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Majoritarian Default Rules In Civil Contract Law: Legal Doctrine And Law & Economics [En Español], Daniel A. Monroy

Daniel A Monroy C

Resumen

El presente trabajo posee dos objetivos complementarios: Por un lado (i) basados en una lectura de la doctrina jurídica civilista en general, se evidencia la existencia de un criterio normativo al que debiera responder las reglas predeterminadas (reglas supletivas) en el derecho de contratos. Por otro lado, (ii) se contrasta e enriquece dicho criterio normativo con los aportes que sobre el mismo punto ha efectuado el Análisis Económico del Derecho (AED). Así, la hipótesis del trabajo se expresa en la idea de que, conforme la doctrina jurídica civilista, las reglas predeterminadas debieran ser el reflejo de lo regular, lo …

There Are Penalty Defaults Rules In The Colombian Contract Law [En Español], Daniel A. Monroy

Daniel A Monroy C

In the late 80s, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner proposed a supplementary and controversial theory about how to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. Specifically, the authors coined the concept of "penalty default rule", this is a default rule that fills a gap with a term that the majority of parties wouldn't have wanted. Based on this theoretical background, the aim of this paper is to show that indeed, there are penalty defaults rules in the Colombian contract law. To this end, our the paper (i) proposes a methodology to identify hypothetical fact situations in which penalty defaults should be established, …

Personalizing Default Rules And Disclosure With Big Data, Ariel Porat, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz

Michigan Law Review

This Article provides the first comprehensive account of personalized default rules and personalized disclosure in the law. Under a personalized approach to default rules, individuals are assigned default terms in contracts or wills that are tailored to their own personalities, characteristics, and past behaviors. Similarly, disclosures by firms or the state can be tailored so that only information likely to be relevant to an individual is disclosed and information likely to be irrelevant to her is omitted. The Article explains how the rise of Big Data makes the effective personalization of default rules and disclosure far easier than it would …

Parallel Contract, Aditi Bagchi

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article describes a new model of contract. In parallel contract, one party enters into a series of contracts with many similarly situated individuals on background terms that are presumptively identical. Parallel contracts depart from the classical model of contract in two fundamental ways. First, obligations are not robustly dyadic in that they are neither tailored to the two parties to a given agreement nor understood by those parties by way of communications with each other. Second, obligations are not fixed at a discrete moment of contract. Parallel contracts should be interpreted differently than agreements more consistent with the classic …

Coordinating In The Shadow Of The Law: Two Contextualized Tests Of The Focal Point Theory Of Legal Compliance, Richard H. Mcadams, Janice Nadler

Faculty Working Papers

In situations where people have an incentive to coordinate their behavior, law can provide a framework for understanding and predicting what others are likely to do. According to the focal point theory of expressive law, the law's articulation of a behavior can sometimes create self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur. Existing theories of legal compliance emphasize the effect of sanctions or legitimacy; we argue that, in addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can also influence compliance simply by making one outcome salient. We tested this claim in two experiments where sanctions and legitimacy were held constant. Experiment 1 demonstrated that …

Incomplete Contracts In A Complete Contract World, Scott A. Baker, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment in contractual relationships. All contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not specify the optimal actions for the buyer and seller in every future contingency. This incompleteness can lead to both under and over-investment in resources specifically targeted to the needs of the other contracting party. To solve these investment problems, economists and legal scholars have looked to complicated contractual solutions and the ownership of assets.

This Article offers another solution: contract doctrine. Specifically, we propose a contractual default rule applicable to all contract …

The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell

Faculty Scholarship

This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds.), surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four topic areas that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These areas include freedom of contract (i.e., the scope of private power to create binding obligations), formation of contracts (both the procedural mechanics of exchange, and rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract interpretation (what consequences follow when agreements are …

On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow

Articles

It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …

Contracts – Only With Consent, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

My friend and former colleague Omri Ben-Shahar has established a reputation for providing nuanced and well-grounded applications of economic analysis to important problems of contract law. In recent years, he has undertaken the ambitious task of exploring a significant topic at the boundary of contract law: liability for problems that arise out of efforts to form a contract. The essay to which I reply, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, is his second work on that topic, following his 2001 article with Lucian Bebchuk entitled Precontractual Reliance. Collectively, these pieces provide a comprehensive analysis …

Inertia And Preference In Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power Of Default Rules And Form Terms, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law Review

In The Problem of Social Cost,' the foundational article of the law and economics movement, Ronald Coase suggested that when transaction costs are zero, the initial allocation of a legal entitlement is irrelevant to its eventual ownership. Assuming no transaction costs, the Coase Theorem predicts that if party A values an entitlement more than does party B, A will keep the entitlement if it is initially allocated to him, and he will buy it if it is originally allocated to B. This powerful insight depends on the behavioral assumption that an individual's valuation of entitlements does not depend on ownership; …

...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II and IV, he responds to the criticisms of his consent theory of contract advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and Patterson object to the enterprise in which the author and others are engaging, and he explains why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate over default rules. Finally, in contrast, in Part III the author shows how Steven Burton's theory of default rules, which he finds most congenial, is …

The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of "gap-filling in the absence of consent" by showing how the concept of default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of consent. He accomplishes this by expanding and refining his analysis of a "consent theory of contract." The author proposes that the concept of default rules reveals consent to be operating at two distinct levels of contract theory. First, the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement of any default rules. Second, nested within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent also operates to …

Rational Bargaining Theory And Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, The Duty To Disclose, And Fraud, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The author begins by responding to Coleman's rational choice approach to choosing default rules. In part I, he applies the expanded analysis of contractual consent and default rules that he had recently presented elsewhere to explain how rational bargaining, hypothetical consent, and actual consent figure in the determination of contractual default rules. Whereas Coleman advocates the centrality of rational bargaining analysis to this determination, the author explains why rational bargaining theory's role must be subsidiary to that of consent.

The author then turns his attention to Coleman's appraisal of contracting parties' duty to disclose information concerning the resources that are …