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Full-Text Articles in Law
Incomplete Contracts In A Complete Contract World, Scott A. Baker, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Incomplete Contracts In A Complete Contract World, Scott A. Baker, Kimberly D. Krawiec
ExpressO
This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment in contractual relationships. All contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not specify the optimal actions for the buyer and seller in every future contingency. This incompleteness can lead to both under and over-investment in resources specifically targeted to the needs of the other contracting party. To solve these investment problems, economists and legal scholars have looked to complicated contractual solutions and the ownership of assets.
This Article offers another solution: contract doctrine. Specifically, we propose a contractual default rule applicable to all contract …
The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell
The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell
Faculty Scholarship
This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds.), surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four topic areas that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These areas include freedom of contract (i.e., the scope of private power to create binding obligations), formation of contracts (both the procedural mechanics of exchange, and rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract interpretation (what consequences follow when agreements are …
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
Articles
It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …