Law Commons^™

Selling The Idea To Tell The Truth: The Professional Interrogator And Modern Confessions Law, Joseph D. Grano

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (3d edition) by Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and Joseph P. Buckley

Miranda: The Case, The Man, And The Players, Yale Kamisar

Reviews

On the eve of America's bicentennial, the American Bar Association told its members of a plan to publish a book about the "milestone events" in 200 years of American legal history, and invited them to vote on the milestones to be included. When the balloting was over, Miranda v. Arizona1 - "the high-water mark" of the Warren Court's revolution in American criminal procedure2 - had received the fourth highest number of votes.3 I venture to say that if members of the general public had been asked to list the "most regrettable" or "most unfortunate" milestones in American legal history, Miranda …

The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), And Police Investigatory Practices, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

In one sense the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure may be said to. have been launched by the 1956 case of Griffin v. Illinois (establishing an indigent criminal defendant's right to a free transcript on appeal, at least under certain circumstances) and to have been significantly advanced by two 1963 cases: Gideon v. Wainwright (entitling an indigent defendant to free counsel, at least in serious criminal cases) and Douglas v. California (requiring a state to provide an indigent with counsel on his first appeal from a criminal conviction). But these were not the cases that plunged the Warren …

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

Confessions And The Court, Stephen J. Schulhofer

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy by Yale Kamisar

Brewer V. Williams, Massiah And Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

On Christmas Eve, 1968, a ten-year-old girl, Pamela Powers, disappeared while with her family in Des Moines, Iowa.2 Defendant Williams, an escapee from a mental institution and a deeply religious person, 3 was suspected of murdering her, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.4 Williams telephoned a Des Moines lawyer, McKnight, and on his advice surrendered himself to the Davenport, Iowa, police.5 Captain Learning and another Des Moines police officer arranged to drive the 160 miles to Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him directly to Des Moines. 6 Both the trial court 7 and the federal district court8 …

Fred E. Inbau: 'The Importance Of Being Guilty', Yale Kamisar

Articles

As fate would have it, Fred Inbau graduated from law school in 1932, the very year that, "for practical purposes the modern law of constitutional criminal procedure [began], with the decision in the great case of Powell v. Alabama."1 In "the 'stone age' of American criminal procedure,"2 Inbau began his long fight to shape or to retain rules that "make sense in the light of a policeman's task,"3 more aware than most that so long as the rules do so, "we will be in a stronger position to insist that [the officer] obey them."4

Foreword: Brewer V. Williams--A Hard Look At A Discomfiting Record, Yale Kamisar

Articles

In recent decades, few matters have split the Supreme Court, troubled the legal profession, and agitated the public as much as the police interrogation-confession cases. The recent case of Brewer v. Williams3 is as provocative as any, because the Supreme Court there revdrsed the defendant's conviction for the "savage murder of a small child" even though no Justice denied his guilt,4 he was warned of his rights no fewer than five times, 5 and any "interrogation" that might have occurred seemed quite mild.6

Kauper's 'Judicial Examination Of The Accused' Forty Years Later—Some Comments On A Remarkable Article, Yale Kamisar

Articles

For a long time before Professor Paul Kauper wrote "Judicial Examination of the Accused" in 1932, and for a long time thereafter, the "legal mind" shut out the de facto inquisitorial system that characterized American criminal procedure. Paul Kauper could not look away. He recognized the "naked, ugly facts" (p. 1224) and was determined to do something about them -more than thirty years before Escobedo v. Illinois' or Miranda v. Arizona.2

Judicial Examination Of The Accused--A Remedy For The Third Degree, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

Reprint from 30 Michigan Law Review 1224.

In its report on "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" the Wickersham Commission concludes that in the police systems of a number of American municipalities the "third degree" is very generally practiced as a means of extorting from accused persons under arrest confessions, incriminating statements, and other information of value to the police. The conclusion of the Commission confirms the results of private investigation made in the same field. It is true that the methods of inquiry pursued by the Commission leave doubt as to the accuracy of some of the facts reported. But the …

Custodial Police Interrogation In Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, Richard J. Medalie, Leonard Zeitz, Paul Alexander

Michigan Law Review

In his attempt to define the meaning of democracy, Carl Becker, looking back to Plato's view of society, observed that "[a]ll human institutions, we are told, have their ideal forms laid away in heaven, and we do not need to be told that the actual institutions conform but indifferently to these ideal counterparts." Becker's observation may well set the perspective from which to view what occurred when the attempt was made in the District of Columbia to implement the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.

'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply. See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. …

Police Interrogation And The Supreme Court--The Latest Round, Jerold H. Israel

Book Chapters

My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the problem embodied in our title. This book has been designated as "Escobedo-The Second Round." What we will be discussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)]. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of statements obtained from the defendant through police interrogation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely new. They had been suggested, at least in part, …

The Citizen On Trial: The New Confession Rules, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Commenting on why it has taken the United States so long to apply "the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel to the proceedings in the stationhouse as well as to those in the courtroom" - as the Supreme Court did in Miranda v. Arizona - this author notes that, "To a large extent this is so because here, as elsewhere, there has been a wide gap between the principles to which we aspire and the practices we actually employ."

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Articles

F the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer3 are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona' has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

Has The Court Left The Attorney General Behind? The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters On Poverty, Equality, And The Administration Of Criminal Justice, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Distribution of the first preliminary draft of the proposed American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure last June touched off a brisk exchange of letters between Chief Judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who maintained that the proposed code left a good deal to be desired, and Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, who, although he did not explicitly treat any provision of the preliminary draft, sharply challenged the conception of equality underlying Bazelon's criticism of it. By now, both the code, and the Bazelon-Katzenbach correspondence which it evoked, are …