred E. Harsch Mar 1928

Admissibility Of Evidence Of Reputation Of The Place In "Jointist" Cases, Alfred E. Harsch

Washington Law Review

No abstract provided.


Evidence: Contradiction Of Collateral Matter, Robert S. Macfarlane Oct 1925

Evidence: Contradiction Of Collateral Matter, Robert S. Macfarlane

Washington Law Review

It has been said so many times that a party is concluded by the answers of a witness on any collateral matter, that the real rule and the reasons therefor are very generally misunderstood and frequently misapplied. Some cases and some textbooks draw a very clear distinction between impeachment as applied to a collateral matter and contradiction as applied to a collateral matter. The distinguishing feature seems to be found in whether or not the answer sought to be refuted is elicited on direct examination or cross-examination. If an answer given on direct examination is to be disproven it is …